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NOTE ON PUBLIC EDmON 
The Commission of Inquiry into the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, constituted by 
the Honourable Gordon J Samuels AC, QC and Mr Michael H Codd AC, reported to the 
Australian Government on 3 1  March 1995. 
In presenting their 3-volume, 33-chapter Report to Government, the Commissioners 
recommended public release in whole or substantial part of 15 chapters of that Report. 
They described their approach in the following terms 
In preparing our more detailed secret report, we took account of evidence presented to us 
by ASIS and other Government witnesses advocating the potential value of more 
authorised material, without operational sensitivity, being made available publicly about 
the accountability and control arrangements within which ASIS operates. 
We were also conscious of the potential value, in relation to our third term of reference 
dealing with protection of sources and methods, of publishing material which might set 
an appropriate framework for parliamentary (and associated public) debate on these 
matters. Such publication may facilitate consultation between the Government and 
media representatives, if the Government wishes to reinvigorate the D Notice system as 
we recommend 
Accordingly, the chapters we have prepared which bear on these matters have been 
constructed, so far as we have been able to manage, in a way which would facilitate 
public release should the Government wish to do so. 
We have taken the view, also, that the matters meriting wider release are topics of 
principle and structure likely to attract parliamentary and public consideration, rather 
than matters of administrative detail or management practice. 
On those administrative matters and on the individual grievance cases we considered, we 
regard our discussion in the proposed Public Report as appropriate and sufficient for 
public dissemination. 
Finally, we are mindful that material which relates to agencies of other countries and 
which is not on the public record cannot appropriately be released by the Australian 
Government. 
This Public Edition contains the fifteen chapters identified by the Commissioners as 
appropriate for release, edited to delete national security sensitive material. The chapters, 
pages and paragraphs of the full report have been renumbered to the extent necessary to 
achieve presentational continuity. 
While the Commissioners did not recommend release of those chapters considering the 
administrative practices of ASIS, nor those containing detailed consideration of individual 
grievance cases brought by former ASIS officers, some discussion of these matters was 
contained in the 18 page summary Public Report prepared by the Commissioners and 
tabled in the Parliament on 24 April 1995. 
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Preface 
The work of the Inquiry has been much assisted by all those who have provided 
evidence to us, including those who attended hearings as witnesses. 
We owe a considerable debt of gratitude to our Counsel Assisting, Mr 
Christopher Maxwell, our Instructing Solicitor, Mr Brian McMillan, our Inquiry 
Secretary, Ms Barbara Belcher, and to all of the staff in our Inquiry Secretariat, 
for their cheerful, efficient and devoted cooperation. 
The Honourable Gordon J Samuels AC QC Michael H Codd AC 
31 March 1995 
Note: In our Report, we have adopted some presentational conventions. Where an 
organisation is first mentioned in each chapter, we use its title: then we use its initials our 
acronym: and we have preserved a single well-recognised acronym for a single entity, regardless 
of changes of its name over the period with which we deal (so that DFAT could, in context, 
mean the Department of Foreign Affairs or the current Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade). Similarly, we have adopted for ease of reference a consistent rather than a strictly 
verbatim approach to the presentation of material quoted, spelling out in full many internal 
acronyms, and standardising references, particularly to individuals. 
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Public Report 
This is a summary account of the major aspects of the inquiry and of 
the principal recommendations, from which all sensitive material has been 
excluded·. 
The functions of ASIS 
2. In 1977 the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), established by 
executive direction on 13 May 1952, was publicly acknowledged by the 
Government as Australia's foreign intelligence agency. It is responsible for the 
covert foreign intelligence collection of which the Prime Minister spoke in his 
statement of 21 July 1992. Its intelligence collectors are stationed overseas. 
Because of their sensitivity, details of its operations are not revealed. 
3. Secret foreign intelligence is of continuing significance to Australia. It 
represents a valuable element in the advancement of Australia's policies and in 
the protection of its security. It provides vital information in areas such as 
nuclear policy, arms control and defence capacity. The collection of such secret 
material depends on people who often put their lives and liberties at 
considerable risk. It is for that reason that secrecy about operations and the 
people engaged in them is necessary in the national interest. 
4. The disclosure of information about operational matters, whether true, 
partly true or false, can prejudice the effective performance of the collection 
function and thereby threaten Australia's national interests as well as the 
physical safety of the individuals involved. 
The genesis of the Inquiry 
5. During 1993 and early 1994 the media published a number of stories 
about ASIS, disclosing what purported to be details of certain of its operations 
and the locations in which they had been carried out. These articles were 
This summary public report was tabled in the Parliament on 24 April 1995. 
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uniformly critical of ASIS, asserting various examples of operational and 
administrative inefficiency. They substantially reproduced, or were based upon, 
information supplied by two former officers of the Service and the wife of one of 
them. Their general tenor was that ASIS was uncontrolled and unaccountable, 
pursued its own objectives (albeit only incompetently) without any adequate 
external guidance or restraint, and was contemptuous of the needs and well­
being of its own officers. 
6. This series of disclosures by the media culminated in a Four Comers 
program on 21 February 1994. The two former officers and the wife appeared in 
it, with their features lightly obscured to hinder recognition, and they made (in 
some instances repeated) a number of allegations of the kind described above. 
Although information published in the Four Comers program on operational 
matters was skewed towards the false, evidence presented to us of action and 
reaction in other countries satisfies us that the publication was damaging. 
The Inquiry is established 
7. On 23 February 1994, Senator Gareth Evans, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, and as such the Minister responsible for ASIS, announced that the 
Government had decided to set up a judicial inquiry 'into the operations and 
management of A SIS'. Its terms of reference were -
(a) to inquire into the effectiveness and suitability of existing 
arrangements for -
(i) the control and accountability of ASIS; 
(ii) the organisation and management of ASIS; 
(iii) the protection of ASIS intelligence sources and methods; 
(iv) . the resolution of grievances and complaints relating to ASIS; 
and 
(b) to consider whether any changes in existing arrangements are 
required or desirable. 
8. The Minister indicated that it was not proposed that the Inquiry should 
address 'the functional role and priorities of ASIS'. Nevertheless, in the course of 
examining other matters within our terms of reference it has proved necessary to 
consider the Service's professional reputation. 
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The proceedings of the Inquiry 
9. The Inquiry held its initial sitting in public on 2 May 1994. Thereafter 
it has sat in camera. It conducted hearings on 67 days between 2 May and 13 
December 1994 and took evidence from 89 witnesses, alone or in groups. 
Commissioners also visited ASIS establishments and held discussions with staff 
in the course of those visits. Commissioner Samuels held discussions in the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Canada with relevant intelligence and 
security organisations and officials from those countries, and with some 
Australian officials. The Commission has not released any transcript of the 
evidence which it has taken, or any copies of the many exhibits it has admitted, 
save for the edited transcripts of hearings at which media representatives gave 
evidence. These were published on 21 February 1995 in order to promote 
discussion in the media about various aspects of the treatment of sensitive 
information, which we await with the keenest anticipation. We consider that 
there are parts of our full report which should remain secret, but other 
substantial parts which, with some editing, could usefully be published in 
addition to this summary account. We have recommended this course to the 
Government. 
The reasons for the Inquiry 
10. The reasons for establishing the Commission of Inquiry were said (on 
28 February 1994 by the Minister) to be the perception of the Government that 
there was a normative case for periodic root and branch review of secret 
organisations, and a wish, in view of the end of the Cold War and the recent 
expansion of ASIS, to consider the desirability of a legislative charter and the 
adequacy of existing management systems and protection mechanisms. The 
genesis of that wish appears to have fortuitously coincided with the culmination, 
in the Four Comers program, of the staged campaign which the former officers 
had undertaken in order to bring escalating pressure to bear on ASIS to remedy 
their various complaints. 
11 .  I t  is  probably true to say that had it  not been for the disclosures made 
by the former officers to the media (and in particular to Four Comers) the 
inquiry would not have been established. On that assumption the media played 
a prominent role - by publishing what they were told - in procuring the 
investigation which the Commission has conducted. 
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The reasons for the disclosures 
12. Both the former officers who appeared on the Four Comers program 
admitted to us that their disclosure of sensitive information which they ought to 
have kept secret represented a serious breach of the promises of confidentiality 
which they had made to ASIS. But they sought to justify their conduct not only 
as the sole means remaining to them of achieving their individual goals of 
personal vindication and financial compensation, but also of forcing on the 
Government an inquiry into the Service. This, it was said, was necessary to 
expose serious tactical and managerial ineptitude, and to reveal grave 
shortcomings in the direction, control and accountability of ASIS. Finally, it was 
put to us that since the Inquiry had been established and would presumably 
produce beneficial results, their actions had 'redeeming social value'. 
13. We do not think that the 'means and ends' argument, which attempts 
to weigh the detection and correction of supposed error or abuse against serious 
breaches of confidentiality which themselves have produced actual damage, 
constitutes a legitimate calculus. The test we have formulated is that it was 
incumbent upon those former officers who had made public disclosure of 
information which it was their duty to keep secret, to show that they believed on 
reasonable grounds that the disclosure was made in the public interest. To 
rephrase that test in the context of present circumstances, it was necessary for 
them to establish that the disclosure was necessary to provoke the only, or the 
most effective, means of investigating and remedying deficiencies which 
required urgent attention. 
The disclosures examined 
14. The disclosures made by the former officers in the course of their 
campaign fall broadly into two categories. First, they alleged general 
deficiencies and irregularities in the Service's operational methods and activities. 
Secondly, they complained of personal injustice, and of procedural unfairness 
inflicted upon them in consequence of defects in the Service's internal 
management procedures. 
The general allegations 
15. The Four Comers program contained disclosures in both categories; 
with the allegations about operational matters included no doubt for their 
dramatic content and in order to focus attention upon the individual complaints. 
We have investigated them all, together with the assertions made in other media 
xxii 
Public Report ASIS Inquiry 1995 
outlets. To take the Four Comers program as an example, the introduction 
promised stories of 'Australia's disturbing secret involvement in wars, coups and 
political intrigue'. But the level of factual accuracy about operational matters 
was not high - neither here nor in other media reports. Indeed, to paraphrase a 
book review attributed to A E Houseman, 'what was disturbing was not true, 
and what was true was not disturbing'. We have discovered no evidence 
capable of supporting the conclusion that ASIS is operating out of control (the 
'loose,cannon' metaphor is well wide of the mark), or pursuing its own targets 
unrestrained by any government agency, or is unaccountable for the activities it 
undertakes or the funds it expends. 
16. On the contrary its operational management is well structured and its 
tactical decisions are thoroughly considered and, in major instances, subject to 
external approval. Its operational people are skilled and discreet, and the 
product it gathers is well regarded by its customers and professional assessors. 
It does not maintain 'tens of thousands of files' containing dossiers about 
Australian citizens, as alleged in the media. We have absolutely no reason to 
suppose that, again as alleged, in November 1994 it set fire to embarrassing 
records so as to prejudice the work of this inquiry. It does not represent a threat 
to Australian democracy. We have set out in our full report the results and 
methodology of the detailed investigations which the Commission made and 
which, in our view, enable us to express these conclusions. 
17. Hence the inquiry was not required in order to eradicate the more 
dramatic sins which have been urged against the Service, or to rectify urgently a 
continuing series of administrative or tactical faults likely to affect adversely the 
freedom of Australian citizens or Australia's relations with other nations. Our 
detailed examination of the matters covered by our terms of reference has led us 
to conclude that, in a number of respects, the control and accountability, and the 
internal organisation and management, of the Service could and should be 
improved, and we have recommended accordingly. These conclusions and 
recommendations do not represent a response to disorder, but rather, as we see 
it, a prescription for enhancement. 
The individual complaints 
18. We have devoted more time to the examination of the individual 
complaints than to any other single element of our inquiry. This was not only 
because of the history and nature of these matters, and of ·the influence which 
they have had upon the genesis of the Inquiry and upon the attitudes of the 
media, but because they reveal important aspects of ASIS's culture and style of 
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internal management. Our lengthy investigation did not reveal the gamut of 
inefficiency and impropriety which had been alleged. But the complaints did 
demonstrate that there had been significant shortcomings in the Service's 
internal management; and in the methods adopted within the Service to deal 
with allegations of misconduct. 
The complainants 
19. The complaints which we examined in detail were made by four 
former officers and the wife of one of them. We consider that two of the 
complainants failed to make good any grievance against the Service, save of the 
most minor kind, and we need say nothing further about them here. We have 
set out our findings in detail in our full report, as we have done in respect of all 
the complaints. 
The first complainant 
20. This officer, while posted overseas, fell out with a senior Australian 
official: a complete rupture occurred in the relationship between them. The 
officer complained to ASIS in vehement terms that the integrity of ASIS 
operations was being threatened. A joint team of two senior officers went to 
investigate the situation. They recommended that the complainant be 
withdrawn to Australia, and he was. In our view the investigation was 
procedurally flawed and the report unfairly weighted against the complainant. 
We consider, however, that even if the report had been better balanced and 
without procedural flaw, the then Director-General would probably still have 
decided to withdraw his officer, which was an operational choice well open in 
the circumstances. We do not accept the assertions of the complainant that he 
was 'abandoned' by the Service. 
21 . After his return to Australia in the mid 1980s the complainant accepted 
a suggestion by the then Director-General to discuss with ASIS' s Director of 
Psychology his experiences overseas. We think it probable that the then 
Director-General did not intend this to furnish the occasion for the obtaining of a 
psychological report about the complainant without his knowledge. Following 
an interview of some four hours the Director of Psychology, however, supplied 
to the then Director-General a report about the complainant which diagnosed an 
abnormal or dysfunctional psychological condition. The report was never 
provided to the complainant. We are satisfied that the then Director-General had 
determined to terminate the complainant's contract before he read the 
psychological report which therefore had only minimal impact on his decision. 
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22. The complainant's separation from the Service was conducted correctly 
and the then Director-General acted properly in providing him with reasons for 
termination which he was not required to give. However, we think it clear that 
the complainant should have been given a copy of the psychological report, at 
least in discharge of the Service's duty as the complainant's employer to enable 
him to take such steps as he might think necessary in the light of the information 
conveyed to him. We do not know, of course, what response the complainant 
might have made to the report (when he finally saw it he regarded it as 'just 
plain silly'); and we of course express no view as to whether it was or was not an 
accurate indication of the complainant's psychological condition. It is therefore 
impossible to say whether the complainant suffered any detriment by having 
been deprived of it. 
23. In June 1991 he made a complaint about the circumstances in which 
ASIS had withdrawn him, and a claim for compensation, to the Inspector­
General of Intelligence and Security, of whose existence the complainant had 
only just become aware. The Inspector-General holds an independent statutory 
office, first created in February 1987, with power to receive and investigate 
complaints about ASIS and to make a report to Government in respect of them. 
24. By late 1993 that complaint had not been fully dealt with and the 
former officer conveyed his concerns to Senator Knowles, a member of the 
Opposition, who sought information about his case. A briefing was provided by 
the Inspector-General and the Director-General of ASIS, with an officer of DFAT 
and an adviser to Senator Knowles also present. In the course of the briefing 
reference was made to the psychological report. We consider that this use of the 
report, however it occurred and whatever the intended purpose, was highly 
inappropriate. The complainant subsequently became aware of the existence of 
a report. He inferred that material which he had never seen but which asserted 
his psychological instability had been used to discredit his complaints and to 
deflect political support for his cause. 
25. He sought to obtain a copy of the report from the Inspector-General, 
who had no power to provide it to him, and later from the Minister. The report 
was not provided, and he did not in fact see the report until July 1994 in the 
course of this Inquiry. We take a serious view of circumstances in which such a 
report was generated without his knowledge, never shown to him before he left 
the Service, but kept on his file and thus available to the Inspector-General, who 
annexed it to his final report; and then referred to in the course of the briefing of 
Senator Knowles; with the consequences, no doubt, which the complainant had 
apprehended. 
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26. We do not, however, regard the complainant as having been justified 
in disclosing the matters which he revealed, in breach of his promises of secrecy. 
The test is whether he satisfied us that he believed, on reasonable grounds, that 
he was justified in the public interest in disclosing the information. Whatever his 
belief may have been, we do not consider that he had reasonable grounds. 
The second cnmplainant 
27. The second complainant was accompanied by his wife on an overseas 
posting. After their return to Australia in 1990 they were subjected to two 
investigations, conducted by a senior officer of ASIS, into allegations of 
misconduct in his case; and, in hers, of emotional and psychiatric instability, 
based upon little more than unauthenticated gossip. In respect of the first 
investigation the former officer was never told anything of the allegations which 
had been made about him, and the second investigation concerned complaints of 
an indefinite kind which were never adequately particularised. The officer's 
wife was inevitably caught up in the investigations of her husband's conduct, 
and was herself the subject of investigation following the publication of the 
wounding allegations against her, of which she was herself never directly 
informed. In the end, they were not substantiated, and were dismissed by the 
Service as 'unproven or unfounded'. Following the second investigation, 
restrictions were placed by the then Director-General upon the officer's 
eligibility for posting overseas. He appealed successfully to an internal 
Grievance Panel which recommended that the limitations on his professional 
deployment be lifted. However, the Panel expressed the view that in the 
circumstances he had no future in the Service; a conclusion which the Acting 
Director-General rejected, although accepting the Panel's reversal of the results 
of the internal investigation. 
28. We are satisfied that the officer was amply justified in accepting the 
conclusion of the Grievance Panel and in seeking the generous redundancy they 
proposed. However, he was unable to reach agreement with the Service and in 
1991 he appealed to the Inspector-General who in December 1992 ultimately 
recommended a financial settlement which the officer and his wife accepted in 
April 1993. We are satisfied that they entered into the settlement without any 
improper pressure or inducement by the Service, although the wife may have 
been genuinely under the misapprehension that if she had declined to join in the 
settlement agreement some part of the compensation offered to her husband 
would have been withdrawn. 
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29. These events caused both the complainant and his wife considerable 
emotional stress over a prolonged period. The Service's response to the 
allegations made against the wife was deplorable. The Director-General 
expressed the opinion in evidence that in the circumstances the wife was entitled 
to an apology for the stress and hurt caused by the investigation. We consider 
that an apology should be made. 
30. We consider that there was no justification for the complainant's or his 
wife's breach of their various promises of confidentiality by supplying to the 
media, after the settlement, information which they each knew to be confidential 
arid covered by their promises. 
All complainants 
31. We have recommended to the Government that all five complainants 
whose cases we have considered in detail should be able to see our full 
assessment of their complaints and our conclusions concerning them. 
Control and accountability 
32. It is essential that those who wish to understand how the Service 
works should appreciate the manner in which it is controlled and the means by 
which its accountability is ensured. At present the Director-General of ASIS is 
directly responsible to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and is bound by the 
terms of a secret Directive which establishes the nature of the Service's mission 
and the extent, and the limits, of the Director-General's authority. It requires the 
Director-General to seek ministerial approval before the Service can undertake 
certain classes of operational activity. The Director-General himself must 
approve the initiation of tactical schemes for the collection of intelligence. 
Examination by the Commission's staff, and personal scrutiny by the 
Commissioners, satisfies us that these procedures, and the requirement tl1at the 
Minister's or the Director-General's approval, where necessary, be fully 
recorded, have been meticulously observed. 
33. ASIS collects secret intelligence pursuant to the directions of the 
Government. Its targets and priorities are set according to the decisions of an 
interlocking structure of committees, headed by the Security Committee of 
Cabinet (SCOC) over which the Prime Minister presides. It is the responsibility 
of SCOC to set broad intelligence priorities, to approve guidelines for the 
operation of intelligence agencies and to approve significant changes in the 
intelligence effort. Material for this Committee is ordinarily channelled through 
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a supporting body of officials at head of agency level, the Secretaries Committee 
on Intelligence and Security (SCIS). SCIS furnishes general oversight of the 
Australian intelligence community (AIC) and policy guidance on behalf of SCOC 
to the principal departments and agencies involved in intelligence, including 
ASIS. Within the policy guidelines established by SCOC more specialised 
committees determine the broad priorities by which the intelligence collectors, 
both overt and covert, should focus ·their collection efforts. Within that 
framework of priorities established by this central system, ASIS may be tasked 
directly by policy or assessment agencies. 
34. Our terms of reference do not require us to consider ASIS' s 
performance of its operational role or whether it should be expanded, curtailed, 
or, indeed, abolished. Nevertheless, in considering questions of control and 
accountability we have necessarily paid some attention to ASIS's reputation as a 
collector of intelligence, and the extent to which it satisfies the requirements of its 
tasking and assessing agencies. Naturally we appreciate that these opinions, 
which were wholly favourable, are largely those of other members of the AIC. 
But, in these circumstances, and for this purpose, we regard them as dependable. 
The impression we obtained from discussions with intelligence agencies overseas 
was that ASIS was regarded as efficient and reliable. 
35. The most important implication for present purposes of the manner in 
which ASIS is tasked to collect intelligence is that its tasking and its priorities are 
established for ifby others and are not self-selected. This is a powerful rejoinder 
to any arguments that ASIS is free to pursue such intelligence efforts as it 
pleases, without the approval, or even the knowledge, of other agencies or the 
executive government. We do not consider that frolics of this kind would be 
feasible within the present framework and arrangements for the exercise of 
control. We are satisfied that the committees which deal closely with ASIS, and 
on which the Service is itself represented, and which are responsible for tasking 
and setting priorities, operate in a thoroughly professional manner and with a 
proper awareness of their responsibilities. Moreover, ASIS's internal operational 
procedures and the rotation of tasks among its officers, both overseas and in 
Australia, would make it impossible to conceal illicit operational activity. 
Recommendations for enhancement 
Legislation 
36. One of the specific matters which it was contemplated that this Inquiry 
should consider was whether ASIS should be provided with a legislative charter. 
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There are arguments both for and against the provision of a statutory basis. We 
are, however, very firmly of the view that legislation to affirm ASIS's existence 
and to provide authority for its activities is desirable in principle and will be of 
benefit in practice. ASIS carries out important functions in the national interest. 
Its operations are usually sensitive and potentially controversial. It is no longer 
appropriate that the authority for the exercise of these functions should be 
conferred exclusively by the executive arm of government. It is appropriate that, 
in a parliamentary democracy, the existence of an agency such as ASIS should be 
endorsed by the Parliament and the scope and limits of its functions defined by 
legislation. Accordingly, we recommend that legislative authority be furnished 
to the Service, and we have annexed to our report a draft bill which defines the 
functions of ASIS, and which also specifies that in performing its functions it 
\ 
must not 'use force or lethal means; or provide training in the use of force or 
lethal means'. We do not suggest that in its intelligence operations it has ever 
used such methods. 
37. Our recommendation in favour of legislation should not be taken to 
imply that the present arrangements for accountability have failed. All the 
evidence is, as we have already indicated, that ASIS has been carefully managed 
and responsive to the direction of successive governments. We consider, 
however, that the move from executive to legislative authority would add a 
significant new dimension to the accountability framework, bringing with it 
qualities of legitimacy and transparency which the Service needs. The enactment 
of legislation should serve to reassure the public, in a way that statements by the 
Minister or the Director-General cannot do, that the activities of ASIS are 
properly authorised and controlled; and the legislation should help to dispel the 
persistent mythology that the Service is unaccountable and out of control. 
38. The Service itself through the Director-General has expressed the view 
that a statutory basis for ASIS 'would enhance both the sense and the reality of 
its accountability'. We appreciate that one consequence of legislation may be to 
heighten public expectations of complete transparency which, in the nature of 
things, cannot be satisfied. 
A new role for the Inspector-General 
39. We have no reason, as we have said, to conclude that current 
arrangements for control of ASIS are defective. However, we recommend the 
adoption of a system of retrospective auditing of the Service's compliance with 
Australian law and with approved rules and operational procedures. We have 
discussed elsewhere in the Report the type of audit we propose. It should be 
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undertaken by the Inspector-General, will not hamper ASIS in the conduct of its 
operational activities, and will furnish further assurance to the Minister, and to a 
parliamentary committee if our recommendation in the report is accepted, that 
the rules are being followed and the procedures applied. 
A parliamentary commiHee for ASIS 
40. As the Minister pointed out, it does not follow that the acceptance of 
legislation for ASIS entails acceptance of a parliamentary oversight committee. 
Nevertheless, if the Parliament is to approve ASIS's charter by lending it 
statutory authority, the Parliament should also be able to review the manner in 
which that authority is exercised. A parliamentary committee represents one 
way in which that scrutiny might be performed. 
41 . Parliamentary oversight through a special committee is the appropriate 
vehicle for ASIS because of the sensitivity of the issues involved and the 
associated need to ensure the security of information provided. The government 
could not, in practice, share much of the information necessary to accountability 
with the whole Parliament nor could that information be published. Under 
appropriate security arrangements, however, a committee could be provided 
with fuller information. Oversight by a committee would, moreover, be 
consistent with the general approach to public sector accountability in Australia 
and in other parliamentary democracies. 
42. There are, we think, a number of possible models ranging from the 
committee of parliamentarians established by the British Parliament to the Joint 
Statutory Committee for which the ASIO Act provides. That committee is, 
however, unable to initiate its own inquiries. 
43. We prefer the establishment of a standing parliamentary joint 
committee with a broad charter enabling it to review the activities, expenditure 
and administration of ASIS. It would be able to initiate its own inquiries, but not 
into operationally sensitive matters. The committee would exercise its functions 
principally through the medium of hearings in camera. It would have sufficient 
access to information to assure effective oversight, but under secure conditions 
designed to maintain operational integrity, and subject to rules capable of 
preventing the release of information without authority. The membership would 
be comparatively small, appointed by the Parliament on the nomination of the 
Government and with a government majority. 
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44. Our draft bill also provides that the Director-General must regularly 
brief the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives about ASIS. 
A single intelligence and security commiHee 
45. It would be anomalous if ASIS were to be subject to more extensive 
parliamentary review than ASIO. Since both are small organisations with similar 
needs for secrecy, it would seem sensible for a single committee to oversee them 
both. If our preferred model is adopted we recommend that it be in the form of 
a single parliamentary joint committee on intelligence and security to cover both 
these agencies and the Inspector-General. The draft bill has been prepared on 
that basis. 
Organisation and management 
46. The organisation and management culture of ASIS is very much 
determined by its core function - the collection of secret intelligence. This 
function requires particular training, skills and dedication, not only on the part 
of those directly gathering the intelligence but also amongst those who support 
that activity. The Commission has found ASIS members to be both skilled and 
dedicated. 
47. Our recommendations for improvement of organisation and 
management principles and practices within ASIS necessarily are framed against 
an assessment of what we see as present problems or challenges. We do not say, 
however, that we see ASIS as seriously deficient in an overall sense. In fact we 
consider ASIS to be well managed and highly focussed on its core function and 
on achieving success. We believe that the problems which we identify are well 
recognised in the organisation, and particularly by the present Director-General, 
and that efforts to deal with them are under way. 
48. However, the problems and challenges for ASIS in the areas of 
organisation and management derive from the nature of the core function itself, 
and, most particularly, from the need for operational secrecy and for 
thoroughness of control over operational activity. Bearing in mind the context in 
which the members of ASIS work, it is not surprising that there should develop a 
culture which sets great store by faithfulness and stoicism and tends to elevate 
conformity to undue heights and to regard the exercise of authority rather than 
consultation as the managerial norm. 
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49. The Director-General himself maintains a high level of personal contact 
with staff. His door is open to all members and he is available to talk to them to 
a degree that would not normally be found in a public service department. The 
Commission has been impressed by the evidence it has heard of the access staff 
have to him, and by evidence of their feelings of loyalty to and respect for him. 
We commend his example and encourage others within ASIS to follow it. 
50. The nature of ASIS's operational activities inevitably means that 
members of staff are subject to pressures and restrictions, present in Australia 
but more onerous at postings overseas. They are bound to a level of secrecy 
rarely imposed on individuals in other organisations and cannot talk freely 
about their work even to family and friends. All of this entails adjustment or 
restriction of outside activities. 
51. These restrictive conditions of employment have led to the view that 
ASIS owes what was described to us as 'a special duty of care' to its employees. 
We do not accept that the duty of care is special, or is different from the duty of 
care owed by any employer to its employees. However, by reason of the matters 
which we have outlined above, proper discharge of the duty requires special 
consideration and action. It is important, we think, to make this clear, because 
otherwise the assumption of some special duty tends to encourage a culture of 
dependence which is undesirable. 
The need for change 
52. There must be an acceptance within ASIS that staff will disagree with 
management decisions from time to time. Not only is that not disloyal, but it can 
contribute to the diversity of ideas and the general health of the organisation. 
We do not doubt that the Director-General accepts this, just as we accept that 
control of ASIS's operational activity requires, in the end, obedience to direction. 
Again, it is a case of managers not allowing the requirements of intelligence 
collection to dictate attitudes and actions in ordinary dealings with staff. 
53. The Director-General has been forthright in acknowledging the need 
for change and the priority which it must be given. At his first appearance 
before the Commission, he listed as one of the challenges for the future the need 
to 'introduce reform and cultural change in the Service'. At his final appearance, 
he acknowledged the pivotal role which he himself must play in managing the 
process of change. 
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54. He has recognised the need for better delegation, for greater 
transparency in promotion and other procedures, for greater application of the 
principles of industrial democracy, and, in particular, for a more participative 
style of management. But it is necessary, of course, that the Director-General's 
own commitment to change should be embraced also by all of his senior 
managers. 
The resolution of grievances and complaints 
55. The culture of stoicism to which we have already referred has 
inevitably had an adverse and constricting effect upon the availability of proper 
procedures within ASIS for the ventilation and resolution of staff grievances. 
One of ASIS's senior managers, in expressing his belief that the attitudes in the 
Service are now changing, has described the type of attitude which must first be 
rectified in order to enable change to occur: 
The relationship between the loyalty culture and the need for proper grievance 
procedures is evolving. It's evolving in the right direction. At the moment there 
is a justified fear that by lodging a grievance one separates oneself from the 
Service which gives one life and salary. ASIS has to become - ASIS staff have to 
become more sophisticated about that. They have to be able to accommodate 
elements of conflict in their relationship with the management because the 
monolithic arrangement whereby everybody is totally loyal to the Service, and to 
question that loyalty is a disgrace, has resulted in individuals suffering. 
56. That analysis was echoed by one of the complainants who pointed out 
that in a closed organisation, 'in a closed family like that is, you don't make 
waves'. It seems to us from our consideration of the individual complaints and 
our contact, both formal and informal, with members of the Service, that there 
still prevails a notion that dissent, and particularly dissent translated into a 
formal complaint, is equivalent to disloyalty. It is necessary to overcome what 
has appeared to be some uneasiness in addressing internal grievances, and we 
have recommended an approach which better acknowledges that a complaint by 
an officer against the Service is not an act of treachery. 
57. In relation to external review we have suggested that the functions of 
dealing with personal grievances by members or ex-members of the Service and 
complaints against the Service (most often from the public) should be separated. 
The Inspector-General should deal with complaints. Staf� grievances which 
cannot be resolved within the Service should be directed to a division of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which has determinative power. 
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58. We think that an inquisitorial or investigative system is suitable for the 
purpose of examining complaints which may well be in a generalised form and 
which may first require to be formulated in some specific shape. But personal 
grievances by staff or former staff usually present an issue which can ultimately 
be dealt with more effectively by a modified and comparatively informal mode 
of adversarial procedure. 
Protection of sources and methods 
59. We have considered very carefully whether it is appropriate to 
recommend changes in the law in order to provide a proper degree of protection 
against the public disclosure of security sensitive information. It was for the 
purpose of a general and informed discussion upon this topic that we invited a 
number of media editors to attend and express their views, and we are grateful 
to those who did so. We had also extended the invitation to other journalists 
who declined, apparently on the footing - for which there was no basis - that we 
were seeking either to extract from them the sources of the media pieces to which 
we have referred, or to gather evidence to support some new and draconian 
methods of suppressing the publication of information about ASIS. 
60. Our purpose was rather to consider, and in doing so to take the advice 
of those professionally involved in the field, how best a balance could be 
maintained between the public interest in the free transmission of information 
and opinion and the public interest in preserving the national security. We were 
interested also in ascertaining the criteria by which editors determined whether 
or not they would publish matter which clearly was sensitive from the security 
point of view; and, in this connection, to seek the views of media representatives 
about the desirability and feasibility of regenerating the D Notice system, which 
is a voluntary process by which media editors are requested not to publish 
certain sensitive information (for example, material which relates to current 
operations being conducted by ASIS) . 
61. Based on this evidence and the other evidence gathered from 
government sources, we have concluded that there is value in the maintenance of 
a voluntary D Notice system which, however, requires reinvigoration through a 
consultative process between government and media representatives. We have 
also formed views upon the quality and value of civil and criminal remedies 
which the government may wish to apply in protection of sources and methods. 
We have recommended some changes, taking account of the final report of the 
Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law (conducted by the Gibbs Committee). 
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The changes we suggest we perceive as refinements designed to supplement, 
rather than to supplant, a voluntary system. 
62. We generally support the approach of the Gibbs Committee to the 
amendment of the Crimes Act. But we do not agree that proof of damage should 
be dispensed with in every case where information is disclosed by an officer or 
former officer. We recommend that in such cases proof of damage be required 
save where the likelihood of harm is overwhelming e.g. the disclosure of current 
operations. 
63. We support the Committee's recommendation on protection of 
whistleblowers. In addition, we recommend the provision of a defence (to 
disclosure) of public interest. We favour the Gibbs Committee's 
recommendations about secondary disclosure. However, because this provision 
would apply most often to journalists it must be considered in the context of the 
D Notice system. We recommend that the Government should not proceed to 
introduce the proposed offence of secondary disclosure until a restored D Notice 
system has been given a chance to function. 
The public face of ASIS 
64. The public face of ASIS is the face presented in the media. Perhaps 
more accurately it is the face drawn by the media, since a degree of artifice is 
often involved in order to supply by invention the facts which a firm policy of 
secrecy must conceal. 
65. Unfortunately, as the media witnesses who appeared before the 
Commission acknowledged, and as we record in our Report, 'ASIS makes a good 
story primarily because it is shrouded in secrecy'. The fascination which 
journalists apparently feel for secret organisations tends to expel judgment and 
restraint. In March 1994 a mass circulation magazine published a story by one 
Wendi Holland in which she claimed to have been employed by ASIS between 
1969 and 1989 as an assassin. She had, she said, committed more than ten 
murders - with the knife it seems - on orders from ASIS. This lurid fantasy was 
repeated in separate media interviews in June and July 1994. It is entirely 
untrue. Ms Holland was never employed by ASIS, and the Service does not 
engage in the kind of activities she described. 
66. The portrait of ASIS painted in the media is seldom other than 
unflattering. There are several reasons for this. First of all, there are journalists 
who are sceptical about the need for an agency such as ASIS and some are 
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therefore predisposed to denigrate it on principle. Secondly, unfavourable 
media attitudes reflect community values in Australia, where there is a strong 
tradition of dislike of spying and of doing things in a way presumed to be 
underhanded or unfair. Thirdly, it is almost inevitable that there should be 
mutual suspicion and even hostility between the media, which trade in the free 
flow of information and opinion, and a Service which is dedicated to secrecy. 
67. It is necessary, in our opinion, to arrive at some better compromise 
which will enable the media to carry out their mission and will enable ASIS to 
preserve its necessary secrets without an unjustifiable degree of protection from 
comment and criticism. A number of the steps we propose are directed to that 
end including: 
• legislation and parliamentary scrutiny; 
• publication of more information about ASIS and the wider 
intelligence community, and about arrangements for 
accountability and control; 
• an appropriately limited modification of the Government's 
'neither confirm nor deny' policy; 
• more open contact between ASIS and the media, including 
through the appointment to ASIS of a media liaison officer, a step 
which has proved worthwhile in the case of ASIO; 
• a reinvigorated D Notice system. 
The Honourable Gordon J Samuels AC QC 
31 March 1995 
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Introduction 
The functions of ASIS 
1 .1  The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) was established by 
executive direction on 13 May 1952, its role being 'to obtain and distribute secret 
intelligence, and to plan for and conduct such special operations as may be 
required'. 1  
1 .2 ASIS was closely modelled on its United Kingdom counterpart where 
both functions (that is, intelligence collection and covert action) were the 
responsibility of the Secret Intelligence Service. 
1 .3 From the beginning, ASIS had a regional focus. This was reflected in 
reasons put forward in 1950 for its establishment. They included: the 
Communist victories in China; the situation in Indo-China and Malaya; the rise 
of nationalism in Asia; the gradual resurgence of Japan; the deterioration in the 
position of the UK as a world power; and the emergence of Australia as the 
leading Commonwealth power in the Pacific, able to assume increased defence 
responsibility in the region and thus relieve the UK of a portion of her world­
wide burden. 2 
1 .4 With the exception of a covert action function, which was abolished 
following the recommendation of the second Hope Royal Commission (the Royal 
Commission on Australian Intelligence and Security Agencies 1983-84), the 
functions of ASIS have remained essentially unchanged from its establishment 
until today. They embrace the collection and distribution of secret foreign 
1 
2 
Exhibit 1 . 1, paragraph 5. 
Exhibit 20.1 .2, paragraph 2. 
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intelligence, associated counter-intelligence activities, and liaison with similar 
foreign organisations. 3 
1 .5 Since the establishment of the Service, its functions have also been tied 
in the Directive to the requirements of Government. Thus, in the first Directive, 
the Service was directed to 'base its efforts to collect secret intelligence on 
requirements of Government Departments and central intelligence agencies'. 
The present Directive lays down that 'ASIS shall accept the guidance on targets 
and priorities issued from time to time by the Security Committee of Cabinet, or 
under arrangements approved by that Committee' .4 
1 .6  We describe below some notable events in the development of the 
Service. 
The Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security - the first 
Hope Report 
1 .7  The Commission was established on 21 August 1974 and charged with 
making recommendations 'on the intelligence and security services which the 
nation should have available to it'. Mr Justice Hope was invited to consider 
issues of efficiency and effectiveness, including arrangements for co-ordinating 
and evaluating intelligence and its distribution and use, and to review the 
machinery for ministerial and official control.5 
1 . 8  The Government's responses to his reports were announced in 1977. 
First, on 5 May 1977, the Government announced the establishment of new co­
ordinating machinery at both the ministerial and official levels, and the decision 
to establish the Office of National Assessments. On 25 October 1977, the 
Government announced decisions relating to other recommendations, including 
decisions directly affecting ASIS and arising from the Fifth Report This was the 
first official acknowledgment of the existence of ASIS - public acknowledgment 
having been recommended by Mr Justice Hope. The Commissioner had 
recommended 'that the Government accept the continuing need for an 
Australian secret intelligence service and that ASIS be retained to fulfil that role'. 
He reported that ASIS was a 'singularly well-run and well-managed agency' and 
was 'right in concept for Australian circumstances'.6 
Exhibit 1 .8, Attachment B, paragraph 3. 
Exhibit 1 . 1 ,  paragraph 5 (1 952); Exhibit 1 .8, Attachment B, paragraph 13 ( 1985). 
Exhibit 2. 1 .4. 
Exhibit 2 . 1 . 1 , paragraphs 614, 609, 603, 541, respectively. 
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1 .9 The Government affirmed in the October statement that the main 
function of ASIS was to obtain, by such means and subject to such conditions as 
were prescribed by the Government, foreign intelligence for the purpose of 
protecting or promoting Australia or its interests.7 The Government also 
accepted recommendations that ASIS should be made responsible to and placed 
under the control of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that its funding should 
in future be the subject of a one-line appropriation. 
1 .10 The statement declared that ASIS's capacity to serve Australia's 
national interest would continue to depend on full protection of the secrecy of its 
activities; and it indicated that the Government would therefore adhere strictly to 
the practice of refusing to provide details of those activities, and would not enter 
into any discussion about the Service. 
1 . 11  The Commission had described the functions i t  considered appropriate 
for ASIS and had recommended legislation embracing those functions. 8 It had 
also recommended that the Headquarters of ASIS be moved from Melbourne to 
Canberra and co-located with the Department of Foreign Affairs.9 Apart from 
detailed recommendations about matters such as cover and personnel 
management, the other main recommendations bearing on ASIS were to do with 
the new co-ordinating machinery announced in the May 1977 statement. 
The move to Canberra 
1.12 The Headquarters of the Service was relocated to Canberra, and co­
located with the then Department of Foreign Affairs, in March 1984. The move 
brought ASIS closer to its customers and, as subsequent reviews have shown, 
into progressively closer working relationships with them and with the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Thus, the move contributed to the 
closer integration of ASIS into the control and accountability arrangements 
which applied to the Australian intelligence community as a whole. The 
adjustments necessary were considerable, not least because ASIS lost some 50 per 
cent of its staff, mainly on the support side, at the time of the move. 
7 House of Representatives Hansard, 25 October 1977, p.2339. 
Exhibit 2. 1 .1 ,  paragraph 57; Exhibit 2. 1 .2.2, Annex 1 ,  s.6. 
Exhibit 2 . 1 . 1, paragraph 618. 
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The Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence 
Agencies - the second Hope Report 
1 .13 This Commission was established on 17 May 1983 to review Australia's 
security and intelligence agencies, especially as they had operated in the period 
since the first Hope Report, and to assess the implementation of Government 
decisions on that earlier report. The terms of reference included issues of 
efficiency and effectiveness and of accountability and control. 
1 .14 After the Commission had been established, and following the incident 
at the Sheraton Hotel, Melbourne, on 30 November 1983, the Commissioner was 
asked to provide a report on that incident as well. 10 
1 .15 In his report on the events of 30 November, the Commissioner 
recommended that the covert action function previously assigned to ASIS be 
abolished. The Government accepted that recommendation and amended the 
Directive accordingly in December 1985. The Directive revised at that time 
remains in force today. 
1 .16 Other recommendations made by Mr Justice Hope in 1984 and 
accepted by the Government dealt with reporting capabilities and product, 
operations in Australia under the Australian Security Intelligence Organization 
Act, overseas operations, machinery of government, resources management and 
training. 
1 .17 Of the general recommendations accepted by the Government, the one 
with most relevance for and impact on ASIS was the recommendation that an 
office of Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security be established. The 
Inspector-General was to have an oversight role in relation to ASIS, a role which 
is discussed more fully later in this report, and a role in the review of public 
complaints and staff grievances. 
Report on the Australian intelligence community in a changing 
international environment - the Richardson Report 
1 .18 This report was prepared by the Secretaries Committee on Intelligence 
and Security (SCIS) and presented to the Security Committee of Cabinet (SCOC) 
10 It was reported that participants in an ASIS covert action training exercise had broken down a door in 
the hotel with a sledgehammer and had threatened hotel staff with guns. 
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in June 1992.11 It reviewed the roles and relationships of the collection agencies 
as they would be affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
disappearance of the strategic and ideological divide between East and West.l2 
In that context, the report considered the contribution made by ASIS in the past 
and its potential future contribution, and generally offered a favourable 
assessment. 
1 .19 It also came to the conclusion that the overall structure put in place 
after the two Hope Royal Commissions remained appropriate in the 1990s, as did 
the existing roles of the agencies. It indicated, however, that management and 
co-ordination arrangements would need to be adjusted so that they could cope 
with the pressures of a more diverse international environment. 
1 .20 Findings of a general character in the report were accepted by SCOC. 
Intelligence collection in a more complex world - the Hollway 
Report 
1 .21 After considering the Richardson Report, SCOC commissioned a 
further report on shortfalls in Australia's foreign intelligence collection and 
means of addressing them. 
1 .22 The resulting Hollway Report13 was presented to SCOC in December 
1992. The report assessed in some depth the performance of the various 
collection agencies and shortfalls in collection. In general, it rated highly the 
performance of ASIS in undertaking the tasks assigned to it, and, proposed more 
refined tasking arrangements.14 
The present inquiry 
1..23 The intention to establish this Commission of Inquiry was announced 
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans, in 
the Senate on 23 February 1994. The composition of the Commission and its 
terms of reference were announced on 28 February 1994 and Commissioners 
were appointed on 15 March 1994. 
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
14 
The principal author of the report was Mr D Richardson, a senior officer in the Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
Exhibit 2.3. 1 .  
Or the Hollway-Kean Report, its authors being Mr DA Hollway, Deputy Secretary, Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, and Dr D Kean, Deputy Director-General, Office of National Assessments. 
Exhibit 2.4 
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1 .24 The terms of reference, as they appear in the Letters Patent, are to 
inquire into: 
(a) the effectiveness and suitability of existing arrangements for: 
(i) the control and accountability of the Service; 
(ii) the organisation and management of the Service; 
(iii) the protection of the Service's intelligence sources and 
methods; 
(iv) the resolution of grievances and complaints relating to the 
Service; and 
(b) whether any changes in existing arrangements are required or are 
desirable.15 
1 .25 The 'functional role and priorities of ASIS' were considered to have 
been exhaustively addressed by the Government in 1992 and it was not proposed 
that the Inquiry should address those matters.16 
1 .26 The reasons for establishing the Commission of Inquiry were said to be 
a feeling that there is a case for periodic root-and-branch review of secret 
organisations, and a wish, in view of the end of the Cold War and the recent 
expansion of ASIS, to consider the desirability of a legislative charter and the 
adequacy of existing management systems and protection mechanisms.17 
1.27 The Minister's announcement in the Senate followed a series of 
newspaper reports and the broadcast of a Four Comers program on 21 February 
1994 in which allegations were made about activities of ASIS. The Minister's 
statement of 28 February referred to purported revelations by former ASIS 
officers, saying that the Government expected those former officers to make 
known their concerns about the organisation and management of ASIS to the 
Inquiry. In response to subsequent questioning in the Parliament, Senator Evans 
gave assurances that the Commission would be able to consider policy or process 
issues which arose out of particular cases.18 
15 
1 6 
17 
18 
The Letters Patent are reproduced at Appendix A. 
Senate Hansard, 28 February 1994, p. 1087. 
Ibid, p.948. 
Senate Estimates Committee A, Hansard, 18 March 1994, pp.A174-9. 
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1 .28 In his evidence before us, the Minister again acknowledged the link 
between the Inquiry and 'escalating tensions and disclosures' and expressed the 
hope that the Inquiry would be a 'circuit breaker'.19 
1 .29 At the outset of the Inquiry, we published our approach to the terms of 
reference, indicating we would first need to understand: 
(a) what arrangements currently existed in each of the four categories 
of our terms of reference; 
(b) how and where those arrangements were defined or laid down; 
and 
(c) how those arrangements operated or were applied in practice. 
We went on to say: 
In addition to general descriptions of how the arrangements actually operate, the 
Commissioners will need to examine some illustrative examples of the 
application of the arrangements to particular cases. 
It is not the function of this Inquiry to investigate or evaluate the 
functional role or priorities of ASIS as an intelligence agency. Nevertheless, the 
effectiveness and suitability of the existing arrangements will be assessed, in part 
at least, by reference to the objectives and functions of ASIS and the nature and 
purpose of the operations which it conducts. Information of a reasonably 
detailed kind will be required with respect to these topics. 
In deciding whether to recommend any change to existing arrangements, 
the Commissioners will need to identify, in relation to each category of 
arrangements, the various purposes and interests which the arrangements should 
serve. Questions may also arise as to the way in which competing interests 
should be resolved. 
In addition to the national interest and the public interest, as broadly 
defined, consideration would need to be given for this purpose to the interests of 
• national security; 
• ASIS as an organisation; 
• ASIS management; 
• ASIS staff; 
• other government agencies; 
• other governments.20 
1.30 The Commission also announced the procedures which it intended to 
follow in taking evidence. These procedures were formulated with the aims of 
1 9 
20 
T2465. 
Exhibit 2.6.3. 
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encouraging people and parties with an interest to participate and make 
submissions, and of ensuring faimess.21 
1 .31 The Commission held its first hearing, in public, on 2 May 1994. 
Further hearings were held between that date and 13 December 1994. At the first 
hearing Mr Christopher Maxwell announced his appointment as Counsel 
Assisting the Inquiry. Leave to appear was granted to counsel for ASIS, IGIS and 
some former ASIS officers. It had been the intention and wish of the 
Commission to conduct some hearings in public, but in practice the matters 
being considered invariably impinged, at least in part, on areas of national 
security sensitivity and we judged it impractical to conduct public hearings in 
such circumstances. Edited transcripts of hearings at which media 
representatives gave evidence were published on 21 February 1995. 
1 .32 The Commission conducted hearings on 67 days over the period from 
May to December and heard from 89 witnesses. Commissioners also visited ASIS 
establishments in Australia and held discussions with staff in the course of those 
visits. Commissioner Samuels held discussions in the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Canada with relevant intelligence and security organisations 
and officials from those countries, and with some Australian officials and ASIS 
staff stationed overseas. 
1.33 Almost 7,000 pages of transcript were produced from the 
Commission's hearings, and over 2,000 documents went into evidence. 
Extensive submissions were received from the Director-General of ASIS, the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and the individuals whose cases 
the Commission examined in detail. Submissions were also received from many 
Commonwealth departments and agencies and from other organisations and 
individuals, including former ASIS officers, academics, authors, civil rights 
proponents, media representatives and people with general or personal interests 
in various of our terms of reference. 
1 .34 The cases of individual former officers of ASIS and the spouse of one 
took a large part of the Commission's time. Some 40 per cent of hearing time 
was consumed in dealing with those cases. Volume 2 of our report addresses the 
cases in some detail, as well as applying the lessons arising from them to the 
general matters embraced in our terms of reference. 
21 T3-4. 
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1 .35 In addition to this detailed report, parts of which are necessarily secret, 
the Commission has prepared a summary report which it has recommended that 
the Government make public. 
9 
Chapter 2 
The Accountability Fram.ework 
The meaning of accountability 
2.1 The Government has endorsed a definition of accountability that was 
prepared for the Management Advisory Board (MAB) of the Australian Public 
Service by its Management Improvement Advisory Committee (MIAC): 
In the context of the relationship between public servants, secretaries of 
departments and ministers, and ministers and the Parliament, accountability is 
defined as existing where there is a direct authority relationship within which one 
party accounts to a person or body for the performance of tasks or functions 
conferred, or able to be conferred by that person or body.22 
2.2 The MAB/MIAC document begins by noting that accountability is 
'fundamental to good governance in modern, open societies'. It describes 
accountability as 'one of the essential guarantees and underpinnings, not just of 
the kinds of civic freedoms [Australians] enjoy, but of efficient, impartial and 
ethical public administration'.23 Accountability guarantees these things through 
controls which ensure that those who are entrusted with governmental 
responsibilities carry them out efficiently and effectively and that the 
responsibilities assumed at each level within government are appropriate. 
2.3 Control means that an individual or body is 'subject to an institution's 
or person's oversight, direction or request that they provide information on their 
action or justify it before a review authority'.24 The accountability obligations of 
public officials and bodies are met through controls which, according to 
MAB /MIAC, operate at three levels. Public servants are responsible, through a 
22 
23 
24 
MAB/MIAC, Accountability in the Commonwealth Public Sector, June 1993, p. 1 ,  (Exhibit 3.3.5). 
Ibid., p.3. 
Ian Thynne & John Goldring, Accountability and Control: Government Officials and the Exercise of Power, 
Law Book Company, Sydney, 1987, p.8. 
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managerial hierarchy, to the heads of their agencies, heads of agencies are 
responsible to ministers, and ministers are responsible to the Parliament. The 
Parliament itself is accountable to the people through elections. In addition, 
individuals and agencies at each level of government are subject to external 
review bodies such as courts and tribunals and investigative bodies such as the 
Auditor-General and the Ombudsman.25 
2.4 Although they exist at different levels, the controls that make up the 
system of public accountability do not operate in a strictly hierarchical way. 
Lines of responsibility and flows of information and responses are not always 
vertical, and ministers and departmental secretaries obtain information directly 
from officers at various levels in departments and agencies. Independent 
external review, parliamentary control of government and popular control of the 
Parliament are even less hierarchical than the control relationships within 
government. They rely on networks of reporting and responsibility which draw 
information from and provide responses to all levels of the governmental 
structure. 
2.5 Information is central to effective control in accountability 
relationships. Each kind of control depends on the availability of information to 
those by whom it is exercised. An individual or body can be held to account 
only by those who have access to relevant information on performance. 
2.6 The MAB/MIAC statement provides an appropriate framework within 
which to consider the accountability and control of ASIS. Although ASIS is not a 
part of the public service in the sense of being governed by the Public Service 
Act, it is an instrument of the Australian Government, funded from the budget 
and under direct ministerial control. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, the 
Director-General and senior Government officials accepted that the Service 
should be part of the system of public accountability, with appropriate 
modifications to meet security needs.26 
The existing framework 
2.7 The existing system by which ASIS is controlled and is held 
accountable comprises elements which operate within the executive government 
and others which provide external scrutiny. The executive government 
components are the Directive, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Director-
25 
26 
Exhibit 3.3.5, p.25. 
Exhibit 39.1 ,  pp. 1-5, 9-19 ;  Exhibit 20. 1, pp.3-4; Exhibit 25.2, pp.3-18. 
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General and internal controls, the Internal Auditor, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, the Security Committee of Cabinet and the Secretaries 
Committee on Intelligence and Security, the Office of National Assessments (and 
the National Intelligence Collection Requirements Committee and the National 
Intelligence Committee), the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, and 
internal inquiries. External components comprise the Parliament, the 
Opposition, the Auditor-General, and external inquiries. 
2.8 These various elements are described briefly in the next sections of this 
chapter in order to provide an integrated summary - and are then described in 
more detail and assessed in chapters which follow. 
The accountability of ASIS within the executive government 
The Directive 
2.9 The basis for the control and accountability of ASIS within the 
executive government is the Directive, issued to the Director-General by the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs after being endorsed by the Security Committee of 
Cabinet (SCOC). The Directive provides for the existence of the Service and 
establishes many of the arrangements for accountability and administration 
under which it works. It sets out the functions of ASIS, and proscribes one 
former function: training for or carrying out covert action. It requires that ASIS 
obey Australian law, and that its activities conform to the foreign policy of the 
Government of the day. The Directive places the Service under the control of the 
Director-General who, in tum, is made subject to direction by the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. It provides for the Director-General, as authorised by the Prime 
Minister, to brief the Leader of the Opposition. It also contains provisions for the 
employment of staff and the administration and financial control of the Service. 
The Minister for Foreign Mfairs 
2.10 The responsibility assigned by the Directive to the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs makes the Minister the most important element in the control and 
accountability of ASIS. The Minister bears the political responsibility for what 
the Service does. The effectiveness of the control and accountability of ASIS 
depends crucially on the competence of both the Minister and the Director­
General and the trust between them. 
12 
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The Director-General and internal controls 
2.11 The Director-General's control of ASIS involves a high level of 
personal responsibility. ASIS officers are employed under contract with the 
Director-General, and the Directive makes him or her personally responsible to 
the Minister for the individual and collective performance of officers. In 
consequence, the Director-General personally exercises a wide range of 
operational and administrative powers. These include all decisions to engage or 
dismiss staff, and approval of all recruitments, terminations, promotions and 
postings. 
2.12 The internal management of operations, which we examined in detail, 
embraces a web of checks and balances which we found to be extensive, 
thorough and effective. The Director-General is then personally responsible for 
all key operational decisions. 
2.13 The Service's program of overseas postings ensures regular movement 
of staff. The handover of responsibilities from one officer to another guarantees 
periodic review of the reliability and integrity with which each function has been 
carried out. As the Director-General pointed out, a conspiracy, progressively 
expanding over time, would be required to defeat this system.27 
The Internal Auditor 
2.14 The Internal Auditor ca-rries a responsibility going beyond that of 
counterparts in most other government agencies. This is because the ASIS 
internal auditor has been the sole auditor of the exempt accounts relating to ASIS 
operational expenditure, as
_ 
well as carrying the normal responsibilities relating 
to the non-exempt accounts which are also subject to external audit. Assurances 
to the Minister on the exempt accounts thus depend on the Internal Auditor and 
the Director-General. 
The Department of Foreign Mfairs and Trade (DFAT) 
2.15 The line of responsibility from the Director-General to the Minister is 
direct and personal. The current Directive prohibits the interposition of any 
official between the Minister and the Director-General, a prohibition that dates 
from Mr Justice Hope's comments in the report of his first Royal Commission on 
Intelligence and Security on the arrangements that applied for 20 years from 
1958. During that period ASIS had been subordinated to the th�n Department of 
27 Exhibit 20.3, p.l; T3 153. 
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Foreign Affairs although the Department, in practice, accepted no responsibility 
for the exercise of its control of ASIS. 28 
2.16 The Directive retains from that period a provision, subject to any 
direction by the Minister, that the Secretary of DFAT, or a Deputy Secretary 
accompany the Director-General when he or she discusses ASIS policy or 
operations with the Minister. The present practice is that DFAT officers attend 
such meetings only when required by the Minister. We commend this approach. 
The Department now has no controlling role over ASIS in either a managerial or 
operational sense. 
2.17 Although the Directive empowers the Secretary of  DFAT or a Deputy 
Secretary to obtain from ASIS any information that is required, the Department 
does not seek to be privy to the details of the Service's most sensitive work, 
considering that such knowledge risks complicating its own business as well as 
making that of ASIS more difficult.29 Consultative mechanisms in Canberra and 
overseas ensure that ASIS and DFAT are each generally aware of the other's 
activities and concerns and, in normal circumstances, this should be sufficient. 
We consider that the power given to the Secretary of DFAT, to obtain 
information from ASIS is anachronistic and that any such demands by DFAT 
should be at the Minister's initiative. Recommendations later in this report for 
revision to the Directive reflect this view. 
2.18 Both ASIS and DFAT believe that the current consultative regime 
works well.30 It is important that it should, since DFAT is a major source of 
information and advice relevant to many of the decisions that both the Minister 
and the Director-General must make in respect of ASIS. 
SCOC and SCIS 
2.19 The Minister and ASIS are held accountable within the executive 
government through the structure in place for control of the Australian 
intelligence community. At the peak of this structure is the Security Committee 
of Cabinet (SCOC) which normally meets three to five times per year. SCOC 
currently comprises the Prime Minister (Chair), the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
(Deputy Chair), the Ministers for Defence and Finance, the Treasurer and the 
Attorney-General, with the Minister for Trade an alternate member for the 
28 
29 
30 
Exhibit 2.1 .1 ,  paragraphs 3 17, 347-8. 
Exhibit 24. 1, paragraph 7. 
Ibid., paragraph 1 1; Exhibit 20. 1 . 10, p.16; T98-99; T618. 
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Foreign Minister.31 SCOC determines the policies and oversees the performance 
of Australia's security and intelligence agencies, including consideration of their 
budgetary allocations.32 The bu�getary function is supported by an annual 
financial report on the Australian intelligence community from the Department 
of Finance. SCOC is supported by the Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and 
Security (SCIS), which is chaired by the Secretary of PM&C, and comprises heads 
of relevant departments as well as the Directors-General of the Office of National 
Assessments (ONA) and of Security. We examine these arrangements in greater 
detail in Chapter 7. 
The Office of National Assessments 
2.20 General tasking of intelligence collection activities and the assessment 
of intelligence product are carried out by ONA or by committees and processes it 
chairs or directs. One of ONA's assessment responsibilities is to report annually 
on the performance of the intelligence collection agencies, including ASIS. 
2.21 ONA has the lead responsibility for preparing the biennial National 
Foreign Intelligence Assessments Priorities (NFIAP) document. ONA chairs the 
National Intelligence Committee (NIC) which refines the draft NFIAP through 
collective discussion and clears it for consideration by SCIS and SCOC.33 The 
NFIAP, when approved, provides the framework within which more detailed 
collection priorities are defined. NIC also meets monthly for general discussion 
of intelligence tasking and product and provides a forum, primarily for users of 
ONA product, to discuss the Office's work program and the relevance of 
intelligence reports to the needs of users.34 ONA provides the chair for the 
National Intelligence Collection Requirements Committee (NICRC) which refines 
intelligence requirements and highlights current issues in overseas intelligence. 
A longer-term Foreign Intelligence Planning Document (FIPD) is now expected 
to be prepared every three years for consideration by SCOC,35 the first having 
been endorsed by that Committee on 3 November 1994. ASIS representatives 
participate in NIC and NICRC and attend SCIS meetings when required. 
2.22 ONA, the committees it services, and the documents they produce, 
contribute to the general tasking and assessment of ASIS from outside the 
Minister-ASIS-DFAT relationship. This strengthens the extent to which the 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Exhibit 25.2, p.6. 
Exhibit 2.3, Attachment E, p.S. 
Exhibit 2.3, pp.62-69. 
Exhibit 28. 1, p.S. 
Exhibit 2.3; pp.62-69, Exhibit 4.3.6. 1, p.vi; Exhibit 4.4.4. 
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Government, particularly through SCOC and SCIS, is able to assure the 
accountability and control of ASIS. Intelligence reports from ASIS and the 
Service's responses to intelligence tasks assigned to it provide a basis on which 
performance can be measured within the governmental control mechanisms. 
This aspect of procedures is supported by an annual report produced by the 
Director-General which is considered by SCOC and reviewed by ONA in its own 
annual report. Further discussion of the role of ONA appears in Chapters 7 and 
8. 
The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
2.23 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) has 
jurisdiction over the five intelligence and security agencies. IGIS has oversight 
responsibilities in respect of ASIS for the Service's compliance with Australian 
law, compliance with directions or guidelines given by the Minister, the 
propriety of particular activities, staff grievances, and acts or practices referred to 
IGIS by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. There are, 
however, substantial limits on the scope of inquiries under these headings. IGIS 
may not inquire into ASIS of his or her own motion or in response to a complaint 
unless the complainant is an Australian citizen or resident, or the complaint or 
matter of concern involves a possible breach of Australian law. Complaints 
relating to most ASIS staff grievances are reviewable by IGIS only so long as he 
or she considers that internal procedures for redress of grievance are not fair and 
effective. Ministerial approval is required for an inquiry into any matter which 
occurred outside Australia or before 1 February 1987. 
2.24 Most of ASIS's activities take place overseas, have no direct effect on 
Australians and have no potential to breach Australian law. The areas of ASIS's 
activities in which IGIS may initiate own-motion inquiries is therefore small. 
The Government has the power under the IGIS Act to refer a wider range of 
matters to the Inspector-General but no such matters have been referred since 
1987. 
Internal inquiries 
2.25 The Government can also effect review of the role and performance of 
ASIS by commissioning inquiries. Some such inquiries have been initiated for 
internal use by the government, including, recently, the Richardson and Hollway 
reviews described briefly in the introductory chapter, embracing the Australian 
intelligence community as a whole. 
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Conclusion 
2.26 The arrangements for the accountability and control of ASIS within the 
executive Government are thus extensive, and the evidence is that they have 
been exercised effectively in the years since the second Hope Royal Commission. 
However, some refinements are recommended in later chapters of this report, 
where the arrangements are also described in greater detail. 
External accountability 
2.27 The Service has been subject to little direct scrutiny from outside the 
executive government. This can be attributed to the need for operational secrecy 
and the limited scope for ASIS directly to affect the rights of Australians.36 It 
means that the normal instruments of external accountability, direct 
parliamentary scrutiny and oversight by the Auditor-General, do not apply fully 
to ASIS, although they have some application. 
The Parliament 
2.28 For ASIS as for any public sector body, an important mechanism of 
parliamentary oversight is the pressure that can be placed on ministers and 
government as a result of publicity about alleged or actual failures by ASIS. 
Ministers can face severe questioning in Parliament when ASIS failures become 
apparent, as in the Sheraton Hotel incident, or are alleged, as in the lead-up to 
the establishment of this Commission. The Government and ASIS can thus be 
held accountable by the Parliament for failures which come to public attention. 
But not all failures may become known to the parliamentary overseers. 
2.29 Even when they do, a significant limit on parliamentary oversight is 
the policy of successive governments, accepted by successive parliaments, that 
the Government neither confirms nor denies non-official claims about the 
security and intelligence agencies. This means that parliamentary oversight is 
subject to Government control, since the Government can refuse access to 
necessary information. 
2.30 Scrutiny of the budget and other aspects of agency operations by 
parliamentary committees provides another mechanism for oversight of the 
public sector. Little use has been made of this technique in respect of ASIS. The 
Service is funded through a one-line entry in the appropriation bills and budget 
36 Exhibit 25.2, pp. 17- 18. 
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papers which are considered at Senate legislation committee hearings;37 but ASIS 
officers do not attend the hearings. The Minister, who may be questioned on 
ASIS at these hearings, is constrained in the answers he or she may give by 
security considerations and the neither-confirm-nor-deny policy. Other 
parliamentary committees have not examined ASIS's activities or 
administration.38 Overall, there has been little direct parliamentary review of 
ASIS.39 
The Opposition 
2.31 The Directive provides for the Leader of the Opposition to be briefed 
by the Director-General. This process has developed so that briefings are 
normally provided to the Leader of the Opposition or to the Shadow Foreign 
Minister on their request and at the discretion of the Prime Minister. In some 
cases the Leader of the Opposition has also been informed of important 
developments on the initiative of the Government. He was, for example, given a 
copy of the Richardson Report and informed in advance of the Government's 
intention to appoint the current Director-General.40 
The Auditor-General 
2.32 The Auditor-General's financial audits across the public sector, and 
performance audits within the public service, are an important means by which 
Parliament obtains information relevant to the accountability of most 
departments and agencies. In the case of ASIS, however, the Auditor-General 
audits only the non-operational accounts and has never conducted a 
performance audit in any area of its work.41 
External inquiries 
2.33 Governments have from time to time instituted external inquiries with 
their powers and in<:}ependence assured by the Royal Commissions Act 1902. 
Although the full reports of the external inquiries have not been released, public 
knowledge that there have been independent external reviews of ASIS and the 
publication of parts of some of these reports have contributed significantly to the 
public accountability of ASIS. 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Senate legislation committees were, until October 1994, known as Senate estimates committees. 
For a reference to an in-camera briefing given by the Director-General to the Parliamentary Works 
Committee in November 1992, see Exhibit 20. 1 .9, p.5. 
See Chapter 5 for further discussion. 
Exhibit 25.2, p. 15. See Chapter 4 below. 
T32 16. Paragraph 48(d) of the Audit Act gives authority for performance audits. 
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Conclusion 
2.34 The mechanisms for the accountability of ASIS outside the executive 
government are thus more restricted in their coverage than those that apply to 
most public sector agencies. Significantly, however, as with internal 
accountability, there is no evidence that the limited applicability of the normal 
external control mechanisms has resulted in any loss of effective accountability 
or control. 
The present limits to accountability 
2.35 The restrictions on the flow of information necessary to successful 
secret intelligence operations limit the application to ASIS of standard public 
accountability controls. The Service is subject to a range of controls exercised by 
the executive government, but the secrecy imperative has meant that the 
availability of information on the full range of ASIS's activities has been 
restricted even for this internal accountability. Security restrictions fall with 
greater force on external accountability mechanisms. ASIS may be questioned 
and required to justify its actions by review bodies external to the executive, but 
there are restrictions on the range of matters subject to their review and on the 
types of information they may request. The Parliament's access to information 
and its capacity to require justification from ASIS or the Government are even 
more severely limited. Governments have, on occasion, responded to 
parliamentary questioning on ASIS's activities, but they usually decline to do so 
and the Parliament generally has not pressed such requests. 
2.36 An intelligence agency cannot carry out many of its legitimate 
functions, and thus serve the interests of national security, without a high level of 
secrecy about its operations, personnel and techniques. Secrecy in these areas 
often will be necessary also to protect the security of individuals. It is security in 
these two senses which provides the only valid argument for limiting or 
modifying the application to ASIS of the standard system for accountability in 
the public service. It is important to ensure that limits on the flow of 
information, and hence on the accountability and control of ASIS, are no more 
rigorous than is essential to these security interests. 
2.37 Judging what is essential will generally need to be left to the 
intelligence agency (within a framework established by the Government) for 
reasons of practicality and relevant knowledge and expertise. But review 
occasionally of the framework itself and its application will be necessary to an 
effective system of accountability and control. Such review should ensure, 
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amongst other things, that those responsible for the accountability of ASIS at 
every level have access to the necessary information. Restrictions on the flow of 
information should not continue merely through habit, or because ASIS has been 
overlooked in progressive changes to the wider system of public accountability. 
2.38 Much of the contemporary structure of public accountability has 
developed recently and a degree of slowness and caution in its extension to ASIS 
is understandable. A comprehensive system of parliamentary committees was 
first established in the Senate in 1971 but extended to the House of 
Representatives only in 1987. The joint committee which oversees ASIO also 
dates from 1987. Public annual reporting by public service departments and 
agencies became systematic in the late 1970s and was formalised in 1982, while 
the comprehensive system of financial reports to Parliament developed between 
the mid-1970s and the late 1980s. The Commonwealth Ombudsman was 
established in 1976 and efficiency auditing by the Auditor-General began in 
1978. Freedom of Information legislation took effect in 1982. The Parliamentary 
Privileges Act, which declared and codified important aspects of parliamentary 
control, was passed in 1987. 
2.39 Progress was made over the same period in developing special 
external accountability and control mechanisms for the intelligence and security 
agencies. The Security Appeals Tribunal commenced operations in 1980 while 
the office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security was established in 
1987. The existence of ASIS was officially acknowledged in public in 1977 and 
legislative controls on ASIO were strengthened in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Substantial strengthening of controls on ASIS within the executive followed the 
Hope Royal Commissions of 197 4-77 and 1983-84. 
2.40 The external components of this new system of accountability have 
limits on their jurisdiction arising from contemporary judgments about the 
security interests referred to earlier. Thus, the structure of control and 
accountability within which ASIS operates is considerably less extensive than 
that which applies elsewhere in the Australian public sector. It is also 
significantly less extensive than is the case for ASIO. Many of the foreign 
intelligence agencies of other countries now face more comprehensive systems of 
control and accountability than does ASIS. In particular, the comparable 
agencies in the United States and the United Kingdom both have a statutory 
base, and formal relationships with review committees of their legislatures. The 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, which has only domestic security 
functions, has been subject to oversight by an independent statutory committee 
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of privy councillors since 1984 and, more recently, has come under the oversight 
of a parliamentary sub-committee. 
2.41 The general arguments for the reforms to public sector accountability 
in recent years have components both of principle and pragmatism. As a matter 
of principle, agencies which exercise the powers and use the resources which 
Australians give their governments should be accountable to the Australian 
community for their actions. At the pragmatic level, if the controls by which that 
accountability is realised function properly, the agencies can also be expected to 
be more efficient and effective. This is because effective controls should promote 
a greater focus on performance and on linking resource allocation to 
performance. The challenge in giving effect to appropriate controls in the 
intelligence sphere is to devise methods that can realise the benefits of 
accountability without exposing aspects of operations which must be secret if 
they are to be effective. 
2.42 These propositions apply with equal force to the intelligence 
community. The 1993 annual report of ONA acknowledged that the intelligence 
and security agencies should not be overlooked in the reform of structures for 
accountability in the public sector: 
Recent years have seen a strengthening of arrangements for accountability in all 
aspects of government activity. The Australian Intelligence Community cannot 
be immune from that trend, despite - indeed, especially because of - its being 
substantially protected from the public eye by the requirements of security.42 
2.43 Proposals to enhance the accountability of ASIS need not imply that 
there has been any significant failure of accountability in respect of the Service. 
In fact, there is no evidence of such a failure since the Sheraton Hotel incident of 
1983. The Service was not involved in significant public controversy between 
that incident and the recent events which led to this Inquiry. Detailed review by 
the Commission of the contentions by former ASIS officers that led to the 
Inquiry, supplemented by an audit of ASIS files by the Commission's staff, did 
not reveal any significant lapses in accountability. On · the contrary, all the 
evidence was of a carefully managed organisation under tight internal and 
ministerial control. This Inquiry has provided an opportunity for a review of the 
arrangements for control and accountability of ASIS in the context of the relevant 
reforms of recent years in the Australian public sector, and of current practice in 
intelligence communities overseas. The changes proposed in this report are a 
response to that opportunity, not a criticism of the current accountability regime. 
42 Exhibit 4.3.6. 1, p. l .  
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2.44 Any adaptation of the recent reforms so as to improve the 
accountability of ASIS while retaining necessary secrecy must take account of 
ASIS's status as only one component of an intelligence community. It will not 
always be possible or desirable to change the arrangements for its accountability 
and control in isolation. The intelligence and security agencies have common 
interests, deal with common issues and share a special need for secrecy. It is 
sensible thac arrangements for their accountability and control be based on 
common principles and, where practicable, shared mechanisms and practices. 
Some of the recommendations in this report may therefore have implications for 
agencies other than ASIS, and they have been framed, where appropriate, with 
that in mind. 
Reasons for enhancing accountability 
2.45 Although we have found that the system of accountability and control 
of ASIS is extensive and effective, especially within the executive government, it 
is subject to the limits outlined in the preceding section, and we have suggested 
some modifications in later chapters. We see these enhancements as desirable for 
two reasons. First, the accountability and control of the Service rests very 
heavily on the Minister and the Director-General. However competent and 
effective particular ministers and directors-general may be, and however 
professional the relationships between them, the accountability and control of a 
secret organisation with sensitive functions should not depend so much on the 
personal characteristics and capabilities of two individuals and the relationship 
established between them. 
2.46 Secondly, it is desirable that external accountability for ASIS be 
enhanced because the Service exercises significant governmental powers. The 
exercise of these powers ought to be subject as far as possible to the same 
processes of democratic control and authorisation as apply to other aspects of 
government decision making. In the report of the first Hope Royal Commission, 
Mr Justice Hope wrote in words quoted to this Commission by ASIS, that the 
fundamental consideration favouring legislative authority for ASIS is that 
'Parliament is the instrument of democratic control of government in this 
country.'43 We see scope for enhancing the controls which ensure that ASIS's 
actions remain within the bounds authorised by the Parliament, and acceptable 
to the Australian people. 
43 Exhibit 2.1 .2.2, paragraph 10; Exhibit 6.3 .1 ,  paragraph 13. 
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2.47 The mechanisms for the control of ASIS, especially those external to the 
executive, have developed less extensively in recent years than have the 
comparable arrangements for public agencies outside the Australian intelligence 
community. It is opportune to make enhancements directed at reducing this 
imbalance. 
23 
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Legislation 
The Hope view 
3.1 The idea of legislation for ASIS is not new. In the report of the Royal 
Commission on Intelligence and Security in 1977, Mr Justice Hope recommended 
the statutory incorporation of ASIS.44 He saw the principal advantage as being 
the conferral of legitimacy: 
Legislation, by giving the service a proper role assigned to it by Parliament, 
would establish it as part of the family of government. It would thereby 
favourably improve its efficiency and effectiveness, and, by removing a cause of 
unease amongst some of its officers, enhance its morale.45 
He considered that legislation would also make regular the financial transactions 
of ASIS and give its officers desirable security of tenure. 
3.2 In notes he prepared on draft legislation, Mr Justice Hope expanded on 
his reasons for supporting a statutory basis for ASIS: 
The fundamental considerations favouring Parliamentary sanction for ASIS is 
that the Parliament is the instrument of democratic control of government in 
this country. So a statute establishing ASIS is a statute authorizing the Minister to 
act to control the service on behalf of the Parliament itself, speaking for the 
people. And the Minister is responsible to the Parliament, in a general way, for 
ASIS.46 
3.3 Mr Justice Hope acknowledged that any statute which established and 
regulated a secret service 'must to some extent break with recognized legislative 
drafting norms'.47 A statute could not lay down precise rules as to the methods 
44 
45 
46 
47 
Exhibit 2 . 1 . 1 ,  paragraphs 302-8. 
Ibid., paragraph 305. 
Exhibit 2 . 1 .2.2, paragraph 10. 
Ibid., paragraph 2. 
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ASIS should use in conducting secret intelligence operations. Nor could it say 
with particularity how or under what conditions ASIS should operate in 
Australia to collect foreign intelligence, save in compliance with Australian law. 
But his Honour believed that it was worthwhile, nevertheless, to attempt to 
obtain from Parliament 'the maximum authority and control consistent with the 
essential need for secrecy'.48 The recommendation for legislation was not, 
however, taken up by the then Government, and Mr Justice Hope did not renew 
it in his 1984 report. 
Current views 
3.4 The question of legislation for ASIS was widely canvassed in evidence 
and submissions to this Inquiry. ASIS itself argued strongly in favour of 
legislation.49 The Service stressed that legislation was needed to ensure adequate 
protection of ASIS's sources, staff and methods, and of its relations with foreign 
liaisons. 5° The need for such protection had been raised with the Minister before 
this Inquiry was instituted. 51 It was the Service's main objective at the outset and 
is still seen by ASIS as the principal practical benefit of legislation.52 Following 
the Four Comers program in February 1994 and 'a massive . . .  amount of hostile 
media attention', the thinking of the Service moved beyond the initial concern 
about protection of sources to the question of the standing of the Service in the 
community. The Service came to the view that it should look ahead and that, for 
the future standing of the Service, it would be much better if it were put on a 
legislative basis.53 It therefore became an important ASIS objective to regularise 
the position of the Service in the eyes of the community.54 
3.5 The Service considers that changing community expectations of 
intelligence and security services mean that executive direction may no longer be 
an appropriate legal basis for the Service: 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
The present legal basis of the Service may no longer be as appropriate as it once 
was. This, together with the policy of not commenting on allegations about 
ASIS, may lead to concern among members of the public and Parliament that 
ASIS is somehow 'out of control'. Greater transparency in regard to the already 
Ibid., paragraph 9. 
T*958*. 
Exhibit 6.3 . 1 ,  paragraphs 4, 5. 
Exhibit 4.2. 1, paragraph 15; T65. 
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extant oversight and accountability arrangements for ASIS is, in the Service's 
view, easily achieved and would allay what concerns there are in the Parliament, 
government and the wider community. A statutory basis for ASIS would 
enhance both the sense and the reality of its accountability. 55 
The Service recognised that legislation to achieve these ends would involve a 
higher public profile for the Service ge.nerally and perhaps for some of its more 
senior office:s. 56 
3.6 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security also favoured 
legislation for ASIS, along the lines of the ASIO model. In his view, the 
legislation and guidelines governing ASIO: 
(a) specifY clearly what ASIO may and may not do; 
(b) define with some precision and care the roles of the Minister and the 
Director -General; 
(c) provide protection for ASIO staff and ASIO intelligence; and 
(d) cover in greater or lesser depth the various accountability mechanisms. 57 
These elements combined to provide a detailed framework within which ASIO 
officers could perform their duties. This made their task easier, and also 
enhanced public confidence that ASIO was under control and was carrying out 
legitimate functions in an appropriate way.58 
3.7 The Minister for Foreign Affairs was more equivocal. He 
acknowledged that legislation would offer some advantages to ASIS. In 
particular: 
55 
56 
57 
58 
(a) some of the mystery and drive to speculate about ASIS might be 
defused; 
(b) ASIS would be seen to be properly established under Australian 
law; 
(c) a general objective for ASIS could be publicly defined; 
Exhibit 6.3 .1 ,  paragraph 15. 
T46. 
Exhibit 23.1 ,  paragraph 107. See also T195. 
Exhibit 23. 1 ,  paragraph 108. 
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(d) safeguards and guarantees could (perhaps with some difficulty) 
be written into legislation to reduce the possibility that ASIS 
could be misused or misdirected to perform irregular tasks of 
political benefit to a government or of personal benefit to 
individuals; 
(e) additional protection could be provided for staff; and 
(f) the Minister could be authorised to issue warrants, as with ASIO. 
3.8 The disadvantages of legislation for ASIS which the Minister 
nominated were that it would: 
(a) represent a movement away from the 'neither confirm nor deny' 
policy; 
(b) amount to a 'public' declaration that Australia had a foreign 
intelligence service and, accordingly, could complicate Australia's 
foreign relations; 
(c ) need to be so vague and general as to be virtually meaningless, 
and of no satisfaction to those (few) clamouring for it; 
(d) still need to be supplemented with a directive; 
(e) be no substitute for close and effective ministerial control, for 
close working relationships with clients, or for high ethical 
standards set by ASIS management; and 
(f) not be necessary in order to achieve those advantages - such as 
enhanced definition, interchange and mobility of staff and added 
protection for staff - which were sought. 59 
3.9 The Minister said that he did not find any of these arguments against 
legislation 'especially compelling'. He saw the balance of argument as favouring 
a statute and considered that the precedent of the UK legislation (see below) 
would assist the passage of legislation through the Australian Parliament. He 
would anticipate Opposition support.60 The Minister was confident, however, 
that the existing institutional mechanisms required no reinforcement.61 He 
59 
60 
61 
Exhibit 39.1,  answer to question 47. 
T2489-90. 
T2476. 
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remained concerned that legislation might ge�erate expectations of disclosure of 
information and accountability which could never be satisfied.62 
3.10 The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) presented a 
similar list of arguments in favour of and against legislation. Like the Minister, 
the Department considered that, on balance, there seemed to be more advantages 
than disadvantages in the legislative option.63 The Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade indicated a leaning towards legislation but doubted whether it 
would really solve any problems. It thought the legislation would need to be 
quite uninformative about the functions of ASIS, and might have to be so non­
specific as to be useless. There would, however, be value in legislative 
protection for ASIS officers similar to that available to ASIO officers under the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act 1979.64 DFAT saw legislation 
as being unlikely to contribute much in practical terms towards meeting the 
'totally desirable goal' of greater public accountability and greater public 
information, and saw in this the risk of raising excessive expectations.65 
3.11 The submission from the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet referred to the need in considering legislation to balance various 
interests. On the one hand, ASIS should be seen to be accountable and its 
powers should be clearly limited. Legislation might achieve this and so allay 
misconceptions that ASIS was above the law. It might also provide greater 
protection against disclosure of sensitive information and officers' names, thus 
increasing the· security of the Service. On the other hand, the introduction of 
legislation to the Parliament could lead to discussion of specific ASIS activities 
and so might draw attention to sensitive matters. It could also give Parliament 
the opportunity to place too many restrictions on ASIS or seeking a greater role 
for itself in overseeing ASIS activities.66 
3.12 The Department suggested as an alternative to legislation that ASIS's 
role and the limits on its activities be set out in a detailed statement to Parliament 
by the Minister setting out the limits to ASIS's powers. While such a statement 
would not have the same force as legislation, it would be treated seriously as a 
considered statement of Government policy.67 
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3.13 The Attorney-General's Department expressed the view that legislation 
did not appear to be necessary to provide adequate legal authority for ASIS's 
present charter. Advice was given to the first Hope Royal Commission in 1977 
by the then Solicitor-General, Sir Maurice Byers QC, that ASIS was validly 
constituted under sections 61 and 67 of the Constitution.68 There was, moreover, 
an inherent difficulty, the Department argued, in legislating for the performance 
of intelligence-gathering activities. It would not be in Australia's interests to 
seek to confer 'legitimacy' on the precise means by which such activities were to 
be conducted.69 
3.14 According to the Department, legislation could nevertheless: 
(a) set out a basic charter of ASIS's roles and functions with 
appropriate restrictions; 
(b) implement and regulate some form of parliamentary oversight; 
and 
(c) provide express legal regulation of ASIS activities within 
Australia. 
The Department pointed out that reforms could be achieved otherwise than by 
means of comprehensive legislation for ASIS. For example, an Act could be 
introduced to establish a parliamentary oversight committee if such a committee 
were thought desirable, and greater legal protection of official information 
relating to ASIS could be secured, through the implementation of the Gibbs 
Committee's recommendations, in an amended Crimes Act.7° 
3.15 The Federal Opposition has not adopted a formal policy position on 
the question of legislation for ASIS. The former Shadow Foreign Minister, Mr 
Reith, told the Inquiry that 'the general view in the Coalition parties would be 
that we would be favourably disposed . . .  to a proposal for legislation to establish 
the framework for ASIS'.71 
3.16 The Australian Democrats emphasised the importance of the 
accountability of ASIS to Parliament. They saw a parliamentary oversight 
committee as essential to this and considered that 'the only realistic basis' for 
68 
69 
70 
71 
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establishing such a committee would be by statute.72 The Democrats expressed 
no view on the need for a statutory basis for ASIS itself. 
3. 17 The Commission took evidence from senior representatives of several 
major media organisations, principally directed at issues arising under the third 
term of reference (see Chapters 10 to 13 and 15) .  With one exception, these 
witnesses supported the idea of legislation for ASIS, on the grounds that it 
would enhance the actual and perceived legitimacy of ASIS and would make 
ASIS more accountable to Parliament, as had occurred with ASI0.73 There was 
recognition that the specification of functions would necessarily be limited, as 
would the amount of information that could be released to Parliament and the 
public, and that legislation might therefore raise expectations that would not be 
met. Legislation would, nevertheless, be an important step in the right direction. 
One organisation, however, submitted that the difficulties of giving legislative 
authorisation to the activities of ASIS meant that it should remain under 
executive direction.74 
3.18 Separate submissions supporting legislation were received from three 
academics and a civil liberties group.75 Two of these urged that ASIS be banned 
from engaging in activities that would break the laws of other countries.76 A 
fifth submission put the view that it would be difficult to give legislative 
authorisation to the types of activities engaged in by ASIS.77 
Overseas experience 
3.19 ASIS submitted in support of legislation that almost all parliamentary 
democracies have a legislative basis for their intelligence services.78 The 
following comparisons were offered as relevant: 
72 
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77 
78 
(a) UK: the Intelligence Services Act 1994, continuing in existence the 
UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS); 
(b) USA: the National Security Act 1947; establishing the CIA; 
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(c) Canada: the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act 1984, 
establishing CSIS; 
(d) New Zealand: the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 
1969; 
(e) Germany: the foreign intelligence service (BND) is supervised by 
a Parliamentary Control Commission and the Trust Committee of 
the Budget Commission of Parliament, which have extensive 
oversight and control powers; and 
(f) South Africa: the Government proposes to legislate to govern the 
activities of the agency which will replace the National 
Intelligence Service. 
3.20 There are, of course, limitations on the utility of these comparisons. 
Neither Canada nor New Zealand has established a foreign intelligence service 
and different considerations apply to agencies with domestic security 
responsibilities. The political and administrative systems in the United States, 
Germany and South Africa differ from those of Australia in ways that also affect 
any comparison with ASIS. 
3.21 The British example deserves closer consideration in view of the 
similarities between the parliamentary systems of the UK and Australia. 
Although widely known and discussed, the existence of SIS was not publicly 
acknowledged by the British Government until May 1992. At that time, the 
Prime Minister informed the House of Commons that SIS was distinct and 
separate from the Security Service and provided foreign intelligence in 
furtherance of the Government's foreign, defence, security and economic 
policies.79 The Prime Minister undertook to introduce legislation to place SIS on 
a statutory basis. This ultimately took the form of the Intelligence Services Act 
1994. 
3.22 As well as removing uncertainty about the position of SIS under 
European law, the legislation was seen as a means of promoting greater 
accountability. In introducing the Bill, the Foreign Secretary described it as 'the 
next logical step in this policy of greater openness in security and intelligence 
79 Exhibit 5.7. 1.2, column 65. 
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matters, wherever possible'. 80 In the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor 
described the objective of the bill as: 
to ensure that Parliament establishes the framework within which the intelligence 
services must operate. It establishes clearly the arrangements for ministerial 
control and decides where the balance must lie between greater openness and 
continued secrecy. 81 
The Lord Chancellor also thought it 'worth emphasising that both SIS and 
[Government Communications Headquarters] welcome this Bill which they have 
been awaiting for some time'.82 
3.23 The parliamentary debate on the Bill reflected general acceptance 
across the political spectrum of the need for the continued existence of SIS. Much 
emphasis was laid by Government ministers on the benefits to the nation of the 
work of the Secret Intelligence Service, and this was not seriously questioned. 
The ASIO experience 
3.24 The legislation for ASIO provides another relevant comparison. ASIO 
was established in 1949 and operated for some years under a charter issued by 
the Prime Minister, similar to that later issued for ASIS. Legislation in 1956 
continued ASIO in existence and conferred telephone interception powers. In 
the 1970s, following the first Hope Royal Commission, the legislation was 
amended to provide for warrant authorisation for intrusive methods, a public 
annual report, briefings for the Opposition, controls on dissemination of 
information, and the establishment of the Security Appeals Tribunal. In the 
1980s, after the second Hope Royal Commission, additional legislation 
established IGIS, a parliamentary oversight committee, and controls on ASIO's 
investigation of political movements. 83 
3.25 The Director-General of ASIO considers that being under this 
legislative regime is very much to the advantage of the organisation. The 
legislation gives legitimacy to ASIO and an assurance to the public that it is 
legally accountable. Legislation gives: 
80 
81 
82 
83 
Exhibit 5.7. 1 .4, column 154. 
Exhibit 5.7. 1 .3, column 1026. 
Ibid, column 1028. 
Harvey Barnett, 'Legislation-based national security services: Australia', Intelligence and National Security, 
IX.2 (April 1994), pp.287-300. 
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[a] clear indication to members of the public that this is not a freewheeling body 
in government or in society - it is subject to control and accountability, to the 
laws of the land - and that having been established by Act of Parliament it is 
something which the Parliament and therefore, in the end, the public, the people 
if you like, have agreed ought to be set up. Therefore it has a legitimate role to 
play.84 
The Director-General identified other benefits. Being known to be a legal body 
allows ASIO to gain better co-operation from the public when this is required, 
and the ability to counter negative media comment by pointing to the legislative 
limits on ASIO is beneficial for staff morale.85 
3.26 In his first report, Mr Justice Hope cited the ASIO legislation as an 
illustration of the feasibility of operating an intelligence agency secretly but 
under the authority of a statute.86 In his 1984 report, he described the enactment 
of the ASIO Act as one of the reasons for the increase in ASIO's concern for 
compliance with the requirements of the law and of propriety.87 He concluded 
that public and political awareness of ASIO had imposed a greater accountability 
on the organisation. 
The arguments for and against 
3.27 The arguments for and against a legislative basis for ASIS can now be 
summarised. The arguments in favour of legislation are that it would: 
84 
85 
86 
87 
(a) give legislative authority of the type which should exist for the 
activities of all significant, continuing government agencies; 
(b) restrict ASIS activities to functions authorised by the legislature 
and establish appropriate arrangements for accountability, thus 
providing the opportunity to refute the common misconception 
that the Service is a 'loose cannon'; 
(c) confer legitimacy on ASIS in the eyes of the community, and 
reduce the suspicion surrounding its activities; 
(d) provide increased protection for ASIS officers, sources, methods 
and product; 
T2583. 
T2583-4. 
Exhibit 2. 1 . 1, paragraph 303. 
Exhibit 2.2. 1 . 1 ,  paragraphs 2, 3-5. 
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(e) provide stability and continuity for the organisation, with 
consequent improvements to staff morale; 
(f) bring ASIS into line with ASIO and with intelligence services in 
most other parliamentary democracies. 
3.28 The arguments against legislation for ASIS are that: 
(a) it is simply unnecessary or, alternatively, the specific issues 
requiring legislative treatment do not justify comprehensive ASIS 
legislation; 
(b) it would be likely to raise expectations in the community - as to 
accountability and the flow of information - which could not be 
met; 
(c) it could not be framed with sufficient specificity to be of practical 
value without also causing undesirable international 
repercussions; 
(d) it would invite intrusive parliamentary debate on the existence, 
role and function of ASIS; and 
(e) it would represent a significant move away from the 'neither­
confirm-nor-deny' policy which is essential to security. 
3.29 After considering these arguments, we have concluded that legislation 
to continue ASIS in existence and to provide authority for its activities is 
desirable in principle and will be of benefit in practice. ASIS carries out 
important functions in the national interest. Its operations are usually sensitive 
and potentially controversial. It is no longer appropriate that the formal 
conferral of authority for the exercise of these functions should be the exclusive 
province of the executive arm of government. The existence of ASIS should be 
endorsed by Parliament and the scope and limits of its functions defined by 
legislation. International comparisons demonstrate how widely this principle is 
now accepted in parliamentary democracies. 
3.30 ASIS is now the only substantial, continuing agency in the 
Commonwealth public sector not subject either to enabling statute or to general 
statutory control through public service or corporations legislation. Both main 
forms of government organisation - departments of state and statutory bodies -
are governed by extensive legislative controls. Government-owned corporations 
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are subject to the corporations law and to additional requirements for public 
reporting to Parliament. 
3.31 As we have already pointed out,88 our recommendation in favour of 
legislation should not be taken as implying that the present accountability 
arrangements have failed or that ASIS is out of control. All the evidence is that 
ASIS has been carefully managed and responsive to the direction of successive 
governments; arrangements for ASIS within the executive, at least those current 
since the second Hope Report, have been comprehensive and, in our view, 
effective. 
3.32 We consider, however, that the move from executive to legislative 
authority would add a significant new dimension to the accountability 
framework, bringing with it qualities of legitimacy and transparency which the 
Service needs. The enactment of legislation should serve to reassure the public, 
in a way that statements by the Minister or the Director-General cannot do, that 
the activities of ASIS are properly authorised and controlled. By defining key 
elements of the arrangements for control and oversight - involving the Minister, 
the Director-General and, as we shall recommend, the Parliament itself89 - the 
legislation should help to dispel the persistent mythology that ASIS is 
unaccountable and out of control. 
3.33 None of the other arguments for legislation is as compelling. Specific 
legislative requirements, to confer legal protection on ASIS officers, sources and 
methods or to deal with unauthorised disclosures, could be addressed in 
separate measures. But once it is accepted that ASIS should, as a matter of 
principle, operate under the authority of legislation, it is obviously sensible that 
the legislation should deal comprehensively with all such ASIS-related issues. 
3.34 We have not neglected the arguments advanced against legislation. Of 
these, perhaps the most important is the difficulty of satisfying public 
expectations. Care will need to be taken to dispel any public impression that the 
introduction of legislation implies a complete opening up of ASIS to public view. 
Careful preparation and management of its introduction should ensure that the 
Parliament and the public for the most part see even generalised legislation as 
providing advantage. Importantly, we are aware of no suggestion in Britain that 
the generalised statement of the functions of SIS in the Intelligence Services Act 
1994 was seen as discrediting that legislative exercise. The terms in which the 
88 
89 
See paragraph 2.43 above. 
See Chapter 5. 
35 
Legislation ASIS Inquiry 1995 
functions and purposes of ASIS are defined would nevertheless need to be 
formulated in a way which enabled the maximum possible to be said about what 
ASIS can and cannot do. 
3.35 The case for legislation will be strengthened if our recommendation for 
the creation of a parliamentary committee on ASIS is accepted. As was 
recognised when the Joint Committees on ASIO and on the National Crime 
Authority were established, it is desirable that the membership, terms of 
reference, powers and procedures of committees overseeing sensitive areas be 
defined by legislation. 
3.36 It is to be expected that the introduction of legislation on ASIS will 
encourage parliamentary debate about the functions of the Service. In a healthy 
democracy, such debate should be welcomed. If there are misgivings in the 
community about ASIS, then it is proper that they be aired. The likelihood is 
that, as in the debate in the British Parliament, there will be no serious challenge 
to the existence of ASIS. The debate will, on the contrary, provide the 
Government with an opportunity to reaffirm the rationale for the collection of 
foreign intelligence, to define its objectives and to explain the benefits to the 
national interest, both generally and by example. In the British Parliament the 
Foreign Secretary used examples drawn from actual operations to demonstrate 
how SIS served the national interest in the fields of counter-terrorism, counter­
proliferation and the detection of drug trafficking.90 A parliamentary debate 
would also provide a suitable opportunity to dispel some of the misconceptions 
about ASIS and to deny some particular allegations. 
3.37 We referred earlier to the suggestion that parliamentary debate over 
ASIS might draw attention to sensitive matters. A distinction needs to be drawn 
between speculation by parliamentarians about what ASIS might be doing -
which might well occur in a debate about its legislative charter - and disclosure 
of operational information. There is no reason to believe that the introduction of 
legislation would lead to undesirable disclosures, and speculation can be treated 
as such with reference to the statutory definition of functions and, where 
appropriate, to the examples given officially. 
3.38 Application of the neither-confirm-nor-deny policy is not inconsistent 
with legislation, nor would legislation necessarily weaken it. Legislation, as we 
envisage it, would merely confirm in a formal way matters which are, with no 
serious exception, on the public record already. It would remain within the 
90 Exhibit 5.7. 1 .4, columns 155-7. 
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Government's discretion to comment or not, as it chose, on other issues which 
might be raised in parliamentary debate or elsewhere. 
The content of legislation 
3.39 The Fifth Report of the first Hope Royal Commission was accompanied 
by a draft bill to continue ASIS in existence. We have had a new draft bill 
prepared, which draws heavily on the ASIO Act and, to a lesser extent, on the 
Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK) and the Hope draft. It has been prepared for 
the purpose both of clarifying our own thinking and of providing assistance to 
the Government in the event that our recommendation for legislation is accepted. 
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Chapter 4 
Briefing the Opposition 
The current arrangements 
4.1 When ASIS was established in 1952, the prime ministerial charter made 
no provision for Parliament or the public to be informed of its existence or 
activities. If the Opposition was officially made cognisant of ASIS in its early 
years, the arrangements for doing so did not last. Mr Whitlam became Leader of 
the Opposition early in 1967 but did not receive an official briefing on ASIS until 
after the change of government in December 1972, long after he had learned of 
its existence from unofficial - including foreign - sources. 91 
4.2 The Whitlam Government adopted the policy of authorising briefings 
on intelligence matters for the Leader of the Opposition. This policy was 
strongly endorsed by Mr Justice Hope in his 1977 report and has been followed 
by all governments since. The current Directive provides, in the following terms, 
for the Leader of the Opposition to be briefed on matters relating to ASIS: 
The Director-General shall, as authorised by the Prime Minister, provide 
briefings in relation to ASIS to the Leader of the Opposition. The Director­
General shall inform the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
matters covered in those briefings.92 
4.3 In practice, according to the Secretary of the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet/3 the Leader of the Opposition and the Shadow Foreign 
Minister are kept informed of significant developments affecting ASIS. Except in 
some special circumstances, briefings are provided to the Opposition only on 
request and at the discretion of the Prime Minister. Briefings are usually 
91 
92 
93 
Exhibit 2 . 1 .3, paragraph 87; Whitlam, E.G., The Whit/am Govemmen� 1972-1975, Viking, Ringwood, 
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provided by the Director-General, and do not usually address operational 
matters. In some cases the Leader of the Opposition has been informed of 
important developments on the initiative of the Government. This was done as a 
courtesy. There was no legal or other requirement to do so. The Leader of the 
Opposition and the Shadow Foreign Minister have been provided with briefings 
relating to the Inspector-General's investigations of the complaints of some 
former ASIS officers. A briefing was also provided to an Opposition senator 
who had raised the complainants' cases in Parliament. 
4.4 These arrangements, which are dependent on the Prime Minister's 
discretion, may be contrasted with the statutory requirement for briefings by 
ASIO, imposed by s.21 of the ASIO Act. That Act also provides (s.94) for the 
Leader of the Opposition to receive a copy of the full, classified version of the 
ASIO annual report, at the same time obliging the Leader to keep the classified 
sections of the report secret. 
The case for formal briefings 
4.5 The Director-General considers that his responsibility for briefing the 
Opposition should be more clearly defined.94 He would prefer to see ASIS on the 
same basis as ASIO, with a set schedule of meetings to brief nominated members 
of the Opposition.95 Formalising the ASIS briefing process would remove any 
uncertainty as to how the Director-General should conduct himself to avoid 
allegations of political partisanship.96 
4.6 In the Minister's view, 'provided that the principle of bipartisanship in 
matters of intelligence and security is both honoured and served,' there would be 
advantages in twice-yearly briefings on the ASIO model. Such briefings should 
focus on the Service's major intelligence-gathering objectives and related 
geographical deployments.97 
4.7 The Hon. Andrew Peacock (himself a former Foreign Minister) advised 
the Inquiry that, when he became Shadow Minister in March 1993, he was 
surprised to find that no process existed for regular briefing of the Opposition. 
Eight months had elapsed before ASIS briefed the then Opposition Leader and 
himself. He also suggested that the Commission consider whether such 
94 
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Exhibit 20. 1, pp.9- 10. 
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arrangements should be put on a more regular footing.98 His successor, Mr Peter 
Reith, proposed that briefings should take place every six months, with 
additional briefings following requests in writing to the Minister. Mr Reith 
argued that the Leader of the Opposition, the Shadow Foreign Minister and, 
perhaps, the Shadow Defence Minister should have a reasonable understanding 
of the operations of ASIS. 99 
4.8 In our view, the Opposition should have assured access to briefings by 
ASIS. Three considerations are relevant. First, the obligation on the Service to 
explain itself to senior members of Parliament who are not part of the 
Government is a form of parliamentary accountability. Although this must take 
place under conditions of secrecy, it provides some assurance to the Parliament 
and the public that such accountability exists. A second reason for a right of 
Opposition access to briefings is the importance of bipartisanship on issues of 
national security. Significant national security issues are involved in ASIS's 
activities and the need for secrecy is obvious. The briefing process, while not 
necessarily achieving a uniformity of view, helps promote a bipartisan approach. 
This in turn can be expected to reassure the foreign governments with which 
Australia has liaison arrangements and so to enhance the value of those 
arrangements. Thirdly, the briefing process is a means by which the alternative 
government can maintain a familiarity with this agency of government in the 
same way as, under well-established convention, it is kept informed of the 
activities of other public sector agencies. 
4.9 We recommend that a system be established under which the 
Opposition Leader and relevant Shadow Ministers are briefed on ASIS by the 
Director-General regularly and as of right. Briefings on the policy, 
administration, budgets or the performance - in general terms - of ASIS should 
not require the prior approval of the Prime Minister or the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. The prior approval of the Minister should, however, be obtained before 
operational matters are dealt with in a briefing. 
4.10 Briefings should be arranged at least every six months. The 
Opposition should also have a right to briefings outside the normal schedule, on 
request in writing to the Minister. A provision establishing the right of the 
Opposition Leader to briefings on ASIS is included in the proposed draft bill. 
98 
99 
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4.11  The draft bill also provides for the Leader of the Opposition to be 
given the full annual report of ASIS, subject to a duty to keep its contents 
secret.l00 This corresponds with the position under the ASIO Act.l01 An 
alternative, favoured by the Minister, would be for the Leader to be provided 
with the section of Part 2 of the ONA Annual Report dealing with ASIS, to be 
supplemented as necessary by oral briefings.102 As a further alternative, an 
edited version of the ASIS annual report could be provided with operational 
detail removed, supplemented in the same way. The full access for which the 
draft bill provides is consistent with the views we have expressed regarding 
briefings, and there is nothing in the ASIO experience to suggest that such access 
will give rise to security concerns. 
4.12 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) has 
participated in briefing of the Opposition on particular matters, with ministerial 
approval.l03 This practice seems to us to be valuable and consistent with 
practices followed in other government agencies. We recommend that the 
Opposition should have a right to be briefed by IGIS, on request in writing to the 
Minister. Any briefing by IGIS should be subject to the same constraints on 
reference to ASIS operational matters as would apply to a briefing by ASIS. 
4.13 There may be occasions on which it would be appropriate for members 
of Parliament, other than the Opposition Leader or a shadow minister, to be 
briefed on matters concerning ASIS. Specific ministerial approval should be 
required for any such briefing. 
100 Similar provisions should be included in a stand-alone directive, if legislation were not proceeded with. 
101 s.94(2). 
102 Exhibit 39. 1, answer to question 36 
103 T2855-6. 
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ParliaDlentary Scrutiny 
Accountability and responsible government 
5.1 The concept of ministerial responsibility, which is entrenched in the 
Australian parliamentary system, creates relationships of accountability between 
the Parliament, ministers and officials. The general principles underlying these 
relationships are set out in the MAB/MIAC paper on accountability and may be 
summarised as follows: 
(a) Ministers are accountable to the Parliament for the overall 
administration of their portfolios, in terms both of policy and of 
management; 
(b) the duty of the public servant is to assist ministers to fulfil their 
obligation to be accountable by providing full and accurate 
information to the Parliament about the factual and technical 
background to policies and their administration; 
(c) heads of agencies and their staff are accountable to the Parliament 
through their ministers, according to long-established convention. 
For example, a head of agency's annual report, detailing among 
other things administrative efficiency, is addressed to the minister 
who, in turn, presents the report to the Parliament.104 
5.2 The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans, 
accepted in his evidence that the arguments, both principled and pragmatic, for 
greater accountability to the Parliament entail that creative efforts be made to 
maximise that accountability while protecting what needs to remain secret. He 
accepted that he should be accountable to the Parliament for ASIS to the 
104 Exhibit 3.3.5, pp.6, 14; see also T1575-6. 
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maximum extent possible consistent with the requirements of operational 
security.105 The then Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Peter Reith, and 
the Australian Democrats in a written submission, advocated strengthening 
parliamentary accountability for ASIS. Mr Reith identified four areas in which 
arrangements for accountability could be improved, including the establishment 
of a parliamentary oversight committee.106 The Democrats cited a general trend 
towards greater accountability in government and advocated the establishment 
of one parliamentary committee to oversee the whole intelligence community.107 
5.3 The Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Dr 
Michael Keating, agreed that accountability to the Parliament should be 
maximised, consistent with security.l08 The Secretary of the Department of 
Finance, Mr Stephen Sedgwick, expressed similar views.109 Both accepted that 
the general principles of parliamentary accountability should apply to ASIS 
except to the extent that a case for exemption was made out. 
5.4 Witnesses generally acknowledged that advantages flow from effective 
arrangements for accountability to Parliament. Mr Sedgwick, for example, 
described as one of the 'very useful' outcomes of public sector reform in recent 
years: 
the discipline that's imposed on organisations when they are required to write 
down what they do and the test by which they can be judged in that activity. 
Specifying what your objectives are and being able to defend them to somebody 
else is a useful device for clarifying thought and, in the course of that, improving 
organisational effectiveness, because you get greater clarity within the 
organisation of what it's about and what it's not. 1 10 
Relating this to ASIS, he saw improvements to parliamentary accountability as 
potentially: 
105 
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1 10 
1 1 1  
useful in requiring organisations and executive government to be clearer about 
what the role is of ASIS and how it goes about its business, in very broad terms, 
which can simply help the management of this organisation. I don't believe that 
ASIS will be any different to any other organisation [or] that the executive 
government would find scrutiny any less valuable in this case than it does with 
any other part of the public administration. 1 1 1  
T2494-5. 
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5.5 The main difficulty in achieving fully the advantages of parliamentary 
accountability for ASIS, as witnesses also generally agreed, is the necessity to 
preserve a high level of secrecy about the activities of the Service. Over the 
course of ASIS's existence, there has been a gradual increase in the amount of 
information provided to the Parliament. But the requirements of secrecy apply 
especially to operational information and, so long as that is accepted as 
necessary, the nature and value of parliamentary scrutiny of ASIS will be more 
limited than for organisations where secrecy cannot be justified. 
Secrecy and ministerial responsibility 
5.6 The traditional vehicles through which ministers meet their obligations 
of accountability to the Parliament include parliamentary questions and debates 
and the provision of detailed information in the context of budget estimates. 
These mechanisms draw support from the tabling in the Parliament of reports of 
independent review bodies external to the agency under review. 
5.7 In theory, a minister has been accountable to the Parliament for ASIS at 
all times since its establishment. Until the late 1970s, however, this was 
meaningless in practice because of the absence of authoritative information on 
the Service and a government policy (accepted by the Parliament) of refusing to 
comment on matters relating to intelligence and security. The public 
acknowledgment of ASIS in 1977, and the regularisation of its budget 
appropriations in the 1978-79 financial year, increased the scope for 
parliamentary questioning of governments on matters connected with ASIS. 
Briefing of the Opposition on ASIS112 and reports to the Parliament by the 
Auditor-General since 1978 and annual reports by the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security (IGIS) since 1987 have also enhanced the accountability 
of the Service to the Parliament. 
5.8 The Minister acknowledged, however, that his accountability to the 
Parliament for ASIS was, by ordinary public sector standards, very attenuated.113 
He maintained that opportunities for accountability would arise: 
when things go overtly wrong - as with the Sheraton affair - and Ministerial 
responses will be tested accordingly. In any event, Ministerial survival has always 
depended in practice more on satisfactory accountability to one's Prime Minister 
(and to a lesser extent, Party colleagues) than to the Parliament: that mechanism 
1 12 See Chapter 4. 
1 13 Exhibit 39.1 ,  answer to question 37; T2494. 
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will be applicable whatever the degree of secrecy maintained in public on 
security-sensitive matters. 1 14 
5.9 The comments on the Sheraton incident by Mr Bill Hayden, when he 
was Minister for Foreign Affairs, like the responses by Senator Evans to the 
media reports that helped to precipitate the present inquiry, departed to some 
extent from the neither-confirm-nor-deny policy. There have been a few other 
such d�partures,115 but in general the policy has greatly reduced the scope for 
direct parliamentary scrutiny. This is true both of parliamentary questions and 
of the kind of scrutiny which might be based on reports of investigations by IGIS 
and the Auditor-General. ASIS also remains outside the coverage of other 
external review bodies such as the Ombudsman, the Privacy Commissioner, and 
the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, which collectively were 
described in the MAB/MIAC paper as 'an integral and vitally important part of 
the modern accountability process'.116 
Overseas comparisons 
The United States 
5.10 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) answers to permanent select 
committees and to separate appropriation committees of each House of 
Congress. 117 It is subject to the Intelligence Oversight Act 1980 and to 
accountability provisions in its own Act (the National Security Act 1947). 
Members of the select committees, which have wide powers of oversight and 
review, are appointed by the presiding officers of the respective Houses, subject 
to maximum terms of membership of six years for the House Committee and 
eight years for the Senate· Committee. Each committee is given access, under 
secure conditions, to extensive information on intelligence activities. A function 
of the select committees is to authorise the CIA's annual budget, separately from 
the work of the appropriations committees. In this lengthy process, the CIA is 
1 14 Exhibit 39.1 ,  answer to question 37. 
1 15 The then Prime Minister, Mr Malcolm Fraser, responded in 1981  to Opposition questioning on reports 
that a UKSIS officer who had been associated with the establishment of ASIS had been a Soviet agent, by 
saying that the allegations had been known to Commissioner Hope and they had 'no present significance 
for Australia' (House of Representatives Hansard, 3 1.3.81, p. 1086). In November 1983, Senator Evans 
responded to public comments by the Hon. Clyde Cameron, telling the Senate that no Australian 
intelligence agency was involved in any activity whatever in Chile at or around the time of the coup 
against President Allende, and that any intelligence cooperation that may have occurred at an earlier time 
did not involve assisting any other country in operations or activity directed against the Allende 
Government (Senate Hansard, 29. 1 1.83, p.2902). 
1 16 Exhibit 3.3.5, p.9. 
1 17 Except where otherwise noted, this section is based on Exhibit 6.3.1, Attachment C. 
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required to provide detailed justification of its budget to each committee. This 
power over the CIA's budget greatly strengthens the capacity of the committees 
to oversee the Agency. 
5.11 There is no formal limit to the information which the committees can 
request. In practice, limits to access have been negotiated between them and the 
Agency. The committees are told in general terms about the methods used, the 
types of operations conducted and the sources which the Agency has. Particular 
sources and methods are not identified except in exceptional circumstances, 
when the information will be confined, for example, to a senior staff member and 
the chair and ranking minority member of the committee. The General Counsel 
to the Senate Select Committee said he had not, in eight years working for the 
committee, encountered an information problem which he could not negotiate 
satisfactorily with the CIA. 
5.12 During his visit to the US, Commissioner Samuels discussed the 
system of congressional oversight with senior officers of the CIA, the National 
Security Council and the select committees. Apart from concerns about the 
significant administrative burdens which the system imposes on the Agency, the 
comments, both from within and outside the CIA, were overwhelmingly 
positive. For example: 
(a) there is a strong message of accountability which is reinforced by 
congressional oversight; 
(b) oversight helps the Agency to do its job better. Having to account 
to congressional committees concentrates the minds of managers 
in the Agency, who pay more attention to detail as a result; 
(c) Congress is the advocate for the intelligence agencies, which do 
not �ave any other constituency. Congress legitimises the 
intelligence budget and is a layer of support and protection for 
the agencies; 
(d) it is appropriate, and beneficial, for the Agency to have to justify 
what it is doing. The Agency can learn things from the members 
of the committees, who often have good questions to ask; 
(e) the committees have a very good record of not leaking, with the 
result that the intelligence community has become progressively 
more trusting of them. 
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5.13 Most Directors of Central Intelligence in recent years have accepted 
that there are benefits in the system of congressional oversight. Admiral Turner, 
who was Director of Central Intelligence when much of the present oversight 
machinery was established, wrote in 1985: 
If we want to have good intelligence over the long run, our only option is to 
make oversight work. The congressional committees on intelligence are in the 
best position to oversee, responsibly and adequately, what the intelligence 
agencies are doing.1 18 
Mr William Colby, a career CIA officer who headed the Agency during 
contentious congressional and executive investigations before Admiral Turner's 
appointment, expressed similar conclusions in his memoirs: 
These committees, with the clear responsibility for reviewing intelligence 
activities, can replace previous congressional 'oversight' (in both senses of the 
word) with the kind of congressional consultation and responsibility in 
American decisions about intelligence operations called for by the 
Constitution.1 19 
5.14 A more recent incumbent, Mr Robert Gates (1991-1993), who had also 
been a career CIA officer, commented in 1993: 
Over the past 16 years, CIA accountability and legislative oversight have grown 
enormously. With this oversight, CIA and the other intelligence agencies have 
become the most scrutinised intelligence services in the world . . . And, yet, I 
believe, under these circumstances we not only remain .effective and capable, we 
enjoy a legitimacy and an acknowledged role in our government not shared by 
any foreign intelligence service.120 
5.15 We emphasise,_ however, that the scrutiny undertaken by these 
committees is compelled by budgetary considerations. The main positive effect 
upon the CIA is to shape its skills in presenting a persuasive program. The 
committees' oversight role does not appear to have imposed restraints, in every 
case, upon the CIA's less successful initiatives. 
1 18 Turner, Stansfield, Secrer; and Democrar;: The CIA in Transition, Houghton Miffiin, Boston, 1985, pp.270-
1 .  
1 19 Colby, William, and Forbath, Peter, Honourable Men: My Lift in the CIA, Hutchinson, London, 1978, 
p.458. 
120 Gates, Robert M., Speech to World Affairs Council of Boston, 15. 1 .93, Boston, Appendix 10 to Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Activities: 
The U.S. Experience, October 1994. 
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The United Kingdom 
5.16 Section 10 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 establishes the 
Intelligence and Security Committee. Its function is to examine the expenditure, 
administration and policy of the Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service and 
Government Communications Headquarters. The Committee is to consist of 
nine members of Parliament, none of them ministers, who are to be appointed by 
the Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of the Opposition. 
Information sought by the Committee can be withheld because it is sensitive 
information, that is, information which might lead to the identification of 
sources, other assistance or operational methods, information about particular 
operations, or information supplied by another government where that 
Government does not consent to its disclosure. Information may also be 
withheld where the Minister has determined that it should not be disclosed, but 
the Minister may not make such a determination on the grounds of national 
security alone. Sensitive information may be disclosed to the Committee if the 
Government considers it safe to do so. 
5 .17 This Committee has several distinctive features. First, it will be a 
committee of parliamentarians, not a parliamentary committee, since the 
members will be appointed by the Prime Minister rather than elected by 
Parliament. Secondly, the Committee will report to the Prime Minister rather 
than to Parliament, although the Prime Minister is required to table at least an 
edited version of a report by the Committee. Thirdly, the Committee will be 
staffed from the Cabinet Office, by a member of the staff of the Intelligence Co­
ordinator, and not by staff appointed by the Committee as would ordinarily be 
the case. These arrangements are intended, respectively, to ensure high-calibre 
membership of the Committee and to maximise the level of security for 
information provided to the Committee. 
Canada 
5.18 In Canada, there is no foreign intelligence collection agency. The 
domestic security service is subject to extensive arrangements for accountability 
to the Parliament. The legislation which establishes and regulates the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) provides for a permanent Security 
Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) with oversight functions. SIRC reports 
annually to the Parliament. Its members must be Privy Councillors, an office 
usually, but not exclusively, reserved for former Cabinet Ministers. In recent 
times the members of SIRC have been respected citizens who have been created 
Privy Councillors for the purpose. 
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5.19 The Parliamentary Committee which reviewed the operation of the 
CSIS Act after five years, as required by the Act, recommended the establishment 
of a parliamentary committee to oversee CSIS. In response to the failure of the 
then Government to implement that recommendation, Parliament resolved to 
create a Sub-Committee of its own Justice Committee, as the sub-committee on 
National Security. This is not a standing committee and has to be mandated 
afresh by each Parliament. The Committee's mandate, as defined by resolution 
of the Justice Committee, is to review and consider the management and 
operations of CSIS and SIRC, including by reference to reports to Parliament by 
the two bodies and statements to Parliament by the Minister in charge of CSIS. 
5.20 During his visit to Ottawa, Commissioner Samuels met with the 
Chairman and members of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee on National 
Security. There being no legislative framework, the Sub-Committee is defining 
its own functions and powers progressively. The Sub-Committee will rely on the 
prerogatives of the Parliament to require individuals to appear or produce 
documents. An important issue to be negotiated is the relationship between the 
functions of the Sub-Committee and those of SIRC. Sub-Committee members 
emphasised that the public nature of what it does and its accountability to the 
electorate put it in a different position from the other elements in the 
accountability framework. At the same time, the Chairman made it clear that he 
did not see it as workable for the Sub-Committee to get into an adversarial 
relationship either with CSIS or with SIRC. 
The ASIO commiHee 
5.21 Although the arrangements under which ASIO was inaugurated were 
similar to those still applying to ASIS, they have been changed to bring the 
Organization closer to the standard system of accountability for public agencies. 
The prime ministerial charter under which ASIS was established in 1952 
followed closely the wording of a similar document which had earlier 
established ASIO. That Organization, however, was brought under legislation in 
1956 and progressive changes to the legislation, including a new Act in 1979, 
have created an extensive public accountability structure for ASIO. The ASIO 
Act now specifies ASIO's functions and precludes it from some activities. It also 
establishes a standing parliamentary joint committee which may review aspects 
of the activities of ASIO on a reference from the Attorney-General or either 
House of Parliament. 
5.22 The Committee is precluded from reviewing any matter related to 
ASIO's obtaining or communicating foreign intelligence, any aspect of ASIO's 
activities not affecting a person who is an Australian or permanent resident, and 
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any matter which is operationally sensitive. Nor can the Committee originate an 
inquiry into individual complaints about ASIO activities. The Minister may 'for 
reasons relevant to security' issue a conclusive certificate, preventing the 
Committee from receiving evidence. The Committee's members are appointed 
by each House of Parliament on the nomination of the Government. The 
Government's nominations must be made after consultation with the leaders of 
recognised parties in the Parliament and taking into account the representation 
of parties in the Parliament. 
5.23 The Committee is not permitted to disclose in a report to the 
Parliament the identity of an ASIO officer (other than the Director-General), an 
employee or an agent. It is also not to disclose classified information, 
operationally sensitive information, or information the public disclosure of 
which would be likely to prejudice the operations of ASIO. Before tabling any 
report, it must seek the Attorney-General's opinion on whether the report 
discloses any information of these kinds. 
5.24 In its seven years of operation, the Committee has reported on two 
inquiries and begun a third. Each inquiry was initiated with the approval and 
support of the Government. Some evidence emphasised the limits to the 
Committee's effectiveness.121 
A parliamentary commiHee for ASIS 
5.25 The views of ASIS about parliamentary oversight developed as this 
inquiry progressed. The Director-General's initial statement asserted that the 
existing arrangements for control and accountability of the Service were 
'extensive, effective and adequate', and sufficiently formalised to ensure proper 
accountability.122 Nevertheless, the Director-General accepted that a form of 
parliamentary review was 'a necessary part of the legislative basis which the 
Service favours',123 and would potentially be of benefit to the Service: 
Members of Parliament have not always approved of the Service, and that may to 
some extent be an attitude fostered by the absence of any formal accounting 
procedures to Parliament . . . A more positive attitude by . . . parliamentarians 
would assist the Service in its duties, and would assist morale of its officers. 124 
121 1'*967*. 
122 Exhibit 20. 1, para 6.2; Exhibit 20. 1 .9, para 49. 
123 Exhibit 20.1 .9, paragraph 49 
124 Exhibit 20. 1, paragraph 10.3-4. 
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5.26 In a later submission on legislative options, the Service proposed that 
any statute establishing and regulating ASIS should provide for a parliamentary 
committee. ASIS envisaged a committee which would review the performance 
of the Service's duties and functions and would complement the role currently 
held by IGIS.125 It argued that the objective of bipartisan political support for the 
arrangements for control and accountability would be advanced by the existence 
of a parliamentary committee.l26 
5.27 ASIS identified one potential benefit of such a committee as being its 
ability to deal with issues arising in the political arena.127 The Director-General 
raised the possibility that the chairperson of the committee might be someone 
who could speak publicly on issues concerning the Service.128 He acknowledged 
that questioning by a committee might also be of assistance in causing the 
Service to reconsider a particular matter but laid greater stress on the advantage 
he saw in having an opportunity to explain to such a committee what the Service 
was doing and why.l29 
5.28 ASIS argued that the extent to which the committee could be taken into 
the confidence of the Service would depend on its composition. In particular, 
ASIS favoured high-level Opposition representation on any parliamentary 
oversight committee.130 In this regard, the Director-General considered that 
'whether you get the right sort of committee . . .  is absolutely crucial'.l31 If his 
preferred model for the committee were adopted, he would expect it to have a 
wide brief to oversee what the Service was doing. The Director-General was 
confident that he could win the trust and support of a committee. 
5.29 Although the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO is modelled 
along somewhat different lines, ASIO has found its relationship with that 
Committee to be of considerable benefit. According to the Director-General of 
Security, it is a relationship which: 
125 Exhibit 6.3 . 1 ,  paragraph 3 1(m). 
126 T*970* 
127 T*967*. 
128 T*969*. 
129 Ibid. 
130 T67-8; see also Exhibit 2 1. 1, p.4. 
131 T*967*. 
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(a) enables regular contact in depth with a representative group of 
parliamentarians, which is especially important in a body whose 
people otherwise have little professional contact with 
parliamentarians; 
(b) brings home to everyone at ASIO that they are subject to the 
Parliament; 
(c) is a sounding board for parliamentary and public op1n10n on 
matters of interest to ASIO or liable to affect its working 
environment; 
(d) generates parliamentary and wider understanding and support of 
ASIO' s role and functions. 132 
5.30 The Director-General of Security acknowledged, in addition, the 
benefits of parliamentary scrutiny and review. 'It is a reminder of who and what 
you are accountable to.'133 Having to answer to a parliamentary committee was 
good for ASIO, obliging people 'to think carefully and consider what they are 
doing and therefore to improve the way in which their work is done and the 
outcome' .134 
5.31 The Minister for Foreign Affairs, while warning of raising public and 
parliamentary expectations unduly, acknowledged that 'from time to time 
matters concerning ASIS do arise . . .  and there may be a case for a Committee to 
be established that would allow such matters to be addressed under agreed rules 
of engagement, in circumstances that preserved national security'. l35 Were such 
a committee to be established: 
Its membership would need to be small, its members selected extremely carefully, 
its own reporting very limited, its function confined to reviewing and 
monitoring ASIS's compliance with its Charter, some management issues, and 
perhaps some funding issues. Its powers would need to be recommendatory only, 
and its access to information about operations negligible. The mechanisms for 
protecting information would need to meet those currently applying to any ASIS 
material. Staff assisting the Committee would need to be selected rigorously and 
arrangements made for the security of material. 136 
132 Exhibit 34.2, paragraph 30. 
133 T2593-4. 
134 T*330*. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
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5.32 The Minister emphasised that the acceptance of legislation for ASIS did 
not necessarily mean acceptance of a parliamentary oversight committee. He 
regarded the case for legislation as stronger than that for a committee, although 
he was not resolutely opposed to the concept of a committee.137 He recognised 
that the establishment of an Intelligence and Security Committee of the British 
Parliament added weight to the arguments in favour. 
5.33 The then Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Reith, while not 
presenting a formal Opposition position, was inclined to favour a parliamentary 
committee 'that had a real job and would therefore require people of standing in 
the Parliament to be on it' .l38 For security reasons, important aspects of the UK 
model - appointment of members by the Government and provision of staff from 
within the executive - might be acceptable to the Opposition.l39 While some in 
the Opposition might be concerned that involvement in any such committee 
would leave the Opposition 'a bit hamstrung by . . .  prior knowledge', Mr Reith 
saw this as outweighed by the benefits of greater accountability.l40 He 
supported the idea that ASIO and ASIS be covered by a single parliamentary 
committee and suggested that, if any committee or other new oversight 
arrangements were to be established, the whole position should be reviewed 
after three years.141 
5.34 The Australian Democrats submitted that a statutory intelligence and 
security committee should be established to oversee the entire intelligence 
community. They proposed a committee with wide access to information but 
subject to restrictions on disclosure.142 In particular, the details of ASIS 
operations and the names of ASIS operatives should remain strictly 
confidential. 143 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
T2496. 
We are well aware of the limitations of this form of parliamentary scrutiny, 
given that security concerns would circumscribe the committee's access to 
information and evidence, and that limitations on disclosure would limit the 
impact of its findings. However, it would provide an additional signal to the 
agencies concerned that scrutiny is more likely in the event that problems arise 
in the conduct of their operations.144 
T*1 173*. 
Ibid. 
T*l l73-4*. 
T*l l74-S*. 
Exhibit 47. 1 ,  ppJ-5. 
Ibid., p.3. 
Ibid., pp.3-4. 
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5.35 We sought the views of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
and the Department of Finance on a possible parliamentary committee. Neither 
Department considered that a committee was essential to parliamentary 
oversight, although the Department of Finance affirmed that the general 
arguments for accountability apply to ASIS as much as to other Commonwealth 
agencies.145 Both Departments proposed. alternative accountability mechanisms. 
5.36 The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet suggested as an 
alternative the expansion of the present practice of briefing shadow ministers. It 
stressed that the requirements of secrecy would limit the role of a parliamentary 
committee and suggested that, unless a system could be developed to protect the 
secrecy of the information provided to th� committee, the balance of 
considerations would probably weigh strongly against access to anything other 
than very general information. A committee might be able to review budgets 
and priorities (without detail of operations and deployments), broad financial 
and personnel management issues, and reports by IGIS, other than on 
compliance with the Directive and ministerial directions. Limitations on the 
committee could be justified in part,� the Department argued, because of the 
limited potential for the activities of ASIS to affect the interests of Australian 
citizens or residents. Given the far greater potential for ASIO's activities to affect 
Australians, it argued, it would be anomalous for a parliamentary committee on 
ASIS to have powers greater than those of the Joint Committee on ASI0.146 
5.37 The Department of Finance considered that there was insufficient 
information available to determine whether it would be appropriate or useful to 
extend the framework of parliamentary committee oversight to include ASIS. 
The most that could be achieved at this stage would be the tabling in the 
Parliament of an unclassified ASIS annual report.147 
The case for a parliamentary committee 
5.38 We have recommended in Chapter 3, that the charter under which 
ASIS operates should be set out in legislation, in which the Parliament specifies 
in broad terms what the Service can and cannot do. If the Parliament is to 
approve ASIS's charter by passing legislation, the Parliament should also be able 
to review the way in which the charter is put into practice. A parliamentary 
committee is one way in which this review could be accomplished. 
145 Exhibit 29.2.2, paragraphs 15, 16. 
146 Exhibit 25.3, pp.7-8. 
147 Exhibit 29.2.2, paragraphs 19-20. 
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5.39 Parliamentary oversight through a special committee is the appropriate 
vehicle for ASIS because of the sensitivity of the issues involved and the 
associated need to ensure the security of information provided. The Government 
could not, in practice, share much of the information necessary to accountability 
with the whole Parliament nor could that information be published. 
Parliamentary questioning of ministers and debate on intelligence matters will 
necessarily be limited for this reason. Under appropriate security arrangements, 
however, a committee could be provided with fuller information. Oversight by a 
committee would, moreover, be consistent with the general approach to public 
sector accountability in Australia and in other parliamentary democracies. 
5.40 If legislation is introduced to give parliamentary authority for the 
continuation of ASIS and to set the parameters within which the Service operates, 
a parliamentary committee should be responsible for testing the way in which 
the legislation is administered. This will necessarily involve some review of 
activities, at least at a general level, as well as review of administration and 
budgets. A parliamentary committee could draw support in this role from the 
detailed monitoring and auditing carried out by IGIS and a committee 
responsible for overseeing ASIS should have access to IGIS reports. 
5.41 The reservations about a parliamentary committee expressed by some 
witnesses from the executive government related largely to the difficulties of 
maintaining security, and to whether a committee could contribute in any 
significant way to management improvement. It was also argued that, because 
ASIS has relatively little scope to affect the rights of Australians, oversight by a 
parliamentary committee would have little to contribute to the public interest.148 
Any committee to oversee ASIS would require a legislative base including 
provisions to address security concerns by setting limits to the disclosure of 
information and prescribing penalties for unauthorised disclosure. Given an 
appropriate legislative base, the Australian and overseas experience suggests 
that security could be reasonably assured. Improving the management of ASIS 
would not be the primary role of a parliamentary oversight _committee, although 
experience again suggests - including the experience of ASIO as submitted to us 
- that it could make a contribution in this direction. Although ASIS has few 
responsibilities with implications for the rights of Australians, its activities have 
the potential to affect their interests significantly, including, for example, 
through the effects on international relations that could be caused by an 
operational failure. 
148 Exhibit 25.2, paragraph 43. 
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5.42 A further question in relation to a parliamentary committee for ASIS is 
whether the Service would require full-time parliamentary oversight. The 
Attorney-General's Department pointed out that few agencies have a direct 
responsibility to the parliament via a parliamentary committee.l49 Most agencies, 
however, are subject to a wide range of general parliamentary accountability 
mechanisms from which ASIS is largely immune, and this the Department also 
acknowledged. A committee with specific responsibility for ASIS can thus be 
justified, although the extent of the committee's operations and the question of 
whether it should cover other intelligence agencies, especially ASIO, are issues to 
be considered. 
5.43 With parliamentary oversight as with legislation, this inquiry provides 
an opportunity to implement reform not in response to any immediate crisis, but 
as a means of applying to ASIS the types of changes that have occurred in 
general public sector accountability, especially over the past ten years. 
Parliamentary oversight must be implemented in a way that protects operational 
security, broadly defined, and the need for oversight processes that will not 
place security at risk may mean that any parliamentary committee that could be 
established would not meet the expectations that might be held of it in some 
quarters. The issue of reconciling security with parliamentary and public 
expectations must be taken into account in the design and introduction of any 
accountability reforms. 
Committee oversight models 
5.44 We have examined four possible models for a parliamentary 
committee, and have identified the model which in our view is best suited to the 
task as we have defined it. 
The UK model 
5.45 The British Parliament has established a committee of 
parliamentarians, rather than a parliamentary committee, to oversee SIS. The 
essential elements of this approach are that members of the committee are 
appointed by and report to the Prime Minister, the committee is staffed from the 
executive, and there are tight controls on the matters which the committee may 
review. If adopted here, this would give Parliament a greater degree of 
assurance than is available from present mechanisms for accountability, while 
preserving a high level of security. But it would amount to no more than 
indirect accountability to Parliament for ASIS. Such a committee would not have 
149 T2361-2. 
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the independence from the executive which characterises normal parliamentary 
oversight. Perceptions of lack of independence and of limited access to 
information would limit the reassurance which such a committee could give to 
Parliament or the public. The problem raised by Mr Reith, of the potential for 
non-government members to be constrained by their participation, would loom 
largest in this model. 
5.46 The arrangement for the committee's staff to be drawn from the 
executive is a defining feature of this model, although it could be adapted to 
others. While it might be thought to increase both the security of information 
held by the committee and the likelihood of its being staffed by persons with 
relevant expertise, such an arrangement would raise further questions about the 
independence of the committee from the executive. It could also create conflicts 
of interest for the committee's staff. 
CommiHee for ad hoc inquiries 
5.47 A second model for committee oversight is suggested by the Minister's 
comment, quoted above, that 'from time to time matters concerning ASIS do 
arise . . .  and there may be a case for a Committee to be established that would 
allow such matters to be addressed under agreed rules of engagement, in 
circumstances that preserved national security' .150 An ASIS Act could provide 
for a parliamentary committee which would be activated by a reference from the 
Minister or from either House of Parliament to review a particular matter of 
concern. The legislation would set the basic rules for the committee's 
membership, operations, access to information and reporting. The detailed 
terms of reference for each inquiry and the membership of the committee when it 
was activated would be determined by normal parliamentary processes at the 
time. A possible task for such a committee would be to review the operation of 
the legislation after, say, three years. 
5.48 This model would provide for detailed review when the Parliament 
thought it necessary while accepting that ASIS should not require continuous 
oversight by a parliamentary committee. It would, however, deprive ASIS of the 
advantages of regular interaction with a representative parliamentary body, and 
would deprive the Parliament of the opportunity to develop specialist expertise 
in the membership of a standing oversight committee. A further potential 
disadvantage is that the committee would normally operate only in the context 
of alarming or controversial events . .  To concentrate parliamentary scrutiny on 
150 Exhibit 39. 1, answer to question 41 .  
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such events might give them greater prominence than was necessary, or 
desirable, and at the same time divert attention from less controversial matters of 
greater significance. 
The ASIO Committee model 
5.49 The ASIO Act provides for a joint standing committee to undertake 
inquiries and to report to the Parliament. The Committee is limited in its access 
to information, is barred from inquiring into some aspects of ASIO's activities, 
and may not initiate its own inquiries. Its membership comprises backbench 
members of both Houses and it is staffed from the parliamentary departments. 
5.50 This model, providing for oversight of an intelligence agency by a 
representative back-bench committee, has advantages of the kinds adverted to by 
the Director-General of Security. 151 The oversight provided by such a committee 
is, however, fairly limited, as most submissions, including those of the 
Opposition and the Australian Democrats, noted.l52 As we observed above, the 
Director-General of Security seemed attracted to the idea of a higher-level 
committee that could be given 'more serious work'.153 
A standing, joint, statutory committee with a broad charter 
5.51 A fourth model for committee oversight would be the establishment of 
a standing, joint, statutory committee with a broad charter to review the 
activities, expenditure and administration of ASIS. The committee would 
exercise its functions principally through in camera hearings. It would have 
enough access to information to assure effective oversight but that access would 
be under secure conditions and subject to rules capable of preventing release of 
information without authority. The membership would be small, appointed by 
the Parliament on the nomination of the Government and with a government 
majority. 
5.52 By operating mainly through hearings, such a committee would 
maintain a level of oversight similar to that faced by other public sector agencies 
in the proceedings of Senate estilnates committees, except that it would do so in 
private in recognition of security considerations. Within the constraints of 
security, the committee would seek to provide normal, robust parliamentary 
scrutiny. By analogy with Senate legislation committees, which consider the 
1 5 1 See paragraph 5 .29 above. 
1 52 T* 1 1 75-6*; Exhibit 47. 1, pp.4-5. 
1 53 T*326*. See paragraph 5.26 above. Also 5.59. 
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appropriations, it would be desirable for the relevant minister to attend hearings 
on the ASIS estimates and to respond to questions as far as practicable. This 
would substantially strengthen the accountability of the Government for ASIS. 
This model should also lead to the development of specialist expertise on the 
part of committee members, a factor which is important to any effective 
parliamentary oversight. 
5.53 The Commission prefers this fourth model. We consider it represents a 
good balance between the need for effective oversight and the need for security. 
The first and third models - the UK and ASIO committee approaches - would 
provide for less effective accountability than is realistically achievable. They 
would introduce to the control and accountability of ASIS some of the 
disadvantages of parliamentary committee oversight without gaining in return 
the maximum possible advantage. The second model - an ad hoc statutory 
committee - would permit effective parliamentary review from time to time but 
would forgo the advantages of continuity in the accountability relationship and 
the development of the expertise of the parliamentary overseers. 
Features of the preferred model 
5.54 The draft bill provides for a committee on the model which we prefer. 
Certain features of the draft deserve brief discussion here. 
A single intelligence and security commiHee 
5.55 It would be anomalous if ASIS were to be subject to more extensive 
parliamentary review than ASIO. Since both are small organisations with similar 
needs for secrecy, it would seem sensible for a single committee to oversee them. 
If our preferred model is adopted, we recommend that it be in the form of a 
single intelligence and security committee to cover both ASIS and ASIO. The 
draft bill has been prepared on that basis. Given the relative size of the two 
bodies and the likelihood that Parliament will have a greater interest in 
operations in Australia than in those overseas, such a committee could be 
expected normally to give more attention to ASIO than to ASIS. 
5.56 Extending the coverage of the committee to include ASIO would mean 
a greater degree of parliamentary oversight of that Organization than is 
exercised by the present Joint Committee on ASIO, since the proposed new 
committee would have greater powers and access to information than the 
existing committee. The Director-General of Security saw benefits in the 
conferral of additional powers, including a power to initiate inquiries: 
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I would not see a problem with it being given the power to initiate [inquiries of] 
its own motion, provided, of course, there were safeguards on .. . which areas it 
could go into. But I think that if you are going to make a ... serious effort to 
produce a committee of high calibre, and you are going to give it more serious 
work - both of which I think are desirable .. . from the Organization's point of 
view; I do not have any difficulty with any greater accountability in relation to 
that - I think that you have to give it rather more power than the current 
Parliamentary Committee has in order to attract the kind of membership and to 
get those members to do the kind of work that you would like to see them doing. 
So I think it would be self-defeating to try to get or put together a higher level 
committee with the intention that it should deal perhaps with the somewhat 
more sensitive issues if necessary, without giving it the right to initiate its own 
inquiry within that wide area. 154 
5.57 The Committee's oversight should extend to reviewing the discharge 
of the functions of IGIS in so far as they relate to ASIS or ASIO. On the 
Inspector-General's current and likely future workload, this would imply that 
the committee would have coverage of the great majority of his activities. But, 
since IGIS is subject to the normal range of public sector accountability 
mechanisms, and the purpose of the proposed committee would be to improve 
the accountability of ASIS and ASIO, there would be no reason for the committee 
to have full coverage of IGIS. 
5.58 The Australian Democrats proposed that such a committee should 
have a wider remit, embracing the Australian intelligence community as a 
whole. For us · to have given proper consideration to this proposal would have 
required evidence from a range of agencies and from the Government, and 
would have taken us more than marginally beyond our terms of reference. But it 
is a proposition which we believe warrants consideration and which the 
Government may wish to explore. 
5.59 The estimates of ASIO are already examined in public by Senate 
legislation committees and an unclassified version of ASIO's annual report is 
tabled in Parliament and published. These practices should continue in respect 
of ASIO, even if the proposed new committee has greater access to information 
in private. The scope for reviewing the ASIS estimates in public would be much 
smaller and the ASIS annual report contains much operationally sensitive 
material. Whilst we believe that the Government should consider the possibility 
of publishing an unclassified version of ASIS's annual report, the security limits 
on what could be published would make review of that report by a Senate 
154 T*326*. 
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legislation committee less fruitful than review by a specialised committee which 
would have greater access to information in private. 
5.60 If the ad hoc committee model were to be adopted instead, it should be 
implemented for ASIS only. It is a means of balancing the special need for 
secrecy of ASIS operations against the need for oversight of a small, highly 
specialised agency which mostly operates overseas and in ways which do not 
affect the rights of Australians. Although the evidence suggests a general 
willingness to consider improvements to the structure of parliamentary oversight 
for ASIO, there was no strong pressure for change and there would be no need to 
adapt the ad hoc model to ASIO's circumstances. With that exception, the 
committee provisions in the draft bill would need little change to convert them to 
the ad hoc model. 
Powers, functions and access 
5.61 The draft bill seeks to balance wide powers, functions and access for 
the committee against restraints on the publication of information it receives. 
The draft bill gives the committee the wide function of reviewing and reporting 
to Parliament on the activities, expenditure and administration of ASIS, the 
power to initiate its own inquiries under these heads, and full access to 
information necessary to its functions. At the same time, it prohibits the 
committee from inquiring into operationally sensitive matters or reporting in a 
way which would disclose the identity of ASIS or ASIO officers and sources, 
operationally sensitive information or information that would be likely to 
prejudice national security or the conduct of Australia's foreign relations. 
'Operationally sensitive' is defined for this purpose to include the sources of 
information and operational assistance or methods available to ASIS and ASIO, 
information about particular operations and any information provided by a 
foreign government which that government is not prepared to have disclosed.155 
Before presenting a report, the committee would be required to seek the advice 
of the Minister on whether it contained any information in these categories. If 
the Minister advised that it did contain such information, the committee would 
be prohibited from publishing the report. 
5.62 The committee would have power to take evidence and to obtain 
documents but the relevant minister would have the power to prevent the 
committee from receiving operationally sensitive information if its disclosure to 
the committee would be likely to prejudice national security. The committee 
155 This is based on a definition in the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (U.K.). 
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would be required to conduct its proceedings in private unless the Minister 
approved otherwise. It would not be able to publish evidence without the 
written consent of those providing it. The restrictions applicable to reporting 
would apply equally to the publication of evidence. The committee would be 
required to maintain a level of security over classified documents acceptable to 
the head of the agency which supplied them. 
Membership and staffing 
5.63 The membership of the committee should be kept as small as possible, 
principally because the sensitivity of the information available to the committee 
makes that desirable for security reasons. In any case, the tasks we envisage for 
the committee should only require a small membership.  We have proposed a 
maximum of eight members, drawn from both Houses, if the committee covers 
both ASIO and ASIS. A maximum of six would be sufficient if the committee 
were to cover ASIS only. A committee covering both ASIO and ASIS could 
operate through sub-committees of six members for each agency, reducing the 
demands on the full membership and the number of members with access to 
information on each agency. 
5.64 The membership should be equally divided between the government 
and non-government parties, with the proviso that the chair be a government 
member and have a casting as well as a deliberative vote, thus assuring a 
government majority. As is presently prescribed for the Joint Committee on 
ASIO, the Prime Minister should consult with the leaders of recognised parties in 
the Parliament before the Government nominates members for appointment to 
the committee, and should take into account the representation of parties in the 
Parliament when considering nominations. 
5.65 In line with long-standing Australian parliamentary practice and the 
UK, US and Canadian precedents, it should not be required that committee 
members be security cleared or vetted. It should be noted, however, that the 
draft bill follows the ASIO Act in making it an offence, carrying significant 
penalties, for any person, including a member of the committee, to make an 
unauthorised disclosure of information received by the committee. One effect of 
the conviction of a committee member for such an offence would be his or her 
disqualification from membership of the Parliament under s.44 of the 
Constitution. 
5.66 Committee staff, as well as being covered by the unauthorised 
disclosure provisions, should be subject to the same level and frequency of 
security clearance and vetting as ASIS officers. The Auditor-General and ASIS 
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have agreed that, if the ANAO is given full access to ASIS's operational accounts, 
the Auditor-General will consult with the Service before assigning an auditor to 
that task and will arrange for the auditor to be security cleared and vetted. ASIS 
proposes that this agreement be given force by regulations under the proposed 
Auditor-General Act. Similar arrangements, including appropriate regulations, 
should apply in respect of parliamentary officers appointed to support the 
committee. 
Initiation of inquiries 
5.67 As well as ongoing review of the activities, expenditure and 
administration of the agencies, the Committee would be a mechanism by which 
the Parliament could conduct specific inquiries. This raises the key issue of the 
power to initiate such inquiries. It is usual for a joint parliamentary committee to 
undertake inquiries on the reference of either House and, since governments will 
rarely have a majority in the Senate, application of the usual rules to a committee 
overseeing ASIS would allow the combined non-government parties in the 
Senate to initiate inquiries over the objections of the Government. 
5.68 The draft bill proposes in addition that the committee have the power 
to initiate its own inquiries within the limits of its statutory functions. The 
assurance for the executive that self-initiated inquiries would not present a 
security problem resides in the prohibition of inquiries into operationally 
sensitive matters - sources, methods and particular operations - and in the 
controls over the release <;Jf information, both to and by the committee, and the 
penalties associated with unauthorised disclosure. With these safeguards in 
place, we believe that the conferral of an 'own motion' power will enhance the 
effectiveness of the committee's oversight, strengthen its standing in the 
Parliament and increase the assurance which its existence gives the public. 
Other provisions 
5.69 Other matters relevant to the committee proposal included in the draft 
bill are: a requirement that heads of agencies brief the committee; provisions for 
the protection of witnesses; secrecy provisions; and a requirement for an annual 
report by the committee. 
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Chapter 6 
The Minister, the Director-General and 
the Directive 
Changes in the relationship between the Minister and the Director­
General 
6.1 ASIS was first established as part of the Defence Department, under a 
charter signed by the Prime Minister in May 1952. This first ASIS charter 
provided for the Service to receive higher direction on policy from a sub­
committee of Cabinet, but such direction was to be transmitted to ASIS by the 
Secretary of the Department of Defence, to whom the Director of ASIS was made 
responsible for the general conduct of the activities of the Service. The Director 
was accountable to the Minister for Defence for the expenditures of the 
Service.156 Under this Charter, according to Mr Justice Hope in the report of his 
first Royal Commission into Intelligence and Security (RCIS) : 
an uneasy relationship had developed between the service and the Department of 
Defence. A considerable difference of opinion arose between the director and the 
secretary over the latter's responsibilities, particularly in regard to financial 
arrangements. 157 
6.2 Under a revised charter signed by the Prime Minister in December 
1954, the Service was removed from the Defence Department and made directly 
responsible to the Minister for External Affairs. The Director was given personal 
access to members of the Cabinet sub-committee, to heads of Commonwealth 
departments and to the Chiefs of Staff.158 
156 Exhibit 1 . 1  
157 Exhibit 2. 1 .2.5, paragraph 83. 
158 Exhibit 1.2, paragraphs 2, 12. 
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6.3 The higher status and greater autonomy conferred on ASIS by the 1954 
charter was, however, short-lived. A new Directive was issued in August 1958, 
by the Minister for External Affairs. ASIS at that time was quite small. Its first 
Director, Mr Alfred Brookes, had resigned the year before, and the Government 
had seriously considered abolishing the Service. 
6.4 The new Directive authorised the continuation of ASIS but under more 
detailed ministerial and public service control. It required the Minister to give 
approval before operations could be commenced in an overseas country, and it 
provided that the Minister, while not normally requiring to know details of 
operations, retained 'at all times the right to be given on request' such details.l59 
The first two charters, by contrast, had affirmed the 'well-established convention 
whereby Ministers do not concern themselves either with the sources providing 
secret information or with the detailed information which may be obtained by 
the Service in particular cases' and had provided that Ministers were to be given 
such information 'only as may be necessary for the determination of the issue'.160 
6.5 The 1958 Directive required the Director to report twice yearly to the 
Minister on the activities of ASIS. Access to the Minister for External Affairs was 
made subject to a requirement that the Secretaries to the Departments of External 
Affairs and Defence be consulted before matters affecting their respective 
departments were discussed. The Director's right of personal access to other 
members of Cabinet was removed. The Secretary, Department of External 
Affairs, was placed firmly in the line of control of ASIS. Like the Minister, the 
Secretary was given the right to obtain, on request, details of operations. The 
Secretary was to approve senior appointments in ASIS and the budget for the 
Service. 
6.6 The Secretary's control over access by ASIS to the Minister was 
strengthened in May 1973 when the Prime Minister (also Foreign Affairs 
Minister at that time) decided that an officer of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs 'should always be present in any discussions you have, as Director M09, 
(i.e. ASIS), with the Prime Minister'.161 In December 1973, the Director was 
further instructed that all his written communications to the Minister were to be 
sent by way of the Secretary, and 'in the rare cases in which it may be necessary 
for you to communicate with [the Minister] by telephone, the Secretary . . .  should, 
159 Exhibit 1 .3, paragraph 10. 
160 Exhibit 1 . 1, paragraph 8; Exhibit 1 .2, paragraph 8. 
161 Exhibit 2.1 .2.6, p.7. 
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without delay, be informed in writing by you of the subject and of the 
outcome' . 162 
6.7 The Service had grown considerably by the mid-1970s. Reviewing the 
1958 Directive, in RCIS, Mr Justice Hope concluded that it: 
asserted 'ministerial control' by designing a set of instructions which, although 
ambiguous, withheld from the Director discretion in all matters except ASIS' 
internal management. The means of 'ministerial control' in fact turns out to be 
a process whereby the onus is placed upon ASIS to inform the department in any 
measure the department requires, about what it is doing, or thinking of doing . . . 
This circumstance, combined with an attitude of mistrust on both sides, and 
exacerbated by the distance between Canberra and Melbourne - indeed between 
two different ways of life - generated an excess of conservatism and over-caution 
in ASIS management. 163 
He described the Directive as containing 'a bizarre mixture of great and small 
constraints [which,] as a lawyer, I find it very hard to construe'.l64 
6.8 As a result of RCIS, a revised Directive was issued in April 1978. The 
1978 Directive removed or modified the controls criticised by Mr Justice Hope 
and made ASIS responsible directly to the Minister. It also altered the title of the 
head of ASIS to Director-General, reflecting an increase in the status of the 
position to public service agency head. 
6.9 The 1978 Directive was further amended in 1985, after the Sheraton 
Hotel incident and the second Hope Royal Commission (RCASIA). The most 
significant changes were in removing from ASIS the responsibility for training 
for or carrying out any covert action, and in making explicit the obligation on the 
Service and its officers to comply with Australian law. Explicit provision was 
also made in the 1985 Directive for briefing the Leader of the Opposition. The 
new Directive embodying these amendments was approved by the Security 
Committee of Cabinet in December 1985 and remains in force. 165 
162 Ibid. 
163 Exhibit 2.1 .1 ,  paragraphs 337-8. 
164 Ibid., paragraph 3 12. 
165 Exhibit 1 .7; Exhibit 1 .8. 
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The role of the Minister and the Department 
Dired ministerial control 
6.10 The successive changes in the charters and directives governing ASIS 
have reflected the evolving views of government on the proper relationship 
between ministers and the Service. In its submissions to this Commission, ASIS 
emphasised the importance of the direct line of accountability to the Minister and 
the direct ministerial control which it achieved in 1978.166 The Service strongly 
opposed any suggestion that it should revert to a situation in which an official 
should hold responsibility between ASIS and the Minister. 
6.11  It is now firmly established that ASIS is directly accountable to the 
Minister. The Minister in turn is accountable to the Parliament and the 
Government for the performance of ASIS. Both elements of accountability -
Director-General to Minister and Minister to Parliament and Government -
require that there be a clear understanding of what types of things the Minister 
should know and be called on to approve, and what types of things are the 
responsibility of the Director-General, for which he or she must account to the 
Minister. It has been one of the functions of the Directive to provide the formal 
element of this understanding, and we set out later in this Chapter our views on 
what the Directive should contain. 
6. 12 As we have said earlier (Chapter 2), the relationship between the 
Director-General and the Minister is central to the control and accountability 
arrangements. This will continue to be true whatever modifications are made to 
those arrangements. The optimal relationship is achieved when the two work 
constructively and harmoniously together, in an atmosphere of trust. All the 
evidence indicates that the present relationship is of this character. At the same 
time, there is a need for a formal set of rules, to allow for the possibility that the 
informal relationship between them breaks down and a resort to formal powers 
of direction becomes necessary. The Directive serves this purpose, by 
identifying those matters about which the Minister must be informed and by 
conferring on the Minister the power to require information, and to insist on the 
attendance of the Secretary of DFAT, where circumstances dictate. 
6.13 In our view, the balance between formal and informal control, between 
Ministerial oversight and appropriate administrative autonomy for the Director­
General, is being appropriately struck. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is kept 
informed of all matters requiring his approval under the Directive. The extent to 
1 66 See for example, Exhibit 45.2.8, section 6.2. 
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which he is informed of other matters is left to the discretion of the Director­
General who either makes a decision himself to inform the Minister of an 
operation, new form of activity or some other related development, or consults 
the Minister's adviser and seeks his advice on whether it is desirable to inform 
the Minister formally about a particular subject.167 The audit conducted by 
Commission staff gave no suggestion that the Minister was not being 
appropriately involved. 
6.14 Where ASIS undertakes an operation in response to a task which 
involves an unusual sensitivity of any kind, whether by reason of the nature of 
the task, the potential for political damage, or the methodology required being 
likely to fall outside routine operational activity, it is the practice of ASIS to 
signal the relevant aspect of the matter to the Minister or at least raise it in the 
first instance with his political adviser or other senior member of his staff. If the 
unusual aspect of the matter relates to foreign policy, the matter will also be 
discussed in the first instance with senior DFAT officers. Such communication 
with the Minister or his staff occurs before any implementation of the activity in 
question, and ASIS thereafter acts as directed by the Minister. 168 
Annual report and corporate plan 
6.15 Reporting by the Service is a central element in its accountability to the 
Minister. It is also essential to enable the Minister to exercise the necessary 
control over the Service, and to meet his accountability obligations to the 
Parliament and within the Government. The annual report of the Service is 
prepared on a program basis and gives the Minister an overview of what ASIS 
has done to achieve the objectives set for it. In accepting the report, and 
presenting it to SCOC, the Minister takes responsibility for ASIS's activities as 
reported. The content of the annual report is discussed further in Chapter 7 in 
relation to control by SCOC. 
6.16 Although prepared for different purposes, the corporate plan should 
also serve as a basis for reporting to the Minister which supplements the annual 
report. The Service should account to the Minister at least annually for its 
performance in achieving the objectives specified in the corporate plan, 
objectives which extend well beyond the program priorities with which the 
annual report is concerned. Reporting of this kind will further enhance the 
control/ accountability relationship between Service and Minister. 
167 Exhibit 20. 1 . 10, p.8 
168 Exhibit 20.3, paragraphs S-6. 
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The role of the Department 
6.17 Although the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) no 
longer has any control over ASIS, the relationship between the two organisations 
remains of vital importance to ASIS. 
6.18 DFAT also contributes to the control of ASIS in a significant way. It 
can influence operational decisions through the advice it gives ASIS, and where 
necessary the Minister, on the likely intelligence dividend from a proposed 
operation and on the foreign relations risks. 
6.19 The existing arrangements for the performance by DFAT of its 
advisory role appear to be working satisfactorily. ASIS seeks advice from DFAT 
informally as the need arises, both at officer level and through Australian 
intelligence community consultative committees on which both organisations are 
represented. Where a proposal is submitted to the Minister, it will ordinarily 
have passed through the international security division of DFAT and any 
departmental comment will be recorded in the submission. The view of ASIS 
and of DFAT is that these procedures generally work smoothly and effectively, 
and there is no evidence to the contrary. 
6.20 In the report of his second Royal Commission, Mr Justice Hope 
expressed the view that ASIS would benefit from the secondment of a senior 
DFAT officer, to serve in a line job. He rejected a proposal that the seconded 
officer should serve as a foreign affairs adviser, considering it impractical, 
unnecessary and likely to reduce the amount of informal discussion between 
ASIS and DFAT.169 
6.21 We are satisfied that no change to existing processes is called for. All 
the indications are that the advice of DFAT is sought appropriately. The co­
location of ASIS and DFAT encourages regular informal contact. This 
interaction, and the now considerable operational experience of the Service 
abroad, ensure that ASIS is well aware of the foreign policy implications of its 
operations. 
The Directive in the control of ASIS 
6.22 Until now, the Directive has been the backbone of the control and 
accountability framework for ASIS. It has defined, and governed, the key 
relationships which make up that framework. It prescribes the functions of ASIS, 
169 Exhibit 2.2.2.6, paragraphs 7.25-7. 
69 
The Minister, the Director-General and the Directive ASIS Inquiry 1995 
the roles and responsibilities of the Minister and the Director-General, the 
relationships between ASIS and other agencies, the main aspects of the 
administration of the Service, and the appointment and terms and conditions of 
the Director-General and members of ASIS. It is the source of legal authority for 
everything ASIS does. 
6.23 In Chapter 3, we have concluded that it is no longer appropriate that 
the sole authority for the existence and activities of ASIS should reside in a 
Directive of the executive government. We have accordingly recommended that 
the Service be given a legislative foundation. Although much of what is in the 
present Directive could, and in our view should, be dealt with in legislation, 
acceptance of this recommendation will not altogether remove the need for a 
Directive. We see a continuing function for a Directive to deal with those matters 
which should remain secret, which are too detailed for legislation or which are 
likely to require frequent amendment. 
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Chapter 7 
Cabinet and Official Control 
Security CommiHee of Cabinet 
7.1 The predecessor of the Security Committee of Cabinet (SCOC) was 
established in 1977, to overcome what the first Hope Royal Commission of 1977 
considered was the poor co-ordination and control of the various intelligence 
agencies. Known as the National and International Security Committee, its brief 
was to provide general policy oversight for the intelligence community and to 
approve intelligence targets and priorities and agency budgets.l70 The 
Committee today comprises the Prime Minister, the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Finance, the Treasurer and the Attorney-General, with the 
Minister for Trade an alternate member for the Foreign Minister. The Office of 
Security and Intelligence Co-ordination (OSIC) in the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet acts as the secretariat for the Committee. 
7.2 SCOC functions much as Mr Justice Hope envisaged. Its roles include: 
(a) setting of broad intelligence priorities; 
(b) consideration of the budgets of the intelligence agencies; 
(c) approval of significant changes in the intelligence effort; and 
(d) approval of broad guidelines for the operation of intelligence 
agencies.171 
7.3 SCOC usually meets between three and six times a year, depending on 
the number of issues requiring consideration. For the most part, material for the 
Committee is channelled through a supporting body at head of agency level, the 
170 Exhibit 2. 1 .3, paragraphs 245-46, 294-96. 
171 Exhibit 25.2, paragraph 14. 
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Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and Security (SCIS). SCOC's most 
important recurrent activities are: 
• consideration of an annual report from SCIS on the activities of 
the intelligence and security agencies, based on the annual reports 
of the agencies. (The individual annual reports are available for 
consideration by the Ministers at the same time); 
• consideration of Part Two of the ONA Annual Report, containing 
an assessment of the performance of each agency; 
• consideration of a Department of Finance report on the budgets 
and forward estimates of the agencies, including any new policy 
proposals, as part of the budget process; 
• endorsement of the National Foreign Intelligence Assessment 
Priorities, usually every two to three years; and 
• every three years, from 1994, endorsement of a Foreign 
Intelligence Planning Document prescribing longer-term strategic 
directions. 
7.4 The depth and quality of SCOC's oversight is dependent first on the 
time and interest of the Ministers and, secondly, on the quality of the information 
provided by the agencies, relevantly Finance, ONA and ASIS. We agree with the 
view expressed by Mr Justice Hope in his 1984 report (RCASIA) that SCOC 
cannot be expected to exercise close oversight of the intelligence community on a 
continuing basis. That is the responsibility of the individual Ministers. The 
Secretary PM&C, Dr Keating, confirmed that: 
Security Committee Ministers are necessarily limited in the time and effort they 
can devote to overseeing agencies other than those for which they are responsible 
... Finding the right balance of ministerial oversight is ultimately a matter for 
ministers themselves and will vary with different groups of ministers. 172 
According to Dr Keating, the Prime Minister takes an active interest in SCOC, 
and has not delegated his position as Chair to any other Minister. He is briefed 
on the performance of all intelligence agencies when the agency annual reports 
are considered by SCOC.173 
172 Ibid., paragraph 21 .  
173 Ibid., paragraph 15. 
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7.5 The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the Security Committee had 
not had occasion to play any 'really major role' in relation to ASIS during his 
tenure. He regarded it as a working body of well-informed colleagues on which 
he would be able to rely for advice in a crisis.174 The main consideration of ASIS 
occurs during SCOC discussion of the annual SCIS Report on the intelligence 
agencies. According to the Minister, questioning and discussion varies from 
cursory to rigorous; it was quite sustained and penetrating in the context of 
SCOC's consideration of the Hollway Review.175 
Secretaries CommiHee on Intelligence and Security 
7.6 Like SCOC, the Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and Security 
(SCIS) was established in 1977 on the recommendation of RCIS, flowing from its 
assessment of deficiencies in the machinery for co-ordination and control of the 
intelligence community.l76 SCIS assists SCOC in its oversight of the intelligence 
community. Its functions are to provide policy guidance on behalf of SCOC to 
the principal departments and agencies involved in intelligence, to ensure that 
SCOC is kept regularly and fully informed of all relevant matters, and to co­
ordinate the handling of issues requiring Ministerial consideration and the 
presentation of advice to SCOC.177 
7.7 The terms of reference for SCIS, revised in 1985 and endorsed by the 
Security Committee, include requirements that it: 
• institute a regular cycle for examination of, and reporting to the 
Security Committee on, annual reports, forward estimates and 
budget estimates relating to the intelligence and security agencies; 
• report regularly to the Security Committee on all relevant 
intelligence and security matters as required by the Prime 
Minister or the Security Committee, or otherwise as agreed 
necessary by SCIS; 
174 Exhibit 39.1 ,  answer to question 17. This accords with Mr Justice Hope's 1984 view that the committee 
should provide a forum to which a Minister could take particular issues (Exhibit 2.2 . 1 .2, paragraph 3.7). 
175 Ibid. The Hollway Review is discussed below. 
176 Exhibit 2.1 .3, paragraphs 245-46, 297-302. 
177 Exhibit 25.2, paragraph 22. 
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• subject to control and oversight by the Security Committee, 
provide guidance to the intelligence and security authorities 
constituting the total national intelligence and security effort, 
external and internal, including on questions of access to 
information and distribution of reports that may arise; and 
• subject to control and oversight by the Security Committee in 
respect of targets and priorities: 
recommend the national assessment priorities and provide 
guidance, as necessary, in respect of the national intelligence 
collection requirements; and 
consider any requests from Departmental Secretaries or 
heads of statutory authorities or intelligence agencies to have 
a priority determined.178 
7.8 Although it has no direct authority over any individual agency, SCIS 
plays a critical part in the control and accountability framework. Its monitoring 
of the performance of the agencies, principally through its scrutiny of annual 
reports and budgets, is the essential underpinning of the control which SCOC 
exerts over priorities and budgets, and of the accountability of the agencies to 
SCOC. SCIS performs both a screening function, ensuring that proposals going 
forward to SCOC are balanced by proper analysis and co-ordination, and a 
signalling function, to ensure that matters of significance are brought to the 
attention of SCOC. 
7.9 SCIS does not intervene in the detailed management of agencies. Dr 
Keating told the Commission: 
Like Security Committee, SCIS is not normally aware of the full details of ASIS's 
activities. Nor does it seek to be. Its emphasis is on broad poliry oversight. It is 
up to ASIS and other departments and agencies to bring to the attention of SCIS 
and Security Committee significant issues which it should be aware of.179 
Thus, any significant ASIS proposal would be discussed at SCIS.l8° Conversely, 
SCIS might draw attention to resource allocation issues within a particular 
agency, or review an agency's response to requirements placed on it arising from 
a major event - such as the Gulf War - but it would be up to the responsible 
Minister and his department to 'draw an inference' and take the action they saw 
178 Exhibit 4.6. 1 1 . 
179 Exhibit 25.2, paragraph 25. See also Mr Costello, T639. 
180 T408. 
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as appropriate.l81 But, while SCIS will deal with issues concerning individual 
agencies which arise in discussions about annual reports or budget constraints, it 
will not delve into day-to-day activities. 182 
7. 10 In our view, this is as it should be. We have already emphasised 
(Chapter 6) the importance of maintaining the primacy of the relationship 
between Minister and Director-General in the management and control of ASIS. 
There would be no advantage, and some clear disadvantages, in SCIS intruding 
into management or operational issues. 
7.11 One issue which highlighted the limits of SCIS's role was the 
'campaign' against ASIS by the disaffected former officers. As we have outlined 
in Chapter 12, ASIS informed SCIS (via its annual report) of its concern about the 
threat to security which the actual and threatened media disclosures represented. 
SCIS in turn reported to SCOC that the potential security threat was a matter of 
concern. But SCIS was content to leave it to ASIS to determine - and pursue ­
the necessary action to deal with the threat. 
7. 12 We agree with the view expressed by SCIS members that the principal 
responsibility for dealing with this issue lay with ASIS, in consultation with the 
Minister.l83 But where, as here, there is a threat of significant damage to the 
national interest, there is in our view an appropriate role for SCIS - and in 
particular its Chair, as the Prime Minister's representative - to ensure that 
everything possible is being done within the executive to support the agency and 
its Minister in determining the best course of action. Earlier experience of other 
agencies may be relevant and helpful and OSIC, as well as the Attorney­
General's Department, should be encouraged to keep a collation of such 
experience in an accessible form. 
7. 13 From time to time, the policy co-ordination role of SCIS extends to 
substantive policy review and development. The 1992 Richardson report (see 
below) is a good example of this. The Report's assessment of the implications of 
the post-Cold War international environment for Australia's intelligence 
requirements enabled SCOC to reach a judgment about appropriate changes in 
priorities and direction for the various agencies. 
7.14 It is, in our view, both appropriate and desirable for SCIS to undertake 
this policy development role where issues arise affecting the intelligence 
181 T307-8. 
182 T796. 
183 Exhibit 12.3.4, answer to question 3; T2545; T2547. 
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community as a whole.l84 The cross-section of viewpoints represented means 
that it is uniquely equipped for this task.185 
7. 15 SCIS is a forum where inter-agency issues are aired, and agencies have 
the opportunity to learn from the experience and approach of others. Typically 
SCIS reaches a collective view about what should be presented to SCOC, but 
there are occasions when different views are maintained and presented to SCOC. 
For example, the SCIS advice to SCOC on new resourcing to meet the shortfall in 
intelligence collection identified in the Hollway Report contained divergent 
views on the balance of responsibility between ASIS and DFAT.l86 Clearly there 
is a balance to be struck between the natural pursuit of individual interest and 
the requirements of the collective interest, and we agree with Mr Sedgwick that 
the value of SCIS is likely to be greatest when the objectives of the intelligence 
community as a whole are paramount in its deliberations.187 
Control and oversight 
7.16 There is a variety of mechanisms through which SCOC, with the 
assistance of SCIS, exercises control over ASIS. Some of these operate on a 
regular basis, such as the annual reviews of performance and the periodic setting 
of foreign intelligence priorities. Other processes are activated only 
intermittently. They include reviews of ASIS's performance in meeting 
particular collection priorities, and in-depth reassessments of the direction and 
resourcing of the AIC, and of the role of ASIS within the community. 
Annual reports and budgets 
7.17 Consideration of annual reports and budgets is probably the most 
important element of SCOC oversight of ASIS.188 This process enables the 
Committee to assess the performance of ASIS (and the other agencies) against the 
priorities which the Committee itself sets (see next section), and to recommend 
changes if necessary. The effectiveness of this oversight naturally depends upon 
the quality of reporting which SCOC receives from and about ASIS. The key 
components of this reporting are the annual report of ASIS, part 2 of the ONA 
annual report and the Finance Report (on the budget and forward estimates of 
the agencies). 
184 T305; T330; T639; T795. 
185 Tl214. 
186 Exhibit 4.6.5, paragraph 12. 
187 Tl2 14. 
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7.18 The evidence indicates that the quality of this reporting has been 
steadily improving, under the close scrutiny of SCIS. Following criticism in 
previous years, ASIS has moved to a program-based annual report. The 
reporting of performance against strategic priorities in its 1993-1994 report189 
prompted special commendation from SCIS190 and from ONA for its 'outcome­
oriented approach to evaluation' . 191 Part 2 of th� ONA annual report has also 
been upgraded, following criticism in the Richardson Review that it needed to 
provide a 'sharper and more helpful overview of . . .  performance'.l92 
Intelligence priorities 
7.19 One of the principal ways in which SCOC gives policy direction to 
ASIS is through its endorsement of the National Foreign Intelligence Assessment 
Priorities (NFIAPs). The NFIAPs set national intelligence priorities for agencies 
involved in foreign intelligence for a period of about two years. They represent 
the Government's guidance - both by topic and by country - about what 
intelligence it requires. The NFIAPs are drafted by ONA, considered and 
endorsed by the National Intelligence Committee and submitted through SCIS to 
the Security Committee. The areas where ASIS collection effort should be 
directed are determined separately, by the National Intelligence Collection 
Requirements Committee (NICRC) and other tasking mechanisms described in 
the following chapter, within the assessment framework defined by the NFIAPs. 
7.20 The Foreign Intelligence Planning Document (FIPD), endorsed by 
SCOC in November 1994, will further enhance the policy framework within 
which ASIS tasking occurs. The development of the FIPD followed the finding 
of the Richardson Report (see below) that the NFIAPs 'work well for the 
purposes for which [they are] intended', but that they are 'not an adequate 
vehicle for setting strategic directions'. 193 The Report therefore recommended, 
and the Government accepted, that long-range planning needs should be 
addressed in the development of a FIPD. 
7.21 ONA has principal responsibility for the co-ordination and preparation 
of FIPD. The first FIPD was submitted to SCOC by SCIS and endorsed by SCOC 
in November 1994. It provides a long-term, strategically-oriented view of 
188 Exhibit 25.2, paragraph 19. 
1 89 Exhibit 4.1 .7, pp.7-22. 
190 Exhibit 4.4.5, paragraph 2(e); T* 1086*. 
191 Exhibit 4.4.4, Chapter 2, paragraph 52. 
192 Exhibit 2.3. 1, paragraph 144. 
193 Ibid., paragraph 139. 
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Australia's foreign intelligence needs, integrating judgments about changes in 
the international environment with resource planning and programs. The 
document aims to look ahead over a five-to-seven year period and is to be 
reviewed on a rolling basis, every three years. The FIPD will provide a broad 
framework within which future NFIAPs will be developed. 
The Richardson and Hollway reviews 
7.22 In January 1992, following a consideration of agency annual reports for 
1990-91, Security Committee commissioned SCIS to review the roles and 
priorities of the agencies in the light of the significant changes in international 
circumstances, notably the end of the Cold War. The report of the SCIS review, 
known as the Richardson Report194 contained a detailed assessment of the 
structure of the AIC, the arrangements for its management and co-ordination, the 
priorities for intelligence collection in the post-Cold War period and the 
respective contributions which the collection agencies could be expected to make. 
The report concluded, amongst other things, that ASIS's role was of continuing 
relevance in the changed international circumstances.195 The recommendations 
in the report were (with exceptions not relevant to our purposes) endorsed by 
the Security Committee196 and the results of the review were announced in a 
Prime Ministerial statement to the Parliament on 21 July 1992. 197 
7.23 The Richardson Report identified certain shortfalls in the foreign 
intelligence collection effort against priority requirements. The Security 
Committee commissioned a further report on available options, and their 
resource implications, for addressing these shortfalls. This report, known as the 
Hollway Report198 laid particular emphasis on the increasing importance of 
ASIS's role as a collector. 
Conclusion 
7.24 In our view, the arrangements for control and oversight of ASIS by 
SCOC are satisfactory. We are inclined to agree with Dr Keating that it is 
difficult to see how SCOC's oversight could, in a practical sense, be any more 
1 94 Exhibit 2.3 . 1 .  Its principal author was Mr Dennis Richardson of the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet. 
1 95 Ibid., paragraph 1 10. 
196 Exhibit 4.6.3 
197 Exhibit 1 .9 
198 Exhibit 2.4. Also known as the Hollway-Kean Report, its authors being Mr DA Hallway, Deputy 
Secretary, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and Dr D Kean, Deputy Director-General, 
Office of National Assessments. 
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rigorous than it is. l99 The annual reporting process, combining ASIS's self­
evaluation with the critical scrutiny of SCIS, ONA and Finance, seems to us to 
provide a sound basis for the performance by SCOC of its general oversight role. 
The other mechanisms we have described provide for appropriate policy 
direction and performance assessment, and we see no reason to recommend any 
change in the present arrangements, noting however that they depend heavily on 
the continued effective functioning of SCIS. 
Should ASIS be part of SCIS? 
7.25 The Director-General of ASIS is not a member of SCIS, nor an observer 
as of right. When matters are under consideration that have a direct bearing on 
ASIS, the Director-General is invited to attend and participate in the discussion. 
The present membership of SCIS comprises the Secretary, Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet (Chair), the Secretary, Department of Defence, the 
Chief of the Defence Force, the Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, the Secretary, Attorney-General's Department, the Secretary, Department 
of Finance, the Director-General, ONA and the Director-General of Security. 
7.26 The first Hope Report (RCIS) recommended full membership of SCIS 
for the Head of ASIS, expressing the view that: 
the heads of the Intelligence Agencies should attend the committee as full 
members. They not only have an interest in what is dealt with but they have 
important advice to offer as well.200 
The recommendation was not accepted. 
7.27 In his second ·report (RCASIA), Mr Justice Hope recommended that 
full membership of the Committee be confined to department heads, with agency 
heads other than the Director-General of ONA, who would be a full member, 
being observers: 
The Director-General of ASIO, and the Director-General of ASIS, should be 
entitled to attend meetings of SCIS, but in the formal capacity of observers. 
They would be able to speak on issues in which they had an interest but would 
not be full members.201 
This, too, was rejected by Government. 
199 Exhibit 25.2, paragraph 18. 
200 Exhibit 2. 1 .3, paragraph 300. 
201 Exhibit 2.2.1 .2, paragraph 3. 15. 
79 
Cabinet and Official Control ASIS Inquiry 1995 
7.28 The arguments advanced against full membership of SCIS for the 
Director-General of ASIS appear to be the following: 
(a) the Committee should be reviewing the budgets and performance 
of the operating agencies and providing general guidance to them 
and it is therefore inappropriate for the heads of agencies to be 
full participants; 
(b) the role of SCIS is essentially one of policy co-ordination and 
advice, and it is therefore inappropriate for an agency which has 
only a collecting role to be represented, since it would have only a 
limited contribution to make to the major part of the Committee's 
work; 
(c) at least until recently the position of Director-General of ASIS has 
been below Secretary level. In any case, it is not a statutory 
position; 
(d) ASIS is co-opted frequently and as a matter of course when 
matters in which it has a direct interest are to be discussed. Its 
participation is as full as it needs to be and the arrangement is as 
efficient as could be devised. 
7.29 We accept that there is force in some of these arguments. The first 
argument, however, would also disqualify the Director-General of Security and 
the Chief of the Defence Force Staff (CDFS) . The second argument is valid in 
that current members all have responsibility for policy advice, while ASIS has 
only a policy implementation or collection role. The third is not persuasive, and 
even less so if the Government accepts our recommendation that ASIS be put on 
a statutory basis. The fourth argument has some weight, but it implies that the 
Director-General's. legitimate interest in matters concerning the intelligence 
community begins and ends with ASIS. 
7.30 The most significant argument favouring the status quo is that ASIS is 
purely a collector of intelligence, its tasks defined by an agenda set by others. 
Full membership of SCIS might suggest that ASIS is somehow a party to the 
setting of that agenda. It should not, of course, be overlooked that the 
assessment priorities are set by SCOC, on which the Minister sits, and the 
collection requirements by NICRC, in which ASIS already participates. We also 
accept that ASIS's contribution to broader policy co-ordination and development 
may be more limited than that of agencies which have a more direct policy role, 
such as ONA. 
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7.31 Against that, we believe there would be considerable value in the 
Director-General of ASIS being able to participate in broader discussions on the 
intelligence and security matters which come before SCIS. The Director­
General's perspective will often be of assistance to SCIS in these broader 
discussions. Moreover, exposure to the full range of issues coming before SCIS, 
and the opportunity to observe the responses of other agencies and departments 
to particular issues, could only enhance the Director-General's understanding 
, and l�adership of ASIS in the particular tasks assigned to it. It would also 
' symbolise ASIS's full membership of the intelligence community and remove 
any perceived disparity between ASIO and ASIS. This in turn should contribute 
to improved morale in ASIS and improve the self-assurance of the Service as a 
participant in Government. 
7.32 There is an important distinction to be drawn between ASIS and the 
two intelligence and security agencies in the Defence portfolio, DSD and DIO, 
neither of which has membership of SCIS. Those agencies report through CDFS 
and the Secretary of the Department of Defence, each of whom is a member of 
SCIS. The Director-General of ASIS, on the other hand, does not report through 
the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade but directly to the 
Minister. Whereas CDFS and the Secretary of Defence can adequately represent 
the interests of DSD and DIO at SCIS, it is not possible for the Director-General 
of ASIS to be adequately represented on SCIS by the Secretary of DFAT. Nor are 
we persuaded that the policy input of the Director-General of ONA on foreign 
intelligence can in any real sense amount to a representation of ASIS at SCIS. 
7.33 In our view, the benefits of a full relationship between ASIS and SCIS 
outweigh the arguments against any change and, like Mr Justice Hope in his first 
report, we recommend that the Director-General of ASIS be added to SCIS as a 
full member. 
National Intelligence Committee 
7.34 The focus of the National Intelligence Committee (NIC) is on the 
assessment function, and the work of ONA in particular. It provides an 
opportunity for policy departments to respond to ONA's assessments to 
comment on its work program and to identify areas of particular interest. It is 
chaired by ONA and includes senior representatives from PM&C, DFAT, 
Defence, Treasury, the Department of Primary Industries and Energy, the 
Department of Industry, Science and Technology, representatives from ADF, 
DIO and AFP, and observers from ASIS, ASIO and DSD. The monthly meetings 
of the Committee discuss ONA's monthly schedule of reports, and now include 
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reports on the preceding NICRC meeting and on recent developments of 
significance for intelligence. NIC also has formal responsibility for the 
development of the NFIAPs. 
7.35 NIC was criticised by SCIS, in the Richardson Review, as having 
become 'somewhat wooden, with little free flowing discussion and bite'.202 ONA 
regards this description as still accurate: 
probably because most of the committee members are not personally in a 
position to discuss the substance of ONA's assessments. Where members are 
able to do so, they may be constrained by the knowledge that others are not. The 
representation on NIC by a range of policy departments also limits the scope for 
discussion of issues before the intelligence community. More effective fora for 
such discussion are SCIS, HIAM or NICRC.203 
In part 2 of its 1993 Annual Report, ONA confirmed that enlivening NIC had not 
proved an easy task. 204 
7.36 Despite these reservations, it seems clear that NIC has a distinct and 
important role to play in ensuring that the output of ONA is meeting the needs 
of policy departments. So far as ASIS is concerned, NIC is of less direct 
relevance than NICRC, but ASIS's observer status means that the Service stays 
informed about areas of major interest to policy departments. This helps to 
inform the processes of setting collection requirements and tasking.205 We see no 
reason to recommend any change to the present arrangements. 
Heads of Intelligence Agencies Meeting 
7.37 The Heads of Intelligence Agencies Meeting (HIAM) comprises DG­
ONA, DG-Security, DG-ASIS, the Directors of DIO and DSD and the relevant 
Deputy Secretary from DF AT. HIAM is an informal meeting, chaired by agency 
heads in turn, which meets approximately monthly. ONA regards HIAM as a 
very valuable forum for building co-operation and avoiding misunderstandings 
among the intelligence agency heads and DFAT.206 As a gathering of high-level 
representatives of both collectors and assessors, HIAM can assist understanding 
and facilitate action on tasking approved through other mechanisms. Both Mr 
Miller and Mr Stevenson observed that the meeting acts as a forum for informal 
202 Exhibit 2.3 . 1 ,  paragraph 147. 
203 Exhibit 28. 1, p.6. 
204 Exhibit 4.3.6. 1 ,  p.6 1. 
205 T369. 
206 Exhibit 28.1, p.9 . 
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exchange of ideas before action is pursued at a higher level, such as SCIS or the 
Minister.207 The presentation of the new Defence Intelligence Assessment 
Priorities at HIAM was cited as an example of the way the meeting facilitates the 
communication of information to ASIS.208 
7.38 We see benefit in the informal interchange which HIAM allows, 
provided that its proceedings do not conflict with the formal processes within 
the framework. Its importance for ASIS would presumably diminish somewhat 
if, as we have recommended, the Director-General became a full member of 
SCIS. 
207 T268, T330. 
208 T3046. 
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Tasking 
Introduction 
8.1 Central to the control of ASIS are the procedures by which its collection 
tasks are defined. Effective external tasking mechanisms are necessary to ensure 
that ASIS does not itself determine what secret intelligence it collects but acts 
only in response to government priorities. The effectiveness of the tasking 
procedures appears to have improved progressively since the first Hope Royal 
Commission, with the result that tasks are defined more clearly, and guidance as 
to customer requirements is more specific. 
The Hope Royal Commissions 
8.2 The first Hope Report emphasised that effective tasking depends on 
clear specification of customer requirements and on critical assessment by 
customers of the value of ASIS product. When attempting to assess the value of 
ASIS output to customers, Mr Justice Hope found it difficult to make a judgment 
because consumers' assessments had been 'subjective and necessarily 
generalized'.209 The Report argued that there 'should be a continuing 
consumer's review of ASIS intelligence production . . .  to encourage improvement 
in quality and to h�lp ASIS in source development and tasking'.210 The Report 
therefore recommended the establishment of machinery to facilitate day-to-day 
criticism and evaluation of the service's reports and continuous review and up­
date of consumer requirements.211 It also called for greater consultation between 
ASIS and consumer departments at the desk level. 212 
209 Exhibit 2.1 .1 ,  paragraph 108. 
210 Ibid., paragraph 109. 
21 1 Ibid., paragraphs 109-10, 63 1-32. 
212 Ibid., paragraph 1 10. 
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8.3 The second Hope Royal Commission of 1984 re-emphasised the crucial 
importance of clear tasking in enabling a secret intelligence service to meet the 
need of its clients effectively. Mr Justice Hope remained critical of the prevailing 
situation: 
Priorities have been set pragmatically, which has sometimes meant erratically and 
on a segmented basis. Requirements have been passed on in an unco-ordinated, 
ad hoc manner. 213 
The second Hope Report was more explicit than the first in placing responsibility 
for the deficiencies on ASIS customers rather than on ASIS itself. The 
Commission found that, without guidance from customers, the job of selecting 
priorities had been passed by default on to ASIS representatives abroad.214 
8.4 The Report strongly endorsed the then newly-established National 
Intelligence Collection Requirements Committee (NICRC) as a way of bringing 
collectors and assessors together to develop priorities for intelligence 
requirements.215 It was careful to state, however, that NICRC was not a panacea 
and that tasking should remain continuous, with ad hoc requests flowing out of 
informal meetings between ASIS and its customers.216 The Report also 
recommended the establishment of the National Intelligence Committee (NIC) as 
a forum for evaluating product and for guidance on targets and sources.217 
8.5 These recommendations were accepted by the Government. By 1992 
NICRC was well established as the principal body setting the collection 
requirements for the intelligence community within the framework of the 
National Foreign Intelligence Assessment Priorities (NFIAPs), discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
The Richardson and Hollway reviews 
8.6 The Richardson Report of May 1992, reviewing nearly a decade of 
NICRC operation, affirmed the value of the Committee's contribution and 
recommended that it be assigned two new roles. It prop?sed that NICRC be 
given the authority to set mandatory requirements for intelligence collection and 
that collectors should be required to show the effort they had made in meeting 
them. In addition, the Report recommended that ASIS and the Defence Signals 
213 Exhibit 2.2.2.3, paragraph 3.53. 
214 Ibid., paragraph 3.54. 
215 Ibid., paragraph 3.56. See also Exhibit 2.5, paragraph 86. 
216 Ibid., paragraph 3.58. 
217 Ibid., paragraph 3.57. 
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Directorate (DSD) should report monthly to NICRC on the tasking they had 
received from customer agencies, so as to eliminate potentially overlapping or 
conflicting priorities.218 The Report also recommended that the Office of 
National Assessments (ONA) upgrade Part Two of its annual report to provide a 
sharper and more helpful overview of the intelligence community's 
performance, which could better inform decisions about strategic directions.219 
8.7 The Hollway Report of November 1992 identified tasking as an issue 
of management and co-ordination. Although tasking procedures had improved, 
partly as a result of the Richardson review, there was still a lack of sufficiently 
clear and precise guidance from customers to the collection agencies.220 Hollway 
called for 'collegial, well-informed dialogue' between collectors and customers, 
to ensure that customers knew what was reasonable - and unreasonable - to 
expect from collectors. Dialogue could be facilitated if customers were educated 
about the range of collection capabilities available to them and understood the 
operational challenges which collectors faced.221 ONA should make itself known 
as a source of advice to departments needing help in registering collection 
requirements. The contribution of NICRC and NIC to co-ordination of tasking 
priorities could be enhanced, for example by NICRC 'sorting out' different views 
amongst collection and assessment agencies about the relative value of different 
forms of intelligence; and by closer co-operation between NICRC (representing 
collectors and assessors) and NIC (representing ONA and its customers) to make 
tasking more _precise and to promote the giving of earlier notice of collection 
requirements to relevant agencies.222 
8.8 These recommendations of the Richardson and Hollway Reports were 
accepted by the Government and have become part of tasking procedures and 
practices. The existing arrangements by which ASIS is tasked are discussed in 
the following section. 
National Intelligence Collection Requirements CommiHee 
8.9 NICRC is the highest level body which sets overall collection 
requirements. The Committee is a meeting place for the main assessment and 
collection agencies. The Committee is chaired by ONA and includes the Defence 
218 Exhibit 2.3, paragraphs 150- 1 .  
219 Ibid., paragraph 144. 
220 Exhibit 3.4.5.6. 1 ,  paragraph 233. 
221 Ibid., paragraph 234. 
222 Ibid., paragraph 238. 
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Intelligence Organisation (DIO), the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT), the Department of Defence, the Australian Defence Force, ASIS, ASIO 
and DSD - and the Australian Federal Police and Customs for transnational 
issues. Other agencies may be co-opted from time to time. NICRC meets 
monthly unless there is an event which requires an ad hoc meeting. 
8.10 NICRC determines the broad priorities on which intelligence 
collectors, both overt and covert, are expected to focus their collection efforts. 
Priorities are set within the framework of government guidance provided by the 
NFIAPs. ONA, in consultation with relevant policy departments, uses the 
NFIAPs to prepare detailed collection requirements papers on individual 
countries and on major issues in world affairs. The papers list the most 
important collection requirements in priority order. They are considered during 
the monthly meetings of NICRC, where the collectors have the opportunity to 
ensure that the requirements are clear and appropriate.223 Meetings also discuss 
current key topics on which collectors should focus their attention in the coming 
month. NICRC assigns appropriate agencies to each collection requirement on 
the basis of ONA recommendations. Adjustments may be made after 
considering collectors' own appraisal of their capabilities. 
8.11  ONA identified the main limitation of requirements papers as being 
that they do not always provide the best tasking format for the different 
agencies. While they are suitable for DSD tasking, the requirements papers are 
less useful for ASIS which 'prefers its tasking to be in the form of a set of 
questions to which it can pursue answers'.224 ONA does not, as a result, treat the 
requirements papers as definitive in all circumstances. It recognises the need for 
frequent interaction between analysts and collectors to ensure that collectors are 
responsive to shifting priorities.225 
8.12 As noted above, the authority of NICRC in setting and co-ordinating 
requirements for ASIS and other collection agencies has been enhanced in recent 
years. ONA's view is that NICRC is increasing in 'vitality and effect'.226 ONA 
considers that, after some initial hesitation, ASIS has responded well to the new 
arrangements.227 The Director-General of ASIS said that the evolution of NICRC 
was a very positive step forward in systematising the whole requirements 
223 Exhibit 28. 1, p.7. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid, p.8. 
226 Ibid, p.3. 
227 T338-9. 
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process and that mandatory requirements had helped ensure that collectors were 
more accountable.228 
8.13 Some important reservations were, however, expressed about the 
workings of NICRC. The Secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, Dr Keating, told the Commission that the requirements laid down by 
NICRC were often very broad, and so did not always provide a sound basis for 
decisions on collection options.229 He considered that the accountability 
provided by the monthly report to NICRC on total tasking was deficient because 
NICRC requirements were broad enough to allow most tasking to be easily 
justified. This practice, in Dr Keating's view, meant that considered judgments 
based on the whole range of collection options were not being made. Instead, 
the tendency was for judgments to be left solely to ASIS and individual 
customers. 230 
8.14 A senior ASIS Intelligence Officer suggested that effectiveness and 
accountability would be enhanced if more detailed requirements were 
determined by a lower-level sub-committee of NICRC which included 
representatives of collectors who understood the challenges and limitations of 
secret intelligence.231 A senior DIO officer confirmed that ASIS preferred a far 
more specific level of tasking than generally appears at NICRC, and that a good 
deal of DIO's tasking of ASIS was at a more detailed level.232 
8.15 We are satisfied that the collection requirements laid down by NICRC 
provide the necessary framework to guide ASIS in its strategic planning and 
general collection activities - and an appropriate framework within which the 
specific requirements of customers can be advised to ASIS. It is essential that this 
framework exist, and that the priority requirements be identified, so that ASIS is 
in a position to satisfy itself that a particular customer requirement is consistent 
with the overall collection and assessment priorities of the Government. Within 
that framework, the onus is on ASIS and on individual customers to ensure that 
specific tasking is clear and precise. 
228 T266. 
229 Exhibit 25.3, p.4. 
230 Ibid. 
231 T1063. 
232 T3045. 
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Direct tasking of ASIS 
8.16 In addition to the tasking of ASIS through the mechanisms of NICRC, 
ASIS is tasked directly by customers. Such tasking and· associated consultation 
in support of tasking includes: 
(a) written requirements to ASIS; 
(b) day-to-day contact between ASIS Intelligence Branch (and other 
ASIS officers), and officers of customer agencies at a working 
level. Such discussions frequently give rise to requirements in 
writing; 
(c) discussions at informal contact groups of analysts working on a 
particular country; 
(d) Comment Sheets on previous ASIS reports which include further 
tasking in the form of follow-up questions; and 
(e) requirements which can emerge from operations, e.g. where a 
source identifies a matter as being worthy of further inquiry.233 
Improving customer liaison 
8.17 A major part of successful tasking is matching customer requirements 
with the capabilities of the collection agencies. As the Hollway Report 
emphasised, this means that customers must be well informed about what the 
collectors can and cannot do. As the head of DIO acknowledged, this is essential 
if agencies such as his own are to task ASIS 'in a reasonable sense'. Knowing 
that ASIS has 'certain people in certain places' enables analysts from assessment 
agencies to frame their requirements appropriately.234 ASIS collection 
capabilities can take a long time to establish, and it is important that analysts 
have an appreciation of the challenges which ASIS faces in the field. Major­
General Hartley, Director of DIO, suggested that, in the past, customers may 
have tasked a number of agencies at the same time in the hope of getting 
something from at least one, but with limited knowledge of what was really 
possible.235 This not only duplicates effort, but often results in requirements 
being incompletely met, with frustrated analysts unable to get the information 
they really want. With a good understanding of the capabilities of individual 
233 Exhibit 20. 1 . 10, pp.4-5. 
234 T3050. 
235 T305 1 .  
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collectors, analysts can direct their requirements to the most appropriate 
collector. 
8.18 If ASIS is to take seriously its characterisatio� of the agencies as 
'customers', it must educate those customers in how to make the best use of its 
services. Ensuring that customers understand the possibilities and limitations of 
secret intelligence collection should be a primary ASIS responsibility. 
8.19 Success in this educative task will depend on the quality of ASIS's 
liaison with customers. The liaison function of ASIS is, in the main, the 
responsibility of the Intelligence Branch of the Operations Division. The 
Intelligence Branch operates as a clearing house for reporting from Stations 
overseas, passing it on to customer agencies and receiving feedback from them. 
The Director of Customer Liaison and desk officers from Intelligence Branch 
maintain regular personal contact with analysts in the major customer agencies. 
ASIS liaison provides 'an essential facilitation channel in the tasking process . . .  
with expert advice on ASIS capabilities and limitations and the likelihood of 
tasking levied on ASIS being satisfactorily achieved'.236 
Tasking and customer feedback 
8.20 Customer comment on ASIS reporting is almost as important to the 
tasking process as precision and realism in the initial definition of a collection 
requirement. Comment from a customer about whether or not a report was 
useful can help to focus further tasking of the particular station and source. It 
also assists ASIS in its evaluation of its performance. 
8.21 If the tasking improves, the customer ultimately benefits from the 
improved reporting. As a senior manager in the Intelligence Branch put it, ASIS 
customers have an interest in keeping the flow of intelligence alive by nourishing 
it with good questions and comments.237 DIO clearly appreciates the importance 
of good feedback: 
DIO's impression is that where an analyst goes to some trouble in providing 
comment, ASIS regards that as valuable and this often results in further reporting 
of relevance to the analyst. Analysts have become aware of this and the quality 
and rigour of comments and responses have improved accordingly.238 
236 Secretary, Department of Defence, exhibit 35.1,  paragraph 6. 1 .3. 
237 T3308. 
238 Ibid., paragraph 6. 1.4. 
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8.22 The principal means by which customers communicate their 
assessment of ASIS output is through comment sheets attached to most ASIS 
reports. Part A of the comment sheet asks recipients to evaluate a report on the 
basis of two criteria: the report's value to the analyst; and the credibility of the 
information it contains. This evaluation is a quantitative one which invites a 
score of A to D for value and 1 to 4 for credibility. Part B of the comment sheet 
provides space for supplementary comment and for follow-up questions. Where 
such comments are made, there are usually follow-up questions placing a further 
requirement on the Service. Officers take greater note of the comments and 
follow-up questions on the sheet than the numerical rating.239 
8.23 ASIS could enhance the quality of the customer feedback it collects by 
impressing on policy departments the value which such feedback can add, and 
by sharpening the focus of its questions. This might involve both some redesign 
of the comment sheets and the greater cultivation of personal contacts by officers 
in the Intelligence Branch. The Commission endorses the view expressed in the 
Foreign Intelligence Planning Document: 
ASIS is sometimes too influenced, or is badly influenced, by feedback from 
assessment agency analysts. They provide most of the comment that ASIS 
receives through comment sheets that it attaches to its reports. And the 
comment sheets constitute almost all the routine feedback received by the 
stations ... Stations should be made less dependent on the comment sheets. ASIS 
needs to do more to solicit and record comment from policy departments, who 
are best placed to comment on the 'actionability' of the information, on how it 
affected outcomes.240 
8.24 While we see value in seeking to enhance customer comment on 
individual reports, we doubt that any system of customer comment can be 
sufficiently standardised to enable any useful aggregation of statistics. The 
principal difficulty is the uneven nature of customer response, which was well 
summarised by Dr Keating: 
239 T3306. 
Customers are often unable or unwilling to provide adequate commentary on 
intelligence reporting. Lack of time often prevents senior policy makers from 
providing any commentary at all, let alone commentary that is useful ... 
Customers often will not have thought carefully about what the criteria should 
be for judging the value of a secret report ... Critical assessment requires careful 
thought by customers, and so is time consuming and leads to uneven responses 
from customers.241 
240 Exhibit 4.4.4, paragraph 345. 
241 Exhibit 25.3, p.l .  
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8.25 ASIS's efforts to improve the quality of its liaison and consultation with 
customers are to be commended, and should be maintained. One way to 
facilitate further improvement is through internal restructuring. 
8.26 Overall, the Commission believes the processes by which ASIS is 
tasked are well developed and enhanc� the accountability and control of ASIS. 
The conclusicns we have reached and the recommendations we make should be 
seen as refinements and as encouraging further progress in directions that are 
already being properly pursued. 
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Chapter 9 
Oversight by the Inspector-General of 
Intelligence and Security 
The role first envisaged for the Inspector-General 
9.1 The office of Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) was 
established in February 1987, after the 1984 Hope Royal Commission (RCASIA). 
In his report on ASIO, Mr Justice Hope had recommended a body with powers 
to inquire into that organization's compliance with the law; the propriety of its 
actions in more general terms; and the appropriateness and effectiveness of its 
internal procedures.242 In his General Report, he further proposed that the 
Inspector-General should oversee intelligence agencies other than ASIO to the 
extent that their activities came within Australian law or could affect the rights of 
Australian citizens, commenting: 
Since the rights or standing of Australian citizens would rarely be involved, this 
responsibility should not be onerous but it would be valuable in providing an 
assurance for the Minister and the public, as well as a protection for the services, 
if allegations of misconduct are made against them. 243 
9.2 Mr Justice Hope emphasised that the role of the Inspector-General 
would be to assist ministers in meeting their accountability obligations, and not 
to assist in the management of the intelligence agencies. He wrote in respect of 
ASIO: 
it would be a mistake to interpose an additional officer in such a way as to 
interfere with or blur the essential line of responsibility from the Director­
General [of ASIO] to the Attorney-General and through him to the Parliament. 
The executive responsibility for decisions in relation to domestic security rests 
with the Attorney-General and, within statutory limits, the Director-General. . . .  
242 Exhibit 2.2.4, paragraph 16.9 1 .  
243 Exhibit 2.2 . 1 .2, paragraph 3.2 1 .  
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The creation of a new position with power to second guess or take over 
managerial or administrative decisions would confuse the issue of responsibility 
and could lead to 'buck-passing' among those concerned.244 
9.3 In relation to ASIO, the Inspector-General was to be an independent 
person with power to maintain a close scrutiny of ASIO's performance of its 
functions, and to look into complaints, in order to give greater assurance to the 
Attorney-General, and through him Parliament and the public, that ASIO was 
acting with propriety and within its charter.245 
In his report on ASIS, Mr Justice Hope similarly proposed: 
The role of the Inspector-General is not designed to affect or intrude on the line 
of responsibility from the Director-General to the Minister. Rather it is designed 
to give the Minister the assistance of an independent watchdog who could, 
through his inquiries and reports, provide greater assurance to the Minister about 
the state of affairs in ASIS. In so doing, he would also provide the Minister with 
a firmer base on which to account to Parliament.246 
9.4 Mr Justice Hope laid greater emphasis on the monitoring function of 
the new office than on the investigation of complaints. Although he saw a need 
for a means by which members of the public and employees of the intelligence 
and security agencies could raise complaints about the agencies, and thought it 
appropriate that the Inspector-General provide that facility, Mr Justice Hope did 
not propose that it be the main function of the office.247 The balance he sought is 
captured in his phrase 'an independent person with power to maintain a close 
scrutiny of ASIO's performance of its functions, and to look into complaints'.248 
9.5 Mr Justice Hope recommended that the Inspector-General report to the 
relevant minister on inquiries. However, where the findings of an inquiry went 
to the propriety or some other aspect of a ministerial direction to ASIO, the 
Inspector-General should also provide a copy of the report to the Prime Minister. 
In addition, the Inspector-General should prepare an annual report, a copy of 
which should be given to the Leader of the Opposition and an edited version 
tabled in Parliament.249 
244 Exhibit 2.2.4, paragraph 16.83. 
245 Ibid., paragraph 16.84. 
246 Exhibit 2.2.2.6. 
247 Exhibit 2.2.4, paragraph 16.84. 
248 Ibid., paragraph 16.84. 
249 Exhibit 2.2.4, paragraphs 16.93- 16.97. 
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9.6 The Hope proposal was thus intended to protect the rights of 
Australian citizens and residents against possible errors or excesses by the 
intelligence and security agencies and to guard against breaches of Australian 
law by the agencies. It was not a proposal for a check on the general 
effectiveness or appropriateness of the agencies' operations. The Inspector­
General was not to second-guess or take over managerial or administrative 
responsibilities, nor to diminish the responsibility of agency heads to their 
ministers, or ministers to Parliament, for the execution of the agencies' work. 
The jurisdiction and powers assigned to the Inspector-General 
9.7 The importance which Mr Justice Hope attached to the proposed office 
of Inspector-General is indicated by the administrative arrangements he 
recommended. The proposed office should be attached to the Prime Minister's 
Department and have a statutory base. It should have access to files and other 
materials held by the agencies it was to oversee, and the power to require 
answers to questions from their officers, to the extent necessary to carry out its 
functions. The Inspector-General should be carefully selected, and would hold a 
personal rather than an institutional office (although a small staff would be 
needed) for a term of appointment of three to four years, renewable no more 
than once. Because of the need for wide acceptance of the office, the Government 
should consult with the Opposition on any proposed appointment to it.250 
9.8 The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986 (the IGIS 
Act) which came into operation on 1 February 1987, closely followed the Hope 
proposals in these regards. The Act provides for the Inspector-General to 
oversee those activities of the five intelligence and security agencies (ASIO, ASIS, 
DSD, DIO and ONA) which have the potential to affect the rights of Australians 
or to breach Australian law. The extent of the oversight role varies for the 
different agencies according to the nature of their activities. At its furthest 
extent, in respect of ASIO, oversight by IGIS applies to: 
(a) compliance with Australian law; 
(b) compliance with directions or guidelines given by the responsible 
minister; 
(c) the propriety of particular agency activities; 
250 Ibid, paragraphs 16.86- 16.90. 
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(d) the effectiveness and appropriateness of agency procedures 
relating to the legality or propriety of activities; and 
(e) acts or practices of agencies referred to IGIS by the Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission (s.8(1)(a)). 
9.9 Inquiries of these types into ASIO may be initiated by IGIS of his or her 
own motion, by the Minister, or in response to complaints. In addition, the 
Prime Minister may request inquiries under the headings (a) to (d) above (s.9) . 
There are also two heads of inquiry specific to ASIO, concerned with the rights of 
Australians upon whom the Organization has reported, and with ministerial 
directions to ASIO (ss.8(1)(c), 8(1)(d)) . 
9.10 Since the operations of ASIS are mostly overseas and have very limited 
potential to affect Australians, ASIS is less open to inquiry by IGIS. A ministerial 
request is necessary before IGIS may inquire into matters which do not affect 
Australians, or which do not involve possible breaches of Australian law (s.8(4)). 
The same condition applies to inquiries into the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of ASIS's procedures relating to the legality or propriety of its 
activities (s.8(2)(c)) .  Ministerial approval is required for an inquiry into any 
matter concerning ASIS which occurred outside Australia or before the 
commencement of the Act in 1987 (s.8(8)) .  
9.11 IGIS's independent power to initiate inquiries into ASIS, in the 
discharge of the oversight function of the office, is therefore limited to matters 
affecting Australians or involving possible breaches of Australian law, and 
occurring in Australia since 1987. Wider inquiries may only be undertaken at 
the request or with the approval of the Government. As a result, such assurance 
as the oversight work of IGIS can provide to the public and the Parliament about 
ASIS does not flow from any power of systematic review of all the Service's 
activities. 
How oversight by the Inspector-General has developed 
9.12 The second Hope Royal Commission reported in December 1984 and 
Cabinet had decided by June 1985 to implement its recommendations on an 
Inspector-General. The IGIS Act was then drafted and administrative 
arrangements for the Office were made, in a process coordinated by the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) and the Secretaries 
Committee on Intelligence and Security (SCIS). The legislation was approved by 
the Security Committee of Cabinet (SCOC) on 30 April 1986 and passed by 
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Parliament later that year.251 A Deputy Secretary of PM&C who had been closely 
involved in the development of the arrangements, Mr Neil Mcinnes, was 
appointed as the first Inspector-General in February 1987, following consultation 
with the Leader of the Opposition.252 
9 .13 Mr Mcinnes told the Commission that there had been concern within 
the Australian intelligence community (AIC) about the potential scope of IGIS's 
activities and that this was manifest in SCIS's deliberations on the proposal. The 
PM&C files support Mr Mcinnes' recollection.253 They record opposition from 
the heads of intelligence agencies to various proposals which would have 
implied a wider-ranging role for the Inspector-General. The agencies of the 
Australian intelligence community also sought to keep open the option of a part­
time IGIS, and to limit the staff appointed to support the Inspector-General to 
one or two research officers and a steno-secretary.254 A proposal for an assistant 
to IGIS at Senior Executive Service level was initially rejected, although that 
position was soon established. The views of the intelligence agencies did not 
lead to any significant reduction in the scope of activities recommended for IGIS 
and approved by SCOC. They did, however, signal to Mr Mcinnes a lack of 
enthusiasm within the Australian intelligence community for his new office.255 
9. 14 During his three-year term, Mr Mcinnes found no occasion to test the 
agencies' reactions to his office outside the context of inquiries into complaints 
and monitoring of activities that might affect Australians. In his evidence to this 
Commission, he summed up his view of the role of IGIS in the following terms: 
The only 'assistance' Ministers expect from IGIS is to protect the Government by 
dealing with complaints from the public. And that role, his true role, is more 
accurately described as protecting the public from the invasion or oppression of 
rights by intelligence agencies. 256 
9. 15 Within that conception of IGIS's role, Mr Mcinnes identified some 
areas in which IGIS 'need not wait for individual complaints but should act to 
see that there is no occasion for them'.257 They were: checking ASIS's and DSD's 
reporting for Australian names; monitoring ASIO's procurement and use of 
warrants for telephone interception and entry onto property. Mr Mcinnes began 
251 PM&C File 86/075, Part 4, folios 78, 189, 200. 
252 Ibid., Part 5, folio 2 1 .  
253 Ibid., T853. 
254 Ibid, Part 1, folios 2, 66. 
255 T854. 
256 Exhibit 32. 1 .2, p.2. 
257 Ibid. 
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regular monitoring of each of these processes, initiating the ASIO process with 
an own-motion inquiry.2ss 
9. 16  Mr Mcinnes also dealt with 34 complaints during his three-year term. 
All concerned ASIO, and 11, from a total of 23 persons, were grievances of 
current or former officers.259 Most of the public complaints were resolved by Mr 
Mcinnes' conclusion after a preliminary inquiry that they had no basis and so 
advising the complainants. Three led to full inquiries and reports to the 
Minister. Contrary to expectations when the office was created, staff grievances 
represented a significant part of its workload from the beginning. Mr Mcinnes 
conducted a full inquiry into one of the grievances he received, and an inquiry of 
his own motion into ASIO's procedures relating to the redress of staff grievances. 
As a result of the latter, he proposed various changes to procedures.260 
9.17 At the end of his term of office, Mr Mcinnes suggested that, since the 
monitoring function had been established and experience had indicated that 
there would be few serious public complaints, the Government should consider a 
part-time appointment to replace him.261 However, his successor, Mr Roger 
Holdich, was appointed from the end of September 1989 on a full-time basis and 
reappointed in September 1992. On both occasions, the Leader of the Opposition 
was consulted first.262 
9. 18 The annual incidence of complaints approximately doubled during Mr 
Holdich's first term and a high rate of complaints has continued. A significant 
proportion of the complaints has been staff grievances, especially from serving 
and former ASIO officers, but including also the grievances relating to ASIS 
which came before this Commission.263 Complaints work, including staff 
grievances, came to dominate IGIS' s work program and Mr Holdich told the 
Commission that, although he would like to undertake more monitoring work 
and inquiries of his own motion, the time and resources necessarily devoted to 
the resolution of complaints has precluded this.264 He estimated that complaints 
had come to occupy 75-80 per cent of his time in recent years, an increase from 
about 30 per cent when he was first appointed in 1989.265 
258 T860. 
259 Exhibit 23.8. 1 .  
260 Ibid. 
261 Exhibit 23.4. 1 .  
262 Exhibit 23.4. 18. 
263 Exhibit 23.6; Exhibit 23.8. 1 .  
264 Exhibit 23.3, paragraph 39; Tl41 .  
265 T140. 
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9.19 The average staffing of the office under Mr Holdich was about 30 per 
cent higher than it had been under Mr Mcinnes, and the number of complaints 
resolved per staff member per year doubled. But the office was still 'well and 
truly swamped' by complaints in the early 1990s, according to the 1992-93 annual 
report of IGIS.266 
9.20 Neither Mr Mcinnes nor Mr Holdich received any requests from 
Ministers for inquiries to be undertaken. On each occasion when Mr Holdich has 
sought the approval of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to inquire into 
complaints about ASIS concerning matters that had occurred overseas or before 
the commencement of the Act, the approval has been given. All these complaints 
related to employment matters and originated with officers, former officers, or 
their spouses. 
9.21 The amount of time IGIS has devoted in recent years to his function in 
relation to inquiries into staff grievances has, in our view, distracted him from 
the general monitoring and oversight functions, and unduly reduced the 
attention which should have been given to these functions. We regard this as a 
matter of concern. It is partly for that reason, though principally for other 
substantive reasons, that we recommend in Chapter 14 that external review of 
grievances be removed from the jurisdiction of IGIS. One of the effects of that 
would be to allow IGIS to concentrate most of the energies of the office on the 
monitoring and oversight functions which we will be recommending be 
expanded in their coverage. 
9.22 We deal in the rest of this chapter with the central role for IGIS 
envisaged by Mr Justice Hope, the monitoring or oversight role. We deal with 
IGIS's role in the resolution of grievances and complaints in Chapter 14. 
How the Inspector-General should oversee ASIS 
9.23 The office of IGIS was established in a context which emphasised its 
role in providing assurance to ministers that the intelligence agencies were not 
encroaching on the rights of Australians or operating in breach of Australian 
law. Within that context, IGIS now regularly monitors six aspects of the 
activities of the agencies. Only one aspect of the monitoring is directly associated 
with ASIS; that concerning its adherence to the rules on retention and 
communication of information about Australians. Another regular IGIS check -
266 Exhibit 4.10.7, p. l . 
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that of ASIO's operations under warrant - includes operations undertaken in 
Australia at ASIS's request. 
9.24 Other activities of ASIS which might be monitored are not currently 
the subject of any systematic external review, and IGIS would be excluded from 
review of most of them except at the request of the Minister. Neither of the 
occupants of the office has sought to widen the scope of its activities by, for 
example, inviting the Minister to request particular inquiries, or by expanding, 
where possible, the range of routine monitoring of ASIS undertaken under the 
own-motion power.267 As already indicated, this may have been the result, in 
part at least, of the demands placed on IGIS in recent years by the large volume 
of complaints received.268 
9.25 It has been accepted since the office was established that IGIS has a role 
in providing general public reassurance about the operations of the agencies. 
This was acknowledged by the Attorney-General when he summed up the role 
of the office in the second reading speech on the IGIS Bill: 
We believe that the legislation establishes an office which will, to paraphrase the 
Royal Commissioner, provide an independent oversight of the agencies' 
activities, give the public a greater assurance that those activities are proper ones, 
and clear the agencies, or bring them to task, as the case may be, if allegations of 
improper conduct are made against them.269 
9.26 It was not disputed in the evidence that the public has a right to 
reassurance about the general propriety of the activities of the intelligence 
agencies. The interests of Australians are affected by activities which are 
undertaken on their behalf, and which they fund, even when their rights are not 
directly affected, or the activities do not breach Australian law. The Government 
is publicly accountable for those activities. 
9.27 Nevertheless, it is clear from the Act governing IGIS that the extent of 
monitoring of ASIS and the nature of the assurance it was to provide, was to be 
directed not to the full range of ASIS activities but to the limited range which 
impact directly on Australian citizens or which may involve breaches of 
Australian law. These are the areas in which IGIS was given the power to 
initiate inquiries. Part of the reason for this may have been that the control and 
accountability of ASIS, unlike ASIO, was to be achieved through executive 
direction rather than legislation - and the associated reason that many of the 
267 T183-9 1 .  
268 Exhibit 23.3, paragraph 39. 
269 Exhibit 3.2.4, p.3706. 
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activities of ASIS, unlike those of ASIO, are undertaken overseas and have 
limited direct impact on Australian citizens. In practice therefore, and not 
surprisingly, routine monitoring of ASIS by IGIS has been directed principally at 
the issue of retention and use of information on Australians.270 
9.28 In his final submission, Mr Holdich proposed some relaxation of the 
statutory limitations on his power to initiate inquiries. In particular, he argued 
that: 
(a) s.8(4) should be amended to allow inquiry of the Inspector­
General's own motion into the propriety of ASIS activities within 
Australia which affect non-citizens and non-residents; and 
(b) s.8(2)(c) should be amended to allow IGIS to inquire, in response 
to a complaint or on his/her own initiative, into the effectiveness 
and appropriateness of ASIS's procedures relating to the legality 
or propriety of its activities. 271 
9.29 We are not persuaded that the restrictions implicit in the need for 
ministerial approval in some cases, and a ministerial request in others, would in 
practice prevent the Inspector-General from mounting inquiries he was 
determined to pursue. We think it unlikely that a Minister would decline to 
approve an inquiry by IGIS in circumstances where an Inspector-General 
regarded the case for it as compelling. The need for ministerial approval or 
request may lead to negotiations on the scope of an inquiry, and the manner of 
approach to it, in circumstances where the proposed inquiry concerns matters of 
particular sensitivity. We accept that there could be cases where such 
negotiation was appropriate and do not see this as being likely to impede the 
conduct of a necessary inquiry. This is especially so given that IGIS can report to 
Parliament if authority for an inquiry is sought and refused. 
9.30 We accept, however, that there is a difference of emphasis between a 
requirement for ministerial approval of an inquiry - which the Inspector-General 
can initiate - and a provision limiting inquiries to those requested by the 
Minister, which the Inspector-General regards himself as unable to initiate.272 If 
the present requirements for a ministerial request as the pre-condition for an 
inquiry were replaced by requirements for ministerial approval, this would 
remove any implication that IGIS was inhibited in investigating issues of 
270 T172. 
271 Exhibit 45.3.1 ,  paragraph 20. 
272 Exhibit 23.3, paragraph 48; See also T176. 
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concern, while still allowing the Minister to consider how matters of operational 
sensitivity should be investigated. We therefore recommend that ss.8(2)(c) and 
8(4) be amended to make clear that, provided ministerial approval is first 
obtained, IGIS may inquire into the procedures of ASIS governing the legality 
and propriety of its activities, and into actions of ASIS within Australia which do 
not affect Australians and do not involve any possible violation of Australian 
law. 
9.31 As far as ASIS activities abroad are concerned, IGIS initially expressed 
the view that he should not require ministerial approval before examining 
activities abroad which affected Australian citizens or permanent residents.273 
This proposition was opposed by the Minister,274 and was not maintained in the 
Inspector-General's final submission, which accepted that the pre-condition of 
ministerial approval could be justified as a means of protecting sensitive 
operational activities. We agree. 
9.32 Mr Holdich argued that the power to conduct a preliminary inquiry 
should not be confined, as at present, to an inquiry prompted by a complaint. 
The power should also be available when the Inspector-General is contemplating 
an inquiry of his own motion.275 We see merit in this proposal and recommend 
that the power in this respect be widened. 
9.33 The amendments we propose affect DSD as well as ASIS. Our Terms 
of Reference have not required us to consider the practical implications of 
applying the changes to DSD, but we expect that the principles of accountability 
and control which have guided our recommendations on ASIS would apply 
equally to DSD. 
9.34 We agree with Mr Holdich that the degree of assurance to the Minister 
and the public would be enhanced if IGIS increased the level of monitoring 
activity by extending the areas over which regular oversight is maintained, 
within the jurisdictional limits, and by assigning a higher priority and dedicated 
resources to this function. As Mr Holdich acknowledges, this would require a 
deliberate emphasis on own motion inquiries, treating them as a non­
discretionary aspect of the office's agenda.276 Such an approach would be 
consistent with the primacy of the monitoring function envisaged for the Office. 
273 T164. 
274 Exhibit 39. 1, answer to question 3 1 . 
275 Exhibit 45.3.4, paragraph 85.6. 
276 Exhibit 45.3. 1, paragraph 2 1(a). 
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The development of a systematic plan of monitoring activities in relation to ASIS 
would, we think, be feasible and is overdue. 
Monitoring of ASIS dealings with information on Australians 
9.35 As we have pointed out in Chapter 3, ASIS has, since 1988, been subject 
to Cabinet-approved rules governing its collection, retention and communication 
of information concerning Australian citizens. We have recommended that those 
rules be given legislative force. One benefit of this would be to make plain the 
circumstances in which, and the purposes for which, ASIS is entitled to hold and 
pass on such information. 
9.36 In his 1993-94 annual report, the Inspector-General reported that he 
had visited ASIS on several occasions to examine the holdings on Australian 
citizens and permanent residents. This investigation was prompted by the 
assertion that ASIS improperly held thousands of files and cards on Australian 
citizens. The Inspector-General found nothing of concern, a conclusion which 
we have independently confirmed.277 
9.37 The Inspector-General indicated in evidence that he regarded further 
investigation of these holdings as a high priority, to which he would devote any 
additional resources which might become available for his monitoring role.278 
The Inspector-General is conscious that he has so far examined only a very small 
proportion of ASIS's holdings on Australians279 and, given sufficient resources, 
would propose to hold a more systematic inquiry.280 
9.38 This regular monitoring provides a valuable assurance and should be 
continued. The monitoring would be enhanced if ASIS established, for internal 
use, a list of the categories of information concerning Australians which ASIS 
staff were permitted to collect and retain. ASIS in practice uses categories similar 
to those identified in our own investigation281 but a clearly defined list would 
operate both as a guide and as a discipline for the Service. In particular, it would 
assist the Inspector-General in assessing whether a particular holding was 
permitted by the rules or by the legislative provisions which we recommend 
should replace them. 
277 See Chapter 15. 
278 T141. 
279 T722. 
280 T159. 
281 T*lOlS*. 
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9.39 The Inspector-General's annual reports have also referred to his 
monitoring of references to Australians in the intelligence reports which ASIS 
distributes. This process is likewise governed by the 1988 rules. We are satisfied 
that this monitoring is comprehensive and results in any apparent departures 
from the rules being identified, and ASIS being called on to provide justification. 
This monitoring would similarly be enhanced if ASIS were required, in any case 
where a report was distributed containing information about an Australian, to 
annotate its own copy of the report with a reference to the provision of the rules ­
or the proposed legislation - authorising its communication. We recommend 
accordingly. 
The gap in assurance 
9.40 These various modifications of the legal framework and of the 
approach to monitoring should enhance the Inspector-General's oversight of 
ASIS. But the range of ASIS's activities covered will remain quite limited. We 
accept the necessity for this because we can see no sensible basis on which an 
agency whose oversight functions are directed - as they should be - to review of 
and assurance about the legality and propriety of actions undertaken in 
Australia, or affecting Australian citizens, can ply a similar trade in relation to 
the operational activity of ASIS. 
9.41 We are comforted that there is, in addition to the monitoring by IGIS, a 
range of other mechanisms for review and assurance to the Minister, 
Government and Parliament that ASIS is properly performing the functions 
assigned to it. In particular: 
(a) ONA and the tasking and evaluation mechanisms of the AIC 
provide a check on the tasks ASIS undertakes and the quality of 
its product; 
(b) DFAT supports the Minister's assessment of the risks and benefits 
of particular operations. The Department's relationship with 
ASIS helps to keep the Minister informed of the Service's activities 
and provides a view from outside ASIS on many of them; 
(c) SCIS supports the Government's general oversight of ASIS, 
including through detailed reviews such as that of Richardson; 
(d) the Auditor-General currently provides assurance through 
auditing of the non-exempt accounts. If the Government accepts 
our recommendations, that assurance will be strengthened by the 
auditing of the entire ASIS accounts. 
104 
Oversight by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security ASIS Inquiry 1995 
9.42 There remains, however, a significant gap in the assurance available to 
the Minister. The Minister is wholly reliant on the Director-General in the area 
of compliance by the Service with those parts of the Directive relating to 
operational control - specifically, the proscription of certain kinds of activity by 
ASIS in its operations, and the requirements of ministerial approval for specified 
operational activity. The legislation which we recommend will substantially 
replace the Directive but it will contain proscriptions, both explicit and implicit. 
The categories of activity requiring ministerial approval will be the central part 
of the supplementary directive which we recommend be issued. 
9.43 It is not that we have found evidence to suggest that ASIS has failed in 
the past to adhere assiduously to those parts of the Directive. On the contrary an 
audit conducted by Commission staff enables us to give the kind of assurance to 
the Minister which we consider is necessary, on a regular basis, to fill the gap we 
have identified. 
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The Protection of Sources 
and Methods 
What should be protected? 
10.1 The proposition that secrecy is crucial to the operations of a secret 
intelligence service is incontrovertible. 282 Since the primary function of ASIS is 
to collect secret foreign intelligence, it necessarily follows that information about 
its intelligence collection activities - where, how and by whom they are carried 
out - must remain secret if the activities are to be viable. 
10.2 The importance of secrecy is heightened by ASIS' s dependence on 
human source intelligence. In responding to media disclosures in early 1994, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs reminded editors that: 
ASIS relies upon people who, sometimes at considerable risk to their lives and 
liberties, are willing to provide Australia with the information it needs. These 
sources of intelligence are a national asset and require protection - indeed, ASIS 
and the Government have an obligation and a duty to protect Australia's sources 
and hold secure information about them. Source protection is the reason for the 
secrecy that surrounds ASIS ... 283 
10.3 Disclosure of information about a particular operation directly affects 
the operation itself and those involved. Such disclosure is also likely to have 
indirect effects which are detrimental to the operational effectiveness of ASIS. 
10.4 There are also adverse consequences of a non-operational kind. Both 
ASIS and the Minister refer to the damage which may be caused to Australia's 
foreign relations by the disclosure of an ASIS operation.284 ASIS is also 
282 Exhibit 20. 1, paragraph 2. 1 .  
283 Exhibit 12.9 . 1 ;  Exhibit 12. 1 0. 1; see also T46. 
284 Senate Hansard 23 November 1988, p.2613 (Exhibit 12. 1, tab 1); Exhibit 20. 1 . 18, paragraph 5. 
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concerned about the loss of public and parliamentary confidence 'among those 
who know little of the Service and never learn of its services and value to the 
nation'.285 If the disclosure is made by an officer or former officer of the Service, 
there may be an adverse impact on staff morale.286 
10.5 In our view, there are two fundamental considerations which create 
the need for secrecy and which determine the scope of the protection it requires. 
The first is the need to maintain the operational effectiveness of ASIS. The 
second is the need to protect the individuals who take part in ASIS operations, 
ASIS officers as well as their sources. The Minister would rank with these the 
need to avoid damage to foreign relations.287 We recognise, of course, that 
disclosure of an operation or alleged operation can cause acute diplomatic 
embarrassment, but arguably this is not as compelling a consideration as the first 
two. In any case, the secrecy required in order to protect operations and 
individuals should be sufficient to ensure that diplomatic embarrassment is 
avoided. 
10.6 Media witnesses who gave evidence regarding the D Notice system 
generally accepted the necessity of protecting operations and individuals. They 
acknowledged the continuing acceptance by their organisations of the rationale 
for the D Notice system, that there is a public interest in the non-disclosure of 
certain classes of information. There were varying views as to how those classes 
should be defined in relation to ASIS, but there was consensus that - except in 
quite exceptional circumstances - information should not be published which 
would put individuals at risk. Most were prepared to accept a wider proposition 
that there is a public interest in the collection of foreign intelligence which 
necessarily depends upon the secrecy of the activity and that - subject again to 
exceptional circumstances - the non-disclosure of current operations was 
therefore justified. 
10.7 What, then, is to be protected? It follows from what we have said that 
the focus of protection must be to prevent disclosure of information about what 
ASIS is doing, or planning to do, and where. Such disclosure may be direct - for 
example, by reference to a particular operation or by identification of an ASIS 
officer as engaged in intelligence collection in a particular place - or it may be 
indirect. Indirect disclosure may take a number of different forms, including: 
285 Exhibit 20. 1 . 18, paragraph 5. 
286 Exhibit 20. 1, paragraph 8.4. 
287 Exhibit 12. 1, tab 1 .  
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(a) a reference to a past operation, from which the existence of a 
current operation can be inferred; 
(b) disclosure of locations in which ASIS works; 
(c) disclosure of details of the ASIS expenditure budget; and 
(d) disclosure of information about ASIS reporting, which can reveal 
how, where and from whom the information was obtained. 
Direct and indirect disclosures of these various kinds may put individuals at 
risk, as well as threatening present and future operations. 
10.8 Whether a particular disclosure causes damage to ASIS, or puts 
individuals at risk, will depend on its content. A direct disclosure of a current 
operation will certainly be prejudicial to the work of ASIS because of its effect on 
the operation. Indirect disclosures, however, may or may not cause significant 
damage, depending on the nature of the disclosure. The same is true of 
disclosures about management matters. For example, the disclosure of changes 
in ASIS deployments would have far more serious potential consequences for 
ASIS than the disclosure of its total staffing complement. Either of these would 
be likely to be more damaging than the publication of a new grievance 
procedure. The more authoritative the source, the more damaging the disclosure 
is likely to be. What might be no more than mere gossip will carry weight if 
attributed to an officer or former officer. In the same way, an untrue statement 
by an officer or former officer is potentially very damaging, because of its 
apparent authenticity. 
10.9 Having identified the interests which require protection, the more 
difficult task is to determine how much secrecy is necessary to achieve the 
required degree of protection. A number of competing considerations must be 
weighed up. On the one hand, ASIS emphasises that the need to defend the 
Service and its operation from penetration and compromise by hostile 
intelligence and security agencies entails a high degree of protection of 
information: 
ASIS knows ... that there is nothing about a target intelligence or security agency 
and its personnel that is not of some significance .. . Every item of information 
about ASIS and its personnel that leaks or is extracted from the Service is 
potentially if not actually damaging, and if not now then at a future time. The 
significance of each item of information may not be apparent at the time it is 
leaked or obtained, and may only be fully appreciated when seen as part of the 
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larger picture. Information of no great present significance may assume crucial 
significance in light of later developments or information. 288 
Taken to its logical conclusion, this line of argument would prevent disclosure of 
any information about ASIS at all. We do not understand the Service to intend 
that result. 
10.10 On the other hand, there are powerful reasons for ensuring that the 
extent of secrecy is no greater than is truly necessary. First, and most 
importantly, there is a competing public interest in the free flow of information 
and opinion relating to Government, and in the public discussion and criticism 
which it facilitates. It is vital for the process of good government and good 
administration that this should occur. Striking the balance between these 
competing interests is of the essence both of the voluntary D Notice system289 
and of the law regarding unauthorised publication.290 Secondly, the principles of 
accountability require that information about ASIS be disclosed to the 
Government and, as we have said in Chapters 4 and 5, to the Opposition and the 
Parliament, subject to adequate safeguards. Thirdly, there is the more general 
problem for ASIS that secrecy tends to breed suspicion in the public mind. ASIS 
has suffered from this in the treatment its alleged activities have received in the 
media and from commentators who, through no fault of their own, lack even a 
basic understanding of what ASIS does and does not do, or of how it accounts 
for itself. Chapter 15, on the public face of ASIS, looks at better ways of 
satisfying public interest while maintaining an acceptable level of protection for 
information. 
10. 1 1  Fourthly, the unnecessary withholding of information from staff can 
itself be detrimental to the functioning of the organisation. Finally, there must be 
some avenue for ASIS staff to disclose information about ASIS which 
demonstrates illegality or serious maladministration. This we discuss in Chapter 
13, in the context of whistleblower protection. 
10.12 Clearly, the scope and limits of legitimate secrecy cannot be defined 
with precision. But once it is recognised that there are limits to secrecy - and the 
Service has recognised this - energies can be concentrated on protecting what is 
most important. Provided that the key interests - the safeguarding of operations 
and the protection of individuals - are kept firmly in view, there is every 
288 Exhibit 22. 1 .2, paragraph 3. 
289 See chapter 1 1. 
290 See chapter 13. 
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prospect that the limits will be defined appropriately and will be accepted as 
legitimate by the media and by the community at large. 
The mechanics of protection 
10. 13 The existing safeguards against disclosure of sensitive ASIS 
information fall into two categories. The first comprises the systems and 
procedures internal to ASIS which are designed to keep information secure 
within ASIS itself. The second category comprises external constraints directed 
at preventing publication of sensitive information. These external systems - the 
voluntary D Notice system, civil remedies to restrain publication and criminal 
remedies to punish publication - are discussed in Chapters 11 to 13. In this 
chapter we are concerned with the internal arrangements. 
10.14 On the evidence, the most serious potential threat to the security of 
information arises from unresolved grievances of ASIS staff. The view of ASIS 
about how to deal with this threat appears to have changed, at least in its 
emphasis, in the course of the Inquiry. At the beginning of the Inquiry ASIS 
contended that the solution to this threat lay in strengthening the external 
constraints: 
It is the absence of effective, enforceable sanctions, legal or otherwise, against 
those who knowingly make unauthorised disclosures of classified information 
into the public domain, that represents the greatest threat to the security of the 
Service, the broader intelligence community and ultimately the nation.291 
10.15 In a later submission, however, the Director-General placed greater 
emphasis on the critical importance of ASIS resolving grievances or complaints 
when they arise, so as to prevent them from developing into major issues. He 
referred to: 
the realisation that no legislation, rules, regulations or undertakings can prevent 
a determined current or former ASIS officer from making unauthorised 
disclosures if this is the path they choose. It shows that we must do all we can to 
attempt to reduce the possibility of unauthorised disclosures, and the first step in 
that chain is to handle grievances and complaints more effectively when they 
first arise. 292 
10.16 The Director-General identified various ways in which this issue 
should be tackled, including a greater acceptance by managers of their 
291 Exhibit 20. 1 . 18, paragraph 9. 
292 Exhibit 20. 1 . 18. 1, paragraph 3. 
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responsibilities towards their staff, changes in ASIS management culture and 
improved training for managers and supervisors. In our view, the focus on the 
internal dimension rather than the external sanctions is the correct one, and we 
commend the Director-General for his commitment to addressing these issues of 
management culture and attitude. We are firmly of the view that the internal 
health of the organisation is the single most important element in the protection 
of that information which must remain secret. 
10.17 There are two related points. The first is that the imperative to avoid 
unresolved grievances applies with equal force to the management of the sources 
upon whom ASIS depends and the handling of ASIS staff at and after the point 
of their separation from the Service. As to the first of these, the Service clearly 
recognises that the maintenance of a relationship of trust with its sources is 
essential not only as a pre-condition to the flow of intelligence but in order to 
prevent discontent. All the evidence suggests that these relationships are 
handled with great care. Secondly, the Service has acknowledged the 
importance of dealing sympathetically with staff who are separating from the 
Service.293 One aspect of this is career transition management. More generally, 
we agree with the Service's submission that the issue of separation must be 
handled in a way which is sensitive, and which provides practical assistance if 
possible and a point of continuing contact with the Service after separation. In a 
case where potential difficulties are clearly apparent at the point of separation, 
we would see a role for the Service to take the initiative in maintaining contact 
with the departing officer. 
10.18 It is appropriate at this stage to refer to a submission with which we 
have been pressed from time to time during the Inquiry. The submission of the 
Service was that it was n�cessary for the proper satisfaction of our third term of 
reference to identify any sources within or outside ASIS of information relating 
to the Service which appeared in the media. We do not agree, and we have 
rejected applications made for that purpose. If we had mounted such an 
investigation and had identified serving officers as the sources, or if journalists 
had been prepared to name them, we would have learned nothing helpful for the 
purposes of this aspect of our Inquiry. We have elsewhere expressed the view 
that those of the former officers who did so were not justified in making their 
disclosures to the media. That disapprobation would apply with no less force to 
others. 
293 Exhibit 45.2.4, paragraph 2. 12; Exhibit 45.2.5, paragraph 3.3.5. 
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10.19 The disciplinary action which might have been open to the Service 
would be irrelevant to the objects of this Inquiry. Further, it might well be 
argued that such action would have been to little purpose in the case of serving 
or former officers. We agree with the view expressed by Mr David McKnight: 
The most likely source of leakages at present are aggrieved and disgruntled 
officers or ex-officers. In my view, the most secure organisation is one which is 
humane, well run and internally fair and exhibits an esprit de corps based on these 
features, not on authoritarian controls. Any conclusion from this Inquiry that a 
more punitive approach to 'leaks' will solve the problem will simply faii.294 
10.20 We have dealt above with the various mechanical means of protecting 
sources and methods. Side by side with those is probably the most effective 
method of protecting the Service against deliberate disclosures of confidential 
information from the Service to the media, which is to preserve a high state of 
morale based upon a fair and open system of management. To aim to establish a 
system of that kind is not to lend any support to the view, which rightly troubled 
the Director-General, that in any organisation which deals with highly classified 
national security information 'you can deal with your personal grievance and 
bring the organisation to heel by leaking national security information'.295 Any 
attitude of that kind must be firmly discouraged, and is not affirmed by the 
resolution of particular cases. 
294 Exhibit 46. 1, p.5. 
295 T*955*. 
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Chapter ll 
The D Notice Systent 
The present system 
11 . 1  The D Notice system is a mechanism for voluntary self-restraint by the 
media on the publication of sensitive defence, security and intelligence 
information. The foundation of the system is an acceptance by media 
organisations - at editorial level as well as management level - that there is a 
public interest in the non-disclosure of certain categories of information. The D 
Notices define the categories.296 
1 1 .2 The Australian D Notice system was established in 1952. It was 
modelled closely on the corresponding British system which itself originated in 
1912.297 Although in its early years the existence of the D Notice system was 
itself secret,298 it has been a matter of public knowledge - and intermittent 
controversy - since the early 1970s. 
11 .3 The D Notices a.re issued under the authority of the Defence, Press and 
Broadcasting Committee (the D Notice Committee). The Committee comprises 
media representatives and government nominees. It is chaired by the Minister 
for Defence, whose department is responsible for administrative support to the 
Committee. The Committee has not met since 1982. At that time, it comprised 16 
media representatives - covering both editorial and management - and four 
Defence representatives. 299 
296 'D' stands for Defence, reflecting the origin of the notices in the first World War as a means of 
protecting defence-related information. 
297 Alasdair Palmer, 'The History of the D-Notice Committee', in Andrews & Dilks (eds.), The Missing 
Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, London, 1984. 
298 In November 1967, the Prime Minister, Mr Holt, answered a question in Parliament on D Notices. He 
described the system in general terms but declined to name the members of the D Notice committee or 
to specify the number or content of the Notices. 
299 Exhibit 1 1 . 1 . 1 .  
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11 .4 A D Notice is in the nature of a request to editors. It is not an 
instruction or a prohibition. As the most recent (1982) D Notice booklet says: 
The system is an entirely voluntary one, offering advice and guidance only. 
Non-observance of a request contained in a Notice carries no penalties. In the 
end, it is for an editor to decide whether to publish an item of information, 
having regard to national security requirements. 300 
11 .5 Originally there were seven Notices but this was reduced to four in 
1974. The four Notices covered defence equipment and communications; air 
capabilities; the whereabouts of the Petrovs; and ciphering and monitoring 
activities. A fifth Notice - on ASIS operations and personnel - was issued in 
1977, following the Government's decision to acknowledge publicly the existence 
of the Service. 
11 .6 In 1982 the Committee again reviewed the Notices, reducing them to 
the prese·nt four which cover: 
(a) the capabilities of the Australian Defence Force, including aircraft, 
ships, weapons and other equipment (D Notice No. 1); 
(b) the whereabouts of Mr and Mrs Vladimir Petrov (D Notice No. 2); 
(c) signals intelligence and communications security (D Notice No. 
3); and 
(d) ASIS (D Notice No. 4) . 
Revitalising the system 
11 .7 The D Notice system has largely fallen into disuse. Although an ASIS­
related program was anticipated, the ASIS D Notice was not drawn to the 
attention of the ABC before it broadcast the Four Comers program of February 
1994.301 When the Minister drew the attention of individual editors to the D 
Notice after various ASIS-related publications in 1993 and 1994, the editors 
concerned - all from leading daily newspapers - confessed to ignorance either 
300 Ibid. 
301 Though ABC witnesses gave evidence that the terms of the D Notice had been considered before the 
program was broadcast. 
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that the system was still operating,302 or of the existence or content of the ASIS D 
Notice itsel£.303 The description of the system as moribund304 seems apt. 
11 .8  The clear view of the media is that the D Notice system should be 
revived, not buried. We took evidence from a number of senior representatives 
of the print and electronic media,305 all of whom supported the continuation of 
the D Notice system. Significantly, no media representative argued for the 
abolition of the system as an unreasonable restraint on publication, although one 
editor considered that the media would look more sceptically at a reactivation of 
the D Notice system in the post-Cold War period.306 Rather, the prevailing 
concern was to oppose the suggestion, given some speculative coverage in the 
media, that the system be made compulsory and sanctions imposed for breach. 
No such suggestion was advanced in the course of our proceedings. 
11 .9 As we pointed out in Chapter 1 1, the media witnesses acknowledged 
the continuing acceptance by their organisations of the rationale for the D Notice 
system. It is not seriously contested that there is a public interest in the non­
disclosure of information which would endanger individuals. Most witnesses 
accepted that the non-disclosure of current operations was also justified on 
grounds of prejudice to the operations,307 with the important proviso that there 
might be an overriding public interest justifying the disclosure of, for example, 
illegality or serious impropriety, even if to do so would involve disclosing a 
current operation. 308 
11 . 10 ASIS, on the other hand, submitted that the voluntary system suffered 
from fundamental problems, and should be replaced by a voluntary 'code of 
conduct'. According to the Service: 
The current D Notice (system] is inadequate because it relies on voluntary media 
restraint, which no longer exists. Changes in Australian society since the 1950s 
have led to debate as to how principles of public participation and independence 
of the media can be reconciled with secrecy required for the sake of the national 
302 Mr Kelly, T*690"". 
303 Exhibits 12.5.3 and 12.6.3; cf. Mr Kohler, T*818- 19""; Ms Grattan, T*867*, T*898-9*. 
304 Mr Ayers, Exhibit 35. 1, p.2. 
305 Those who appeared before the Commission were: Mr David Hill, Managing Director, and Mr Chris 
Anderson, Managing Editor, Australian Broadcasting Corporation; Mr Peter Harvey, Director of News, 
Canberra Bureau, Nine Network; Mr Paul Kelly, Editor-in-Chief, The Australian; Mr Dennis Grant, 
Bureau Chief for Channel Seven; Mr Alan Kohler, Editor, The Age; and Ms Michelle Grattan, Editor and 
Mr Jack Waterford, Deputy Editor, The Canberra Times. 
· 
306 Mr Kelly, T*693*. 
307 But see the evidence ofMr Hill, T*635-37*. 
308 T*874*. 
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interest. This debate has engendered increasing disagreement on what constitutes 
the national interest. The media organisations have shown by their actions that 
they will decide what the public interest is in any given situation without 
assistance from those affected. The media organisation's perception of the 
national interest appears to coincide with its own journalistic interests. 309 
ASIS also pointed to differences in the interpretation of the ASIS D Notice by 
different organisations and what it argued was inadequate verification by media 
organisations of the content of stories proposed to be published and inadequate 
assessment of compliance (or otherwise) with the D Notice. 
11 . 11  The essential elements of the code of conduct proposed by ASIS were: 
(a) a summary of information on the role, functions, oversight and 
accountability of ASIS; 
(b) a statement of the Government's commitment to the protection of 
intelligence assets and sources; 
(c) an explanation of the potential of ASIS-related material to identify 
staff and sources; and 
(d) the identification of points of contact for the media to seek advice 
on the content of proposed stories on ASIS. 
This code would no longer define specific matters which should not be 
published, that being the function of a specific legislative prohibition against the 
identification of ASIS staff and sources.310 
11 .12 In Chapter 13, we have recommended the enactment of a specific 
legislative prohibition, directed (like s.92 of the ASIO Act) at the identification of 
individuals. We are not, however, persuaded that the voluntary D Notice 
system should thereupon be abandoned. In the first place, the scope of the D 
Notice is considerably wider than that of the proposed legislative provision. 
Most importantly, it deals with the disclosure of information about operations 
independently of disclosures which identify individuals. Secondly, and more 
generally, we see an important role, both symbolic and practical, for a voluntary 
system. The hallmark of the system is that compliance by the media is by 
consent and not by coercion. In accepting the D Notices, the media are 
309 Exhibit 45.2.5, paragraph 3.2.5.3.1 .3. 
310 Ibid, paragraphs 3.2.5.2.3, 3.2.5.3.4.6, 3.2.4.3. 
116 
The D Notice System ASIS Inquiry 1995 
acknowledging that, in the field of security and intelligence as in others, the right 
to publish is not absolute and that there are competing public interests: 
the essence of the exercise [is] to get the media themselves to reflect upon the 
balance between the national interest and their right to publish ... which would 
be harder to do if you established a link between their right to publish and the 
government's right to punish.31 1  
Provided that sufficient information and assistance is available to enable editors 
to make judgments about when a D Notice is applicable, the voluntary system 
should be more effective than a penal provision in preventing publication. 
1 1 . 13 A voluntary system is also peculiarly appropriate to the role of the 
media as a vehicle of public accountability for government. We share the view 
advanced by some of the media that it is important for the process of good 
government and good administration that there be some light shed on 
government administration when it goes wrong.312 Provided that the D Notices 
are designed so as to provide real guidance, and their concept and application 
are accepted by the media, their existence should ensure that the interests of 
defence and security are generally given proper consideration in any decision 
whether or not to publish. The non-coercive nature of the system means that the 
final decision about what should and should not be published rests with editors, 
not with governments. 
1 1 .14 We recognise that the system is not working satisfactorily at present. 
There is very limited awareness of the existence of an ASIS D Notice, let alone of 
its precise terms; the rationale for the specific proscriptions is not understood; 
and there is insufficient information in the hands of journalists and editors to 
enable them to assess whether particular publications would or would not 
breach the D Notice. The result is that, amongst the individual articles and 
broadcasts which we have examined in detail, there are to be found some clear 
(though unintentional) breaches of the D Notice. But we believe that the revival 
of the system along the lines we propose will reduce - although not remove 
altogether - the risk of such breaches occurring. 
11 . 15 The D Notice system will never provide complete protection. The 
option of recourse to legal sanctions will always need to be retained. In the next 
chapter, we examine the civil remedies against media disclosures of information 
relating to ASIS. In Chapter 13, we discuss the existing, and proposed, criminal 
31 1  T818, H .  White, Defence Department 
312 Ms Grattan, T*924*; See also Mr Harvey, T*677*; submission from the 4ge, 18 November 1994. 
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provisiOns applicable to such disclosures. Given the apparent reluctance of 
Governments to activate legal process, either civil or criminal, against journalists, 
we see the D Notice system as an important mechanism through which 
Government and media can seek to deal constructively with these complex 
issues. 
A new Notice and a new committee 
1 1 .16  In December 1993, the Defence Department initiated a review of the D 
Notice system. This was partly prompted by a review of the British Notices 
completed in 1993313 but the immediate stimulus was twofold - a contact 
between the Minister for Defence and a Melbourne newspaper about D Notice 
No. 3 (concerning DSD) and an expectation that Four Comers would disclose 
information relating to ASIS operations.314 The preliminary conclusion of the 
review was that the system should be maintained and revitalised, and that each 
of the Notices required revision. 
1 1 . 17 ASIS agreed to redraft its Notice to give 'more focus to the question of 
the rationale underlying the Notice'.315 A redrafted ASIS D Notice was 
submitted to the Minister in February 1994.316 Both the review process, and the 
redrafting of the ASIS Notice, were interrupted by the establishment of this 
Commission. The evidence of media witnesses provided an opportunity for an 
examination of the content of the present D Notice in the context of actual 
publication decisions. We consider that the content of the present ASIS D Notice 
requires examination, as discussed in the next section. 
1 1 . 18  The D Notice Committee should be re-established and given the task of 
carrying out a review of the content of the D Notices. The basic structure of the 
former Committee, with its mixture of media and Government representatives, is 
appropriate for this task. The media representatives should be drawn from as 
wide a cross-section as possible, including representation from specialist 
periodicals. Although in its original conception the D Notice Committee was a 
forum in which Government dealt with newspaper owners, we endorse the 
modern emphasis on representation from the editorial side. After all, the key 
decisions from day to day about whether or not publication is permitted under 
the terms of a D  Notice rest with editors, not owners. On the Government side, 
3 13 They are now called Defence Advisory or DA Notices - Exhibit 13 . 1 .  
3 1 4 Exhibit 1 1 . 1 .3 . 1 ,  letter of20 December 1993. 
3 1 5 Exhibit 1 1 . 1 .3.2. 
3 1 6 Exhibit 1 1 . 1 .2.2. 
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consideration should be given to widening the official representation beyond the 
Defence portfolio. It seems to us desirable that individual Ministers should 
participate when D Notices relating to their portfolios are being debated or 
finalised. This should have the result that the process, and the agreement 
reached through it, have and are seen to have full Government authority. 
11 . 19 We do not see the D Notice Committee as having a continuing role 
once agreement is reached about the content of the Notices. Its inactivity since 
the last revision of the Notices in 1982 underlines the point. In the event of a 
major review in the future, the Committee could be reconvened. There should, 
however, be a permanent secretariat to the Committee, which should function on 
a full-time basis at least until the form of the new Notices is settled. The 
secretariat should probably be located, as at present, in the Department of 
Defence, especially if the Minister for Defence continues to chair the Committee. 
The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet or the Attorney-General's 
Department would be suitable alternative locations, but we see no need for a 
change in the existing arrangement. There is little enthusiasm from other 
agencies to take on the role. 317 
1 1 .20 We would see the secretariat's ongoing functions as including the 
publication, distribution and promotion of the D Notices, communication with 
editors, monitoring changes in ownership and changes of editor, and ensuring 
that new appointees are informed of the system. The secretariat should also be 
available to give advice on request about the functioning of the system, although 
advice on particular issues arising under one of the D Notices should be 
provided by the relevant agency. The secretariat would also have a role in 
monitoring publications on topics to which the D Notices related, but it would 
again rely heavily on the agencies themselves to keep it informed of relevant 
publications. It should report to the Government periodically on the results of 
this monitoring, but the responsibility for responding to particular publications 
would once again rest with the individual agencies. Whether a Minister became 
involved in direct contact with a media organisation on a D  Notice issue would 
continue to depend on a case-by-case assessment. 
Reviewing the ASIS D Notice 
11 .21 The current (1982) version of the ASIS D Notice opens with a short 
description of the functions of the Service and a reminder of the importance of 
317 T8 19.  
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secrecy of its activities. The operative part of the Notice is a request to editors 
not to publish or broadcast information which would lead to: 
(a) the identification of individuals employed by the Director­
General of ASIS; or 
(b) the disclosure of current or projected foreign intelligence activity 
of ASIS. 
The Notice provides some limited further assistance on the question of 
identification: 
Identification does not depend simply upon a name but also upon the 
publication of an ASIS member's whereabouts or other identifying 
characteristics. Publication of the name of a person believed to be a former 
member of ASIS can by association lead to the identification of current 
members. 
1 1 .22 Any review of the D Notice will need to address each of its constituent 
elements: 
(a) a rationale for secrecy; 
(b) the defined non-publication area; 
(c) .assistance to editors in applying the Notice. 
We deal with each of these in turn. 
1 1 .23 As to the first, the advantage of a clearly-stated rationale is that it 
reminds editors and journalists that there are sound reasons for restraint in 
publication. In the case of ASIS, it is a reminder of the need to protect the 
Service's sources and the well-being of people overseas who are working in 
Australia's interests. The achievement of this purpose would be enhanced if the 
D Notice rationale included, or was accompanied by, a fuller account of what 
ASIS does and why it is important in the national interest - along the lines of the 
public booklet which the Director-General has been developing.318 This would 
help to establish the context in which publication decisions are to be made, rather 
than the D Notice existing - as it does at present - in a vacuum. 
1 1 .24 The re-draft prepared by ASIS in early 1994 contains a section of this 
kind. The draft draws attention to the 'real risk of harm' to which the 
318 See Chapter 15. 
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identification of ASIS staff or sources may expose them or their families. It also 
points to the prejudice to operations which can flow from the disclosure of 
identities, emphasising the necessity for intelligence operations to be pursued in 
conditions of secrecy. As they stand in the draft, these assertions are made in 
fairly bald terms. We would expect that before such assertions were accepted by 
media representatives on the reconstituted committee, there would need to be 
some fuller explanation provided, perhaps with the assistance of some 
hypothetical examples. 
1 1 .25 Defining the non-publication area will be the most controversial part of 
any review. Not surprisingly, media witnesses expressed their opposition to any 
widening of the operative part of the ASIS D Notice. The 1994 ASIS draft 
proposes certain extensions, directed at ensuring the non-publication of 
information which would lead to: 
(a) the identification of the families of 'individuals employed by the 
Director-General, ASIS'; 
(b) the disclosure of the whereabouts of such individuals or their 
families; 
(c) the identification of visiting foreign intelligence liaison officials; 
and 
(d) the disclosure of past operational activity of ASIS. 
1 1 .26 Of these, only the last involves a change of real substance. The first 
and second are simply an elaboration of the long-established ban on the 
identification of serving officers. They are consistent with the scope of the 
legislative prohibition we recommend.319 We would add two comments. First, 
neither the existing Notice nor the ASIS redraft brings former officers within the 
non-publication area unless their identification would lead to the identification 
of current officers. Consistently with our recommendation for legislative 
protection, we consider that the D Notice should extend to former officers and 
sources. Secondly, the phrase 'individuals employed by the Director-General, 
ASIS', carried over from the existing Notice, is not appropriate to cover - as it is 
obviously intended to do - the sources of the Service who may or may not be 
properly characterised as 'employed' by the Director-General. The third 
extension, concerning visiting officials, relies on the same rationale, the 
319 See paragraph 13.56. 
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protection of individuals, and would in practice be likely to have a very limited 
operation. 
11 .27 The proposed extension to past operations is, however, a significant 
one. According to the rationale set out in the ASIS re-draft, the justification for a 
specific prohibition directed at past operations is that publicity 'may deny the 
opportunity for fuller exploitation of a capability or technique'. To this we 
would add that publicity about a past operation may also tend to identify, and so 
put at risk, former officers and former sources who participated in the operation. 
Evidence was given that certain of the articles published about ASIS in early 1994 
had had repercussions of this kind, and it seems to us to be understandable that 
this can occur. 
11 .28 The effect of the existing Notice is that information about a past ASIS 
operation may be published unless it would lead to the identification of serving 
officers or to the disclosure of a current or projected operation. Provided that the 
non-publication area defined in the D Notice is extended to former officers and 
sources, as suggested in paragraph 11 .26 above, we would regard the extent of 
the prohibition on disclosure of past operations as being sufficient, albeit that it is 
an indirect rather than a direct prohibition. That is, information should not be 
published about a past operation if (but only if) that publication would tend to 
identify either a serving or a former officer or source or would disclose a current 
or projected operation. The explanatory section of the D Notice should make 
quite explicit that past operations are, in this indirect sense, within the ambit of 
the Notice. 
11 .29 The rationale advanced by ASIS does not persuade us that a blanket 
prohibition on the disclosure of information about past operations is justified. 
While we can conceive of circumstances where publication of information about 
an operational capability or technique would impede its future operational use 
or otherwise prejudice current operations, we would have thought this would be 
a relatively rare occurrence. At the other end of the scale, there are operational 
techniques, which are now a matter of notoriety, and public reference to them 
cannot sensibly be said to inhibit their future use. This is the kind of issue to 
which the D Notice itself could usefully draw attention, urging the need for 
caution. 
1 1 .30 Whatever may be decided about the ambit of the proscription, it is 
essential that the Notice contain some fuller explanation of the kinds of 
considerations which need to be borne in mind by editors in deciding whether or 
not the publication of a particular piece of information will contravene the terms 
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of the Notice. There was considerable discussion during the evidence of media 
witnesses about the difficulties associated with assessing the sensitivity of 
particular pieces of information. It was acknowledged by most that there was 
considerable complexity associated with determining whether, for example: 
(a) the publication of a statement purporting to describe a past 
operation would, if that operation were in fact still current, tend 
to disclose that operation; 
(b) the identification (by name or otherwise) of a former officer as 
having carried out operations in the past in a particular place 
would tend to lead to the identification of his/her successors at 
the relevant station; or 
(c) the disclosure of a past operation would expose to present risk 
those officers or sources who had been involved in that operation. 
11 .31 The revised Notice should give as much guidance as possible on how 
these linkages can be made. It might, for example, usefully give some 
illustrative examples. In addition, the Notice should encourage editors and their 
staff to seek advice, either via the proposed D Notice secretariat or direct from 
ASIS, about a publication under consideration and the applicability of the 
Notice. 
ASIS media liaison officer 
11 .32 Whatever the precise text of the ASIS D Notice, its application involves 
the making of what are agreed on all sides to be complex judgments. Most 
witnesses conceded that media organisations are necessarily less well placed 
than Government, or the Service in particular, to make those judgments.320 In 
this context, there was much discussion of the concept of an ASIS media liaison 
officer who, amongst other functions, would be available to media organisations 
to provide advice regarding the sensitivity of particular pieces of information. 
Understandable scepticism was expressed about this proposal, because it was 
thought that such contact might simply alert the Government to an impending 
publication and provoke an injunction application, and because - at least initially 
- there would be doubts about the reliability of the advice provided. There was 
also a natural suspicion that the advice would tend to be self-serving. 
320 See for example, Mr Kelly, T*71 1 *. 
123 
71te D Notice System ASIS Inquiry 1995 
1 1 .33 Nevertheless, the majority of media optruon was supportive of the 
notion, provided that it was left to media organisations to decide whether or not 
to avail themselves of the service. The solicitor for the Age, Mr Bartlett, likened 
the proposal to his regular recourse to advice from the Office of the Victorian 
Director of Public Prosecutions about whether publication of material regarding 
a criminal trial would be prejudicial. 321 ASIS also expressed support for the 
creation of a media liaison position, in . the expectation that the officer's advice 
would be 'likely to provide a brake for the more outlandish stories'.322 
11 .34 We recommend that ASIS establish such an office for this advisory 
purpose (amongst others). We say more about the functions of such an office in 
Chapter 15. The selection of the right person to hold the office would, of course, 
be critical, as the success of it would depend very much on the ability of the 
person to establish credibility with media organisations. That credibility would 
depend on the officer establishing over time that advice given was not 
misleading. Media representatives understand that there will be times when the 
officer can do more than offer 'no comment'. But, where advice can be given, 
credibility will be earned if it can be established progressively, by example, that 
advice or information given is truthful and factually well-based. Once 
credibility is achieved, the office will be likely to contribute significantly to a 
generally constructive relationship between ASIS and the media. In the present 
context, it has the potential to help make the D Notice system more effective. It 
need hardly be added that, were contact with that office in the D Notice context 
to be seen to lead to injunctive action, credibility would be likely to be impaired 
and this would undermine the operation of the D Notice system. We discuss this 
problem in Chapter 15. 
321 T*824*, *827*. 
322 Exhibit 45.2.5, paragraph 3.2.5.7.3. 
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Civil Rem.edies to Prevent 
Unauthorised Disclosures 
Background 
12.1 During 1993 and the early part of 1994, the print and electronic media 
carried a number of stories relating to ASIS. Some of these referred to 
operational activities, past and present, by particular individuals in particular 
places. They thus disclosed information (or what purported to be information) 
of a kind which should ordinarily be protected.323 
12.2 The only remedy of any real potency against unauthorised disclosures 
is the injunction to restrain publication. There are other remedies available after 
a disclosure has occurred, including damages, an account of profits and an order 
for destruction or delivery of documents, but by then the damage to the public 
interest has occurred. It is damage which cannot be compensated in monetary 
terms. 
12.3 The critical thing, therefore, is to prevent the disclosure before it 
occurs. But unless there is advance warning of the disclosure, the injunction 
remedy is useless. It is rare for the Government to have sufficient warning to 
justify an application for a restraining order. Publishers and broadcasters do not 
ordinarily give formal advance notice of publication of secret material. Even 
where some notice is given, it will not usually identify with any precision what 
is to be published. Government needs to know enough about the proposed 
publication to enable it to decide whether the damage likely to be caused by 
publication warrants its acting to restrain publication and being seen accordingly 
as a censor. 
323 See Chapter 10. 
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12.4 On occasion, armed with the requisite knowledge, the Government has 
successfully taken injunctive action. In one case,324 the application was based on 
a promotional leaflet describing the contents of a forthcoming book. In another 
case, the High Court granted an interim injunction to restrain publication of a 
magazine on the basis of a reported conversation with its editor about its 
proposed content;325 and in related proceedings in the Federal Court the 
Commonwealth obtained on subpoena the manuscript of a forthcoming book, 
the contents of which were subsequently negotiated with the authors to delete 
sensitive material.326 
12.5 In all but one case, the disclosures about ASIS during 1993 and 1994 
occurred without warning. The Government was, as a result, unable to take any 
preventive action. In the case of the Four Comers program which triggered this 
Inquiry, the Government, and the Service, had warning that the ABC was 
proposing to broadcast an ASIS-related program although the precise timing and 
content were unknown. 
12.6 In this chapter we examine the legal remedies and procedures 
currently available to the Government to prevent the disclosure of sensitive 
information. We first outline the present state of the law. We then review the 
unusual circumstances leading up to the Four Comers program, before 
considering whether any reform of the law is indicated. 
The existing remedies 
12.7 Of the available causes of action, breach of confidence and breach of 
contract are likely to be of most assistance. As to the first, the relevant equitable 
principle is that: 
the court will "restrain the publication of confidential information improperly 
or surreptitiously obtained or of information imparted in confidence which 
ought not to be divulged" (Lord Ashburton v. Pape ( 1913] 2 Ch. 469, at 475, per 
Swinfen Eady L.J.). In conformity with this principle, employees who had access 
to confidential information in the possession of their employers have been 
restrained from divulging information to third parties in breach of duty and, if 
they have already divulged the information, the third parties themselves have 
been restrained from making disclosure or making use of the information 
324 Commonwealth v. john Fairfax and Sons Limited (1 980) 147 CLR 39. 
325 Commonwealth v. Toohry (unreported) 8 November 1988. 
326 Oyster - The Story of The Australian Secret Intelligence Service, Toohey B. and Pinwill W. ( 1989). See T2520. 
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(Tipping v. Clarke (1843) 2 Hare 383, at 393 [67 E.R. 157]; Lamb v. Evans ( 1893] 
1 Ch. 218, at 235).327 
If the intending publisher is an employee or former employee of the 
Commonwealth, there may be a breach of the fiduciary duty not to disclose, 
without authority, information acquired in the course of the employment.328 
12.8 The claim in contract will ordinarily be available only against an 
employee or former employee of the Commonwealth. Its basis would be a claim 
to restrain a breach by the (former) employee of a contractual obligation such as 
an undertaking not · to disclose information acquired in the course of the 
employment or an undertaking not to publish without pre-publication 
clearance.329 Legal advisers to both the CIA and SIS regard the obligation to seek 
pre-publication authorisation as the starting point for injunctive action against an 
employee or former employee. 
12.9 Where the intending publisher is a former ASIS employee, the contract 
of employment will of course have come to an end. The secrecy agreement 
which ASIS employees are now required to sign is, however, a separate, 
collateral contract, under which the ASIS employee agrees never to make an 
unauthorised disclosure. This collateral contract survives the expiry of the 
en1ployment contract itself. 
12.10 The key issue for the Commonwealth, as a prospective plaintiff, is 
whether it can demonstrate to the court that the anticipated disclosure will 
include material damaging to the public interest to the requisite degree. This is 
so whether the obligation of confidence sought to be enforced is grounded in 
equitable principle or in contract. An Australian court will not restrain 
publication at the suit of the Commonwealth unless it can be demonstrated that 
there will be damage to the public interest 'because national security, relations 
with foreign countries or the ordinary business of government will be 
prejudiced' .330 The court may be called on to consider whether the public 
327 Commonwealth v. john Fairfax and Sons Limited ( 1980) 147 CLR 39 at 50 per Mason, J. 
328 In Snepp v. United States (1 980) 444 U.S. 507, the United States Supreme Court held that a former CIA 
employee had breached a fiduciary obligation by publishing a book about Agency activities without pre­
publication clearance. The proceeds of the breach were, accordingly, impressed with a constructive trust 
for the benefit of the Government. A claim based on fiduciary obligation was advanced by the British 
Government in the Spycatcher case - see Attorn�-General (UK) v. Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty Ltd 
( 1988) 165 CLR 30. 
329 Exhibit 1 1 .2.2. The standard ASIS secrecy agreement now in use includes undertakings of both kinds. 
33° Fairfax (supra) at 52. 
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interest in publication overrides the risk of damage if the information is 
disclosed.331 
12. 11  In Commonwealth v. Fairfax/ Mason J. enunciated principles which 
will govern the court's approach to the question of detriment: 
It can scarcely be a relevant detriment to the government that publication of 
material concerning its actions will merely expose it to public discussion and 
criticism. It is unacceptable in our democratic society that there should be a 
restraint on the publication of information relating to a government when the 
only vice of that information is that it enables the public to discuss, review and 
criticize government action. 
Accordingly, the court will determine the government's claim to 
confidentiality by reference to the public interest. Unless disclosure is likely to 
injure the public interest, it will not be protected. 
The court will not prevent the publication of information which merely 
throws light on the past workings of government, even if it be not public 
property, so long as it does not prejudice the community in other respects. Then 
disclosure will itself serve the public interest in keeping the community informed 
and in promoting discussion of public affairs. If, however, it appears that 
disclosure will be inimical to the public interest because national security, 
relations with foreign countries or the ordinary business of government will be 
prejudiced, disclosure will be restrained. There will be cases in which the 
conflicting considerations will be finely balanced, where it is difficult to decide 
whether the public's interest in knowing and in expressing its opinion, outweighs 
the need to protect confidentiality.332 
These principles were publicly endorsed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
1988.333 
12.12 The Commonwealth may also have a cause of action in breach of 
copyright. In the Fairfax case, it was the only basis on which the High Court was 
prepared to grant an injunction. But the significant limitation on the utility of 
copyright in relation to the protection of confidential information is that it 
protects only the form of the copyright work, not the information or ideas 
contained in it. Thus, if the purpose is to restrain disclosure of information 
contained in a document, rather than the publication of the documents as such, 
an injunction based on copyright will be of no practical use because the 
information can be published in a different form. As a matter of policy, the 
Commonwealth has not, in recent times, relied on copyright when its real claim 
331 Ibid., see also Attorney-General (UK) v. Heinemann (supra) at 45. 
332 147 CLR at 52. 
333 Senate Hansard, 23 November 1988, p.2614. 
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is that publication of the information in a document will damage the public 
interest. 334 
12. 13 It may be possible to demonstrate that the anticipated disclosure will, 
if it occurs, constitute a breach of the criminal law - for example, of ss.70 or 79 of 
the Crimes Act 1914.335 On the present state of the law, however, a threatened 
breach of the criminal law would not be sufficient for the Commonwealth to 
obtain an injunction. In Fairfax, Mason J. noted that the issue of an injunction to 
restrain a threatened breach of criminal law was exceptional, confined in practice 
to cases where an offence was frequently repeated, in disregard of an inadequate 
penalty, and to cases of emergency. His Honour concluded that s.79 was not 
designed to provide a civil remedy to protect the government's right to 
confidential information.336 We consider below the proposal by the Gibbs 
Committee on Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law that the Crimes Act be 
amended to provide specifically for the grant of an injunction in respect of a 
threatened breach of the relevant criminal provisions. 
12.14 The defence of public interest, also known as the defence of iniquity, 
applies to disclosure of confidential information.337 It is probably also available 
when the claim is brought in copyright.338 According to Mason J in Fairfax, the 
defence is limited in scope: 
It makes legitimate the publication of confidential information ... so as to 
protect the community from destruction, damage or harm. It has been 
acknowledged that the defence applies to disclosures of things done in breach of 
national security, in breach of the law (including fraud) and to disclosure of 
matters which involve danger to the public.339 
It is not possible to characterise with precision the degree of wrongdoing the 
disclosure of which would be sufficient to attract the defence in a particular case. 
Clearly, the matter disclosed must be of a serious nature.340 
334 Exhibit 13.3, p.2. Unauthorized Disclosure of Government Information, Attorney-General's Department, 30 
October 1991. We acknowledge the assistance we have derived from this paper, and from a written 
commentary on this issue prepared at our request by its author, Mr B. Leader, Deputy Government 
Solicitor (Litigation). 
335 See Chapter 13. 
336 At 49 1 .  
337 Fairfax at  56-57. See also Attorney-General v. Observer Limited [ 1990] 1 AC 109. 
338 Fairfax at 57. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Be/off v. Pressdram (1973) 1 All ER 241, 260; A v. Hayden ( 1984) 156 CLR 532 at 545-56. 
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Proposals for law reform 
12. 15 In the light of the Four Comers experience, we have considered 
whether the law requires modification to reduce or remove the impediment to 
injunctive action which the Government's lack of knowledge about content often 
creates. There are two principal ways in which this could be done. First, the 
substantive law could be altered to remove or modify the obligation to 
demonstrate a likelihood of damage to the national interest in the event of 
publication. Secondly, the procedural steps available to the Commonwealth 
could be strengthened to facilitate access to documents or other information 
likely to reveal content. We deal with these possibilities in tum. 
Substantive law 
12.16 The Gibbs Committee has recommended the amendment of the Crimes 
Act to create specific offences for disclosure of intelligence and security 
information.341 The Committee further recommended that there be a provision 
enabling the Commonwealth to obtain an injunction where there is a threatened 
breach of one of the criminal provisions. 342 
12.17 We support this recommendation, but with a qualification. The 
Committee proposed that disclosures by officers or former officers of the 
intelligence and security services be punishable without proof of damage. It 
recommended that the availability of the civil remedy of an injunction be subject 
to the same requirements of proof of damage as would apply in a prosecution.343 
This would seem to mean that, in the case of an officer or former officer of ASIS, 
the Commonwealth as applicant would need only to show the threatened 
disclosure of information 'relating to intelligence or security', without the need 
to show that its publication would be damaging. This would represent a very 
significant change in the law, beneficial to the Commonwealth. 
12. 18 In Chapter 13, however, we have recommended that the requirement 
to prove damage should be dispensed with only where the offence alleged to 
have been committed by the officer or former officer is the disclosure of 
information identifying current or former officers, sources or operations of ASIS. 
If this recommendation regarding the criminal provisions were accepted, it 
would have the effect of narrowing any benefit which the companion injunction 
provision confers on the Commonwealth. That is, in a proceeding for injunction 
341 Exhibit 14.4. 
342 Ibid, paragraph 3 1 .39. 
343 Ibid. 
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to restrain a threatened breach of the criminal provisions, the Commonwealth 
would be required to adduce proof of the damage which the apprehended 
disclosure was likely to cause, except where the defendant to the civil proceeding 
was · an officer or former officer and the threatened disclosure concerned 
individuals or operations. While not having to prove damage in those particular 
circumstances, the Commonwealth would nevertheless need sufficient evidence 
to demonstrate that the threatened disclosure was likely to identify individuals 
or operations. It is evidence of that very kind which, under present 
circumstances, is required to prove the threat of detriment but which is so often 
lacking. 
12. 19 Whichever formulation of the criminal provisions is adopted, proof of 
likely damage will remain a pre-requisite for injunctive relief against anyone 
other than an officer or former officer, including media organisations and 
commercial publishers. Neither the Service nor the Minister suggested that there 
should be any change to the law in this regard and we, for our part, see no 
reason to recommend a change. 
12.20 A separate issue concerns the publication of what purports to be 
information about ASIS but which is in fact untrue. Such a publication can be 
damaging to the Service or to individuals, especially if the source is 
authoritative. At present, the publication of false information would not be 
either a breach of confidence or a breach of contract because, by definition, it 
would not be a publication of information obtained in confidence or derived by 
the defendant in the course of his/her employment with the Commonwealth. In 
the case of a threatened disclosure by an officer or former officer, this problem 
will disappear if the Gibbs Committee recommendations are accepted. Since the 
disclosure of false information by an officer or former officer will be an offence, 
injunctive relief will be available to restrain the commission of that offence. 
12.21 We are not otherwise persuaded that this problem is of significant 
magnitude to justify any change in the law. We think it somewhat unlikely that 
the Commonwealth would know in advance that false information was to be 
published. In any case, the disclosures about ASIS in 1993 and 1994 suggest that 
false information would almost certainly be intermingled with one or more true 
statements. Moreover, false information about ASIS would in most - perhaps all 
- cases be coloured by knowledge gained in the course of employment or 
otherwise in confidence, in order to give it plausibility. A description of a 
fictitious operation, for example, is likely to be couched in terms drawn from 
true operations, derived from actual experience. It follows that in most cases the 
disclosure can be dealt with adequately under the present law. 
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12.22 The Government's concern will continue to focus on preventing 
publication of information in the two key categories, relating to individuals and 
to operations respectively. Those are the categories where the likelihood of 
damage flowing from disclosure is most obvious. In our view, there must be a 
greater readiness on the part of the Government and the Service, when they have 
notice of a possible disclosure of such information, to make a direct approach to 
the intending publisher for the purpose of identifying what is sensitive and 
seeking to negotiate undertakings not to publish the sensitive information. An 
approach to the ABC in early 1994 might have been worthwhile, at least in 
modifying the content of the Four Comers program. An approach based on 
early contact and negotiation has clear advantages over litigation, and is 
consistent with the way in which we see a revitalised D Notice system working. 
Procedwal mechanisms 
12.23 Court rules in the various Australian jurisdictions make provision for 
applications for preliminary discovery. A prospective plaintiff (A) can apply for 
pre-action discovery against a prospective defendant (B) for the purpose of 
enabling A to determine whether to commence a proceeding against B. A must 
demonstrate that B is likely to be in possession of relevant information, and that 
all other reasonable inquiries have been made.344 In circumstances such as those 
preceding Four Comers, this procedure would have enabled the Commonwealth 
to make application for discovery by the ABC of any documents in its possession 
or under its control relevant to a potential claim by the Commonwealth for 
breach of confidence or breach of contract. If such an application had been made 
in early February 1994, and had succeeded, the ABC would have been required 
to produce the material it had gathered in preparation for the program.345 
12.24 There is no evidence that consideration was given to the use of this 
procedure. This was presumably because of a concern that such an application, 
which must be made on summons, would have alerted the ABC to the 
Government's awareness of the program and might have prompted an early 
screening of the program.346 Even the making of such an application ex parte 
would not solve that difficulty, since the order for discovery must necessarily be 
served on the other party. The obligation to comply with the order does not, of 
course, inhibit publication in any way. In any case, the privilege against self-
344 See for example Federal Court Rules 0.15A r.6.; Rules of the Supreme Court of Victoria, Rule 32.05. 
345 Exhibits 12.4.2, 12.4.3, 12.4.4. 
346 T2527. 
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incrimination347 might be invoked as a ground for resisting the production of 
documents. 
12.25 ASIS submitted that the court rules should be amended to give the 
Commonwealth an entitlement in 'national security cases' to interrogate potential 
defendants about what they possess. This would have the advantage of 
extending the scope of the existing rules to non-documentary information. The 
Service was pessimistic about its proposal, because of the improbability of 
uniformity being achieved in all Australian jurisdictions.348 The problem of 
uniformity would largely disappear if, as is proposed, jurisdiction were 
conferred on the Federal Court in proceedings brought by the Commonwealth. 
But an order for interrogatories, like an order for discovery, would not prevent 
publication and might in fact precipitate it. Once again, the provision of answers 
to interrogatories might be resisted on the ground of tendency to incriminate. 
12.26 Finally, we were invited to consider the ex parte order for entry and 
inspection of premises. Developed in the intellectual property field, this remedy 
is obtained without notice to the defendant and before any writ is issued. 
Sometimes known as an Anton Piller349 order, it permits a plaintiff to enter a 
defendant's premises, to search for evidence of infringement of intellectual 
property rights and to seize and retain infringing material. 
12.27 Such orders have been made in cases involving breach of confidence.350 
The pre-conditions for the grant of such an order are, however, quite strict: 
First there must be an extremely strong prima facie case. Secondly, the damage, 
potential or actual, must be very serious for the applicant. Thirdly, there must be 
clear evidence that the defendants have in their possession incriminating 
documents or things, and that there is a real possibility that they may destroy 
such material before any application inter partes can be made. 351 
12.28 There are two obstacles to the utilisation of such a procedure. The first 
is the one already referred to, of alerting the prospective defendant who may, 
even after seizure of the documents, proceed to publish. Secondly, the 
requirement of 'an extremely strong prime facie case' may be difficult to satisfy. 
In any case, the Anton Piller order, like the Mareva injunction, has been 
347 E.g. in respect of a subsequent charge under the Crimes Act (see 12. 13  above). 
348 Exhibit 45.2.5, paragraph 3.2.2.2. 
349 KG. v. Manufacturing Processes Limited [ 1976] Ch. 55. 
350 Anton Piller (supra); House of Spring Gardens Limited v. Point Blank Limited [ 1980] FSR 359; Ocli Optical 
Coatings Limited v. Spectron Optical Coatings Limited [ 1 980] FSR 227. 
351 Anton Piller (supra) at 167. 
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fashioned by the courts as a means of preserving the status quo - in the case of 
Anton Piller by preventing the destruction of evidence relevant to the plaintiff's 
case. It is not designed to supply the plaintiff with information about the 
defendant's state of knowledge or intentions. In an appropriately serious case 
such an order could be sought by the Commonwealth, and we see no reason to 
recommend any statutory alteration of the conditions of its availability. 
12.29 The Commonwealth always has the option of commencing 
proceedings for injunction and issuing a subpoena requiring the intending 
publisher to produce relevant documents. The obstacle here is that, if the 
subpoena can be characterised as a 'fishing' expedition, designed to elicit 
documents out of which an otherwise indistinct cause of action can be 
constructed, it is liable to be set aside.352 In other words, the subpoena approach 
will only assist if the Commonwealth already has sufficient information in its 
possession to justify the commencement of the proceedings. 
Conclusion 
12.30 It is apparent that the various procedural steps available to the 
Commonwealth are not designed to give it the advantage which it needs in 
seeking to restrain publication. That advantage depends on advance knowledge 
being obtained without notice to the intending publisher. It is, of course, 
conceivable that if an application for pre-action discovery were made, the 
intending publisher might elect to withhold publication and provide the 
documents sought, so as to enable a court determination of the Commonwealth's 
claim. But this would, we think, be a rather rare occurrence. 
12.31 We recognise the significant obstacles which stand in the way of civil 
action by the Commonwealth to prevent unauthorised disclosures. We are not, 
however, persuaded that any change to the law or procedure is required, beyond 
that which will flow from the adoption of the Gibbs Committee 
recommendations (modified as we recommend) .  While new and more stringent 
remedies could be developed, that is not a course which either the Minister or 
the Service has urged us to follow. There are circumstances where the public 
interest compels action to suppress publication but they are, or should be, rare. 
We would not recommend the introduction of a new remedy in the absence of 
compelling reasons for doing so. 
352 See, for example, Commissioner for Railways v. Small ( 1938) 38 SR 564 at 575. 
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Crintinal Sanctions Against 
Publication 
The existing provisions: Crimes Act ss.70 and 79 
13.1 The provisions of Commonwealth criminal law applicable to 
disclosure of information about ASIS operations, sources and methods are ss.70 
and 79 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) .353 These are general provisions on the 
disclosure of government information. Section 70 of the Crimes Act creates a 
general offence of disclosure by Commonwealth officers, or former 
Commonwealth officers, of any information which they have a duty not to 
disclose. It provides: 
�1) A person who, being a Commonwealth officer, publishes or communicates, 
except to some person to whom he is authorised to publish or communicate it, 
any fact or document which comes to his knowledge, or into his possession, by 
virtue of his being a Commonwealth officer, and which it his duty not to 
disclose, shall be guilty of an offence. 
(2) A person who, having been a Commonwealth officer, publishes or 
communicates, without lawful authority or excuse (proof whereof shall lie upon 
him), any fact or document which came to his knowledge, or into his possess-ion 
, by virtue of having been a Commonwealth officer, and which at the time he 
ceased to be a Commonwealth officer, it was his duty not to disclose, shall be 
guilty of an offence. 
The penalty for an offence against section 70 is two years imprisonment. 
13.2 Section 79 similarly relies on the notion of a 'duty to treat as secret'. 
The relevant provisions are as follows: 
353 This chapter draws upon a report prepared by the Attorney-General's Department in October 1993 
entitled The protection of official information (Exhibit 14. 1). Referred to in this chapter as the Attorney­
General's Department response, it was part of a Government response to the recommendations contained 
in the final report of the Gibbs Committee Rr:view of Commonwealth Criminal Law (Exhibit 14.4). 
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�1) For the purposes of this section, ... information is prescribed information 
in relation to a person if the person has it in his possession or control and: .. . 
(b) it has been entrusted to the person by a Commonwealth officer or a person 
holding office under the Queen or he has made or obtained it owing to his 
position as a person: 
(i) who is or has been a Commonwealth officer; 
(ii) who holds or has held office under the Queen; 
(iii) who holds or has held a contract made on behalf of the Queen or the 
Commonwealth; . . . 
(v) acting with the permission of a Minister; 
and, by reason of its nature or the circumstances under which it was 
entrusted to him or it was made or obtained by him or for any other reason, it is 
his duty to treat it as secret; . . . 
(2) If a person for a purpose intended to be prejudicial to the safety or defence 
of the Commonwealth or a part of the Queen's dominions: 
(a) communicates . . .  prescribed information to a person other than: 
(i) a person to whom he is authorised to communicate it; or 
(ii) a person to whom it is, in the interest of the Commonwealth or a part of 
the Queen's dominions, his duty to communicate it; 
or permits a person, other than a person referred to in sub-paragraph (i) or 
(ii) to have access to it; . . .  he shall be guilty of an indictable offence. 
The penalty for an offence against s.79(2) is imprisonment for seven years. 
13.3 Disclosure by an ASIS officer, or former officer, of information about 
ASIS activities would seem to fall squarely within these provisions, subject in the 
case of s.79 to proof of purpose. The general duty imposed on public servants by 
regulation 35 of the Public Service Regulations (not to disclose any information 
except in the course of official duty) does not apply to ASIS officers. The 
existence of a duty on the part of an ASIS officer - both during and after 
employment with ASIS - not to disclose ASIS information is nevertheless readily 
apparent from the terms of the secrecy agreement, which forms part of the 
employment contract between each officer and the Director-GeneraP54 and from 
the secrecy acknowledgment signed by an officer on departure from ASIS.355 
Criticisms of the existing provisions 
13.4 The provisions of sections 70 and 79 were reviewed by the Gibbs 
Committee on Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law (the Gibbs Committee) . 
This was the first time there had been a thoroughgoing review of the provisions, 
354 Exhibits 1 1 .2. 1  and 1 1 .2.2. 
355 Exhibit 1 1 .2.3. 
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although they had been much criticised. In 1979 the Senate Standing Committee 
on Constitutional and Legal Affairs recommended that urgent consideration be 
given to reforming section 70 'so as to limit the categories of information that it is 
an offence to disclose and to establish procedural safeguards for any person who 
may face prosecution under that section'. In 1983 the Human Rights 
Commission suggested that section 70 could be inconsistent with Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which protects the right to 
freedom of expression. In accordance with that Covenant, it recommended that 
the operation of section 70 be limited to restrictions which were necessary for the 
respect of the rights and reputations of others, and for the protection of national 
security, public order or public health or morals.356 
13.5 The Gibbs Committee identified three basic principles which, the 
Committee believed, would be generally accepted in any consideration of 
restrictions on disclosure of official information. The first was that 'it is 
unacceptable in our democratic society that there should be a restraint on the 
publication of information relating to Government when the only vice of that 
information is that it enables the public to discuss, review, and criticize 
Government action' (Commonwealth v. fohn Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 
39, 52 per Mason J). The second was that it is undesirable that the sanctions and 
machinery of the criminal law should be applied in relation to the unauthorised 
disclosure of all forms of official information and this should be avoided if 
possible. Thirdly, there are some descriptions of official information that should 
be protected by the criminal law from unauthorised disclosure.357 The 
Committee also accepted a broader principle that: 
in a modern democratic society, the public should have access to as much 
information as to the workings and activities of Government and its servants as 
is compatible with the effective functioning of that Government.358 
13.6 Applying these principles, the Gibbs Committee criticised the breadth 
of the existing provisions: 
The combined effect of sections 70 and 79 is that the unauthorised disclosure of 
most information held by the Commonwealth Government and its agencies is 
subject to the sanctions of the criminal law. No distinction is drawn for the 
purposes of these provisions between information the disclosure of which may 
356 Exhibit 14.4, paragraph 26. 1 .  
357 Ibid., paragraph 3 1 . 1 .  
358 Ibid., paragraph 3 1 .2. 
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cause real harm to the public interest and information the disclosure of which 
may cause no harm whatsoever to the public interest. 359 
The Committee concluded that 'the catch-all provisions of existing law are wrong 
in principle and additionally . . .  are seriously defective from the point of view of 
effective law enforcement'.360 
13.7 The ASIS perception is that the provisions are ineffective, both because 
of difficulties of proof and, associated with that to some extent, because of a 
reluctance on the part of Government to prosecute. The former Director-General, 
Mr Furner, described the Crimes Act provisions as 'this terrible Damoclean 
sword . . .  which never seems to leave its silken thread'.361 He referred to 'an 
inbred reluctance to invoke the Crimes Act in cases of apparent threats to 
national security'.362 The explanation for this, according to the Service, is that: 
leaving aside the politics of Crimes Act prosecutions, the relevant provisions of 
that statute are insufficiently distinct to allow for rigour and confidence in 
mounting a prosecution against those who make unauthorised disclosures about 
ASIS.363 
13.8 Historically, it has been rare for governments to resort to the Crimes 
Act to punish unauthorised disclosures. Despite the apparent breadth of sections 
70 and 79, there have been very few reported prosecutions under those 
provisions.364 One of the obstacles to prosecution has been the apparent belief 
that it was necessary to prove intent to cause harm on the part of the officer 
making the disclosure. The Minister said he had been advised on a number of 
occasions about the difficulties of establishing the necessary degree of intent in 
criminal prosecutions under the Crimes Act.365 
13.9 The element of intent only arises, however, under s.79. Section 70 
contains no such requirement. Clearly, if the prosecution is required to prove 
that the person making the disclosure did so 'for a purpose intended to be 
prejudicial to the safety or defence of the Commonwealth', this presents 
problems of proof. For this reason, it would be expected that the first recourse in 
any consideration of prosecution would be to s.70. 
359 Ibid., paragraph 25.12. 
360 Ibid., paragraph 3 1 .4. 
361 T*42*. 
362 T2765. 
363 Exhibit 20. 1 . 17, paragraphs 17 & 18. 
364 Exhibit 14. 1 ,  paragraph 2. 10. See also the cases there cited. 
365 T2533. 
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13. 10 The Minister identified, as a further inhibition on prosecution, the risk 
that prosecution action will prompt further publication: 
Free speech, penalising people, jailing, fining people for merely exercising a 
whistleblowing function, and so the argument will go. It runs the risk of 
flushing out further publications by people who are discontented with this . . . 366 
This consideration will exist whatever legislative regime is in place, and is likely 
to become more significant in the event of any strengthening of criminal 
sanctions. 
The Gibbs CommiHee recommendations 
13. 11  The central recommendation of the Gibbs Committee was that criminal 
sanctions should apply only if the information discussed fell into one of a 
number of specific categories. These categories should be 'no more widely stated 
than is strictly required for the effective functioning of Government'.367 The 
relevant category for present purposes was 'information relating to security or 
intelligence'. The Committee recommended that disclosure of such information 
by an officer or ex-officer of one of the intelligence and security services should 
be an offence without the requirement to prove damage. Publication by any 
other person would not be an offence unless it were proved that the disclosure 
was damaging, that is, unless the disclosure: 
(a) caused damage to the work of, or of any part of, the security and 
intelligence services; or 
(b) was of information that was such that its unauthorised disclosure 
would have been likely to cause such damage.368 
13.12 The Committee's recommendation that damage should not be an 
element of the offence where the disclosure was made by an officer or ex-officer 
was justified in the following terms: 
366 T2533. 
Undoubtedly, a member of the intelligence or security services stands in a special 
position and it is not unreasonable, in the opinion of the Review Committee, 
that he or she should be subject to a lifelong duty of secrecy as regards 
information obtained by virtue of his or her position. Subject to the very 
important proviso that satisfactory procedures are established by which 
complaints or allegations by such a person as to illegality, misconduct or 
367 Exhibit 14.4, paragraph 3 1.5. 
368 Draft Bill, sub-clause 85DB(3). 
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improper activities of those services or persons employed in them are received, 
investigated and dealt with ... the Review Committee is satisfied that disclosures 
by such persons should be prohibited by criminal sanctions without proof of 
harm.369 
13.13 The Attorney-General's Department response supported this 
conclusion: 
If it were necessary to prove that the disclosure of information by a member of 
the intelligence or security services had caused damage, it may then be necessary 
to either confirm the validity of the information, or to reveal further secret 
information. Unauthorised disclosures by such individuals are also harmful to 
the public interest because they diminish confidence in the ability of the service 
to carry out its duties properly. 370 
13. 14 The category of protected information was recommended to extend to 
statements made by officers of the services which purported to be of information 
relating to the services, or were intended to be taken as such.371 This was in 
recognition that, given the constraints of the conventional 'neither confirm nor 
deny' policy, disclosures of misinformation by an officer can also be harmful. 
13.15 In our view, the essence of the Gibbs Committee's recommendations ­
the replacement of wide provisions of general application with offences referable 
to disclosure of defined categories of information - is desirable both in principle 
and in practice, and should be implemented. Some of the specific 
recommendations, however, require closer examination. 
A whisOeblower scheme 
13. 16  The recommendation that proof of damage not be required in a case of 
a disclosure by an officer or former officer was subject to the proviso that there 
be satisfactory procedures for complaints or allegations to be investigated and 
dealt with. To this end, the Committee recommended that a scheme be 
established by law for 'whistle-blowers'. The proposed scheme would apply to a 
Commonwealth officer who believed that he/ she had evidence of illegality, 
gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds or 'a substantial or specific danger 
to public health or safety'.372 Under the scheme, an ASIS officer in possession of 
such information could, without risk of criminal liability, disclose it either to a 
369 Exhibit 14.4, paragraph 3 1 .26. 
370 Exhibit 14. 1 ,  paragraph 4.27. 
371 Exhibit 14.4, Part VI, paragraph 85DB(1)(d). 
372 Exhibit 14.4, paragraph 32.35 and paragraph 32.50. 
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designated complaints officer of the Service or to IGIS. The Attorney-General's 
Department response supported these recommendations.373 
13.17 We have no hesitation in supporting the principle that there should be 
protection from criminal liability and from disciplinary sanctions for disclosures 
of this special character. Such a scheme should be established regardless of 
whether, or in what way, the Crimes Act may be amended. As the Gibbs 
Committee recommended, the IGIS Act should be amended to empower IGIS to 
inquire into allegations of the requisite kind against any of the intelligence and 
security agencies,374 and to confer immunity from prosecution or disciplinary 
action on a person disclosing information to IGIS in support of such 
allegations. 375 Allegations of this special character are to be clearly distinguished 
from employment-related grievances which at present are within IGIS's 
jurisdiction376 but which we recommend in Chapter 14 should be transferred to 
the jurisdiction of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. If this change is 
implemented, it will need to be clearly stated that once a complainant has 
invoked the Tribunal's jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of IGIS in relation to the 
subject-matter of the complaint is permanently excluded. 
13.18 We have not seen it as our function to investigate possible schemes for 
whistleblower protection. The recommendations of the Gibbs Committee took 
account of relevant statute law in the United States and a variety of Australian 
proposals.377 The Senate subsequently established a Select Committee on Public 
Interest Whistleblowing, which reported in August 1994. It is sufficient for us to 
say that we regard the scheme proposed by the Gibbs Committee as appropriate, 
with one significant qualification. The protection which the scheme affords 
should, in our view, be extended to a disclosure by a former officer, or by a 
source or former source,· of one of the services who believes that he/she has 
evidence of the requisite kind. 
373 Exhibit 14. 1, paragraphs 6.8-6. 19. 
374 Exhibit 14.4, paragraph 32.12. !GIS already has power under s.8(2)(a) of the !GIS Act to inquire into 
complaints regarding ASIS's compliance with Australian law and with ministerial guidelines. 
375 cf. the existing immunity from civil action - !GIS Act s.33(2). 
376 !GIS Act, ss.8(6), 1 1 (5). 
377 Electoral and Administrative Review Commission (�d), The Protection of Whistleblowers ( 199 1); Finn, 
P.O., Integrity in Government: Official Information; Interim Report of the Integrity in Government Projec� 
Canberra, Australian National University, 1 99 1; ].G. Starke, The Protection of Public Service Whistleblowers 
( 1991 )  65 ALJ 205-219, 252-265. 
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Proof of damage 
13.19 Like the Gibbs Committee, we see the task of defining appropriate 
criminal provisions in this area as one of finding the right balance between 
competing public interests, between protecting intelligence-gathering activities 
on the one hand and maximising disclosure of information about the workings of 
government on the other. In failing to distinguish between damaging and non­
damaging disclosures, the existing Crimes Act provisions are too heavily 
weighted against disclosure. 
13.20 Clearly, however, officers and former officers of the intelligence and 
security services are in a rather special position. The question is whether the 
character of their work, and the sensitive nature of the information with which 
they are entrusted during that employment, justifies criminal liability without 
proof of damage when that information is disclosed. We have referred already 
to the considerations advanced in support of this Gibbs recommendation, 
namely: 
(a) the officer's lifelong duty of secrecy; 
(b) the loss of public confidence in the Service if an officer or former 
offic�r makes disclosures; and 
(c) the likely need to disclose secret information in court in order to 
prove damage. 
13.21 As to the first of these, the obligation of secrecy is imposed on an ASIS 
officer as a matter of civil law, by virtue of his/her contract with the Service and 
the equitable obligation of confidence. We accept that it is a lifelong duty, the 
observance of which is essential to the effectiveness of what ASIS does, but it is a 
very serious thing for any breach of that civil law obligation to attract a criminal 
penalty regardless o.f whether damage is caused - for example, if the information 
disclosed is of an administrative kind entirely lacking in operational significance. 
We have not ignored the argument that any breach of the secrecy obligation has 
a tendency to damage ASIS because of its effects on internal morale and 
reputation of ASIS with its liaison partners. But in the end we are not persuaded 
that the existence of the duty of secrecy by itself justifies a criminal sanction for 
any breach. 
13.22 In our view, the balance of interest favours taking the risk of harm 
being done simply because an officer is making a disclosure, rather than the 
detriment which would flow from the creation of criminal liability for an officer 
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who discloses problems with Service administration which are not in themselves 
damaging. 
13.23 As to the second consideration, it is impossible to assess whether 
public confidence is affected by the mere fact of a disclosure, apart altogether 
from the impact of the information disclosed. Assuming that changes in public 
confidence are capable of detection, we would doubt whether individual 
disclosures - especially harmless ones - would produce any measurable change. 
This is not, in our view, an argument which would justify the step of imposing 
criminal liability without proof of damage. 
13.24 The problem of disclosing secret information in court in order to prove 
damage is more significant. But this problem will arise in other prosecutions 
concerning intelligence-related information - whenever the defendant is 
someone other than an officer or former officer - and it is therefore not by itself a 
ground for treating officers and former officers differently. In any case, a 
solution is to be found in taking the necessary evidence in camera, an approach 
which ASIS informed the Gibbs Committee it would generally be prepared to 
accept.378 Such a procedure would necessarily involve the disclosure of sensitive 
information to the jury, but risk of any wider disclosure would be minimised by 
the combination of the judge's order closing the court and prohibiting 
publication of the evidence - breach of which would be a contempt of court if not 
a criminal offence in itself379 - and the prohibition on secondary disclosures (see 
paragraphs 13.43-51), the effect of which could readily be explained to the jury. 
13.25 An alternative solution, adopted in New Zealand, would be to remove 
the question of damage from the jury. Under the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), the 
question whether a communication was likely to prejudice the security or 
defence of New Zealand is reserved for determination by the judge, who may 
receive evidence on the question in addition to that heard by the jury. We agree 
with the view of the Gibbs Committee that the removal of such a significant 
element of the case against an accused from determination by the jury should not 
be considered except as a last resort. 380 
13.26 Our chief concern is with the extent of the criminal liability which the 
Gibbs proposal would create. It would render an ASIS officer or former officer 
criminally liable - without proof of damage - for the disclosure of 'any 
378 Exhibit 14.4, paragraph 30. 13. 
379 Crimes Act s.85B. 
380 Exhibit 14.4, paragraphs 28. 13 - 28. 14. 
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information relating to security or intelligence'. Thus, there would be liability 
not only for disclosures of sensitive operational information, which are 
damaging to the work of the Service, but also for disclosures of an innocuous 
kind, for example concerned with administrative or management issues. 
13.27 The chain of events which started with the Four Comers program 
demonstrates that judgments about what is and is not damaging are often 
complex. The disclosure of a piece of information, which may not have appeared 
to be damaging at the time, may be followed by (and may itself lead to) other 
disclosures, the cumulative effect of which is damaging. Additionally, the 
'mosaic' theory advanced by the Service means that any piece of information 
about the Service is, in the wrong hands, potentially damaging. This is, 
however, a difficult argument to evaluate and, taken to its extreme, it would 
prevent disclosure of any information about ASIS. 
13.28 As we said in Chapter 11,  disclosures of various types can be 
damaging to ASIS, depending on the circumstances. We accept that disclosures 
about operational matters will often - but not always - be damaging to the work 
of ASIS. Disclosures about management matters may or may not be damaging, 
depending on their content. But if no damage can be demonstrated as flowing 
from a particular disclosure, does that nevertheless justify subjecting the officer 
or former officer to criminal penalty? Such a result might offend against the first 
of the three principles identified and adopted by the Gibbs Committee (see 
paragraph 13.5 above). 
13.29 In our view, the solution lies in confining liability without proof of 
damage to those disclosures which, by their nature, are most likely to cause 
damage. This could be done by defining certain narrower categories within the 
general category of 'information relating to security or intelligence'. This 
possibility was explored by the Gibbs Committee, in the context of disclosures by 
persons other than officers or former officers of the intelligence and security 
services, whose guilt would depend on some form of damage.381 The ASIS 
submission to the Committee on this point said: 
A list of "specific forms of information relating to . . . intelligence" presents some 
difficulty for ASIS because such a list could itself disclose classified information. 
An unclassified list could include "any information purportedly: 
(a) identifYing current or former officers, sources or contacts of ASIS; 
(b) identifYing current or former places of operation of ASIS; or 
381 Exhibit 14.4, paragraphs 28. 17 - 28. 18. 
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(c) describing specific intelligence operations of ASIS by such persons and/ or 
at such places". 382 
13.30 In the event, the Gibbs Committee did not proceed with this 
approach, 383 but recommended instead that proof of damage be required in 
relation to all non-officer disclosures. Whilst agreeing with that conclusion, we 
consider that the approach can be usefully adapted to the different purpose of 
narrowing the scope of liability-without-damage for officers and former officers. 
13.31 The ASIS list set out above is a useful starting-point. It concentrates on 
those categories of information which we have identified as most obviously in 
need of protection because of the damage which their disclosure is likely to 
cause.384 It is no coincidence that the categories in this list are similar to those in 
the ASIS D Notice. They also reflect what the Minister has said is the focus of the 
Government's concern: 
The Government's concern is not and never has been with the publication of 
material about the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) as such. Much 
more specifically, the concern has been about the publication of information 
which identifies former or current officers of ASIS or their contacts, which 
identifies current or former places of overseas operation of ASIS, or which falsely 
describes specific intelligence activities involving those officers or those places. 385 
13.32 The first of the categories proposed by ASIS - the identification of 
individuals - is addressed later in this chapter, where we recommend a specific 
provision in the legislation for ASIS, corresponding to a provision in the ASIO 
Act. The second and third categories focus on specific operational information. 
They require some modification. In our view, it would be appropriate that any 
disclosure by a serving or former ASIS officer of a current or projected operation 
or of current or projected ASIS operational locations should constitute an offence 
without proof of damage. The probability of damage in such cases is high, as 
reflected in the equivalent D Notice provisions. On the other hand, as we have 
discussed in Chapter 11, disclosures about past operations or past locations may 
or may not be damaging, depending on the circumstances. In those cases, proof 
of damage should be required. 
13.33 It follows that we do not agree with the Gibbs Committee that proof of 
damage should be dispensed with in any case where the information is disclosed 
382 Ibid, paragraph 30. 16. 
383 Ibid., paragraph 3 1 .32. 
384 See chapter 1 1 . 
385 Senate Hansard, 23 November 1988, p.2613, at Exhibit 12. 1 ,  tab 1 .  
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by an officer or former officer. Instead we recommend that proof of damage be 
an element of the offence arising from disclosure of information relating to 
intelligence and security, except where the person making the disclosure is an 
officer or former officer and the information disclosed: 
(a) identifies or purports to identify current or projected places of 
operation of ASIS; or 
(b) describes or purports to describe current or projected intelligence 
operations of ASIS. 
Where the exception applied, the offence would be committed when information 
of the requisite kind - including false information - was disclosed. No proof of 
damage would be necessary. Nor would it be when the disclosure involved the 
identification of current or former officers or sources. 
13.34 At the same time, we recommend that the proposed definition of 
'damage' be widened, to include a case where an individual (e.g. a source in a 
foreign country) was put at risk by the disclosure, even though it might not be 
possible to demonstrate that this had had any direct adverse effect on the work 
of the Service. This expansion of the definition will ensure that the scope of the 
criminal provisions corresponds with the nature of the interests to be protected. 
As we have seen, those interests are individual as well as operational. 
Defence of prior publication 
13.35 The Gibbs Committee recommended that it should be a defence in a 
prosecution for unauthorised disclosure for the defendant to satisfy the court 
that: 
(a) the information in question had previously been published; 
(b) the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the second 
publication was not damaging; and 
(c) the defendant was not in any way involved in the prior 
publication. 386 
Importantly for present purposes, however, the Committee recommended 
against this defence being available in relation to an unauthorised disclosure of 
intelligence and security information by a member or former member of the 
386 Exhibit 14.4, paragraph 3 1 .35. 
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intelligence and security services, if the information disclosed had been available 
to the person because of his or her position as a member of such a service. The 
denial of this defence was said to be justified by 'the very special position' of a 
member of such a service. The Attorney-General's Department response 
endorsed the Committee's recommendations. 387 
13.36 Once again, we have come to a different view. As we have already 
indicat�d, we do not accept that the position of members or former members of 
ASIS is such that they should automatically be placed in a less advantageous 
position than other persons making unauthorised disclosures. In our view, the 
defence of prior publication should be available to a member or former member 
in any case where damage is an element of the offence, that is, where the 
information disclosed falls outside the categories proposed in paragraph 13.33. 
In such a case, the elements of the defence, as defined by the Gibbs Committee, 
mean that it will only be available if it was reasonable for the officer to believe 
that no damage to the work of ASIS would be caused and where the officer was 
innocent of involvement in the original publication. If the officer is able to 
satisfy those requirements, we see no reason in principle why the defence should 
not be available. 
Defence of public interest 
13.37 In an action for breach of confidence brought against a person who has 
made an unauthorised disclosure of information, it is a defence if the defendant 
can establish that the disclosure was required in the public interest.388 The Gibbs 
Committee doubted whether an equivalent defence was available in a 
prosecution under either ss.70 or 79 of the Crimes Act, but, in view of its 
recommendations about whistleblower protection, did not consider it necessary 
to make provision for a defence of public interest specifically in that form.389 The 
Attorney-General's Department response endorsed the Committee's view, 
arguing that: 
There should not be a general public interest defence in the criminal law on 
protecting official information. It is acknowledged that persons who illegally 
disclose information may be motivated by a perceived benefit to the public. Yet 
this will be true for a number of crimes. It is not appropriate to make the 
application of the criminal law depend upon the ultimate motives of the 
offender. Rather, it should be based upon the nature of the act and the damage 
387 Exhibit 14. 1, paragraphs 4.50, 4.52. 
388 See Attorney-General v. Observer Limited [ 199 1] A.C. 109 at 259, 264 and 282; Commonwealth v. John 
Fairfax & Sons Limited (1 980) 147 CLR 39 at 56-7; A v. Hayden ( 1984) 156 CLR 532 at 544-6. 
389 Exhibit 14.4, paragraph 32.2. 
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which it may cause. Questions of motive should be relevant only with respect to 
sentencing. 390 
13.38 The Department's comment appears to misunderstand the nature of 
the defence under consideration. If the defence were dependent on a wholly 
subjective test - whether the defendant honestly believed that publication was 
necessary in the public interest - it would have a far wider operation than could 
reasonably be justified. In civil law, the defence is not made out unless the 
defendant establishes the facts on which the allegations (of criminal activity or 
misconduct) are based, sufficient to satisfy the court that in all the circumstances 
it was in the public interest for the defendant to make the disclosure of 
confidential information about which the plaintiff complains.391 Disclosure must 
be required in the public interest, not merely believed to be required.392 
13.39 Here again, our conclusions diverge from those of the Committee. We 
have already indicated our support for the Committee's recommendations on 
whistleblower protection. But we do not regard the establishment of such a 
scheme as concluding the question about a public interest defence. On the 
contrary, allowance must be made for the possibility that a person, having 
information of the kind to which the whistleblower scheme will apply, 
concerning for example serious illegality or gross mismanagement, will disclose 
that information publicly. Such disclosure might be made in ignorance of the 
existence of the whistleblower scheme; it might be made by a person who was 
concerned that an investigation by the Ombudsman or (in the case of ASIS) the 
Inspector-General would not be sufficiently rigorous; or it might reflect 
dissatisfaction with an investigation which the Ombudsman or IGIS had already 
carried out. 
13.40 We think that a defendant, in those circumstances, should be entitled 
to call in aid a defence of public interest. We do not consider that the 
establishment of such a defence would be likely to encourage a rash of 
disclosures since, ex hypothesi, the person making the disclosure will be running 
the risk of conviction. We recommend that it be a defence to a charge under the 
new provisions if: 
(a) the defendant believed that the disclosure to which the charge 
relates was necessary in the public interest; and 
390 Exhibit 14. 1, paragraph 6.5. 
391 A v. Hayden (supra) at 546, 545. 
392 Attornr;y-General v. Observer Limited (supra) at 282. 
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(b) there were reasonable grounds for the defendant to hold that 
belief at the time the disclosure was made. 
The defendant would bear the onus of establishing both these elements on the 
balance of probabilities. The requirement to show reasonable grounds ensures 
that liability is not dependent upon 'the ultimate motives of the offender'. 
13.41 Failure to report the matter in question to the whistleblower agency in 
the first place should not be a bar to reliance on this defence, although we would 
expect that recourse to the agency would be the first step in most cases. Not only 
is public disclosure generally seen as a last resort, but a defendant who had not 
given the whistleblower agency an opportunity to investigate before the matter 
was raised publicly would find it much more difficult to establish in court that it 
was necessary in the public interest to make a public disclosure. 
13.42 We deal next with the issue of secondary disclosure. If, contrary to the 
recommendation we there make, the offence recommended by the Gibbs 
Committee is created, the defence of public interest should apply to it. The 
offence can be committed by persons other than Commonwealth officers and 
contractors, and in those circumstances the existence of the whistleblower 
scheme is irrelevant. 
Secondary disclosures 
13.43 'Secondary' disclosures are made by those who gain access to 
government information as a result of an unlawful 'primary' disclosure. Section 
70 of the Crimes Act does not directly apply to secondary disclosures, such as 
where an officer or former officer has wrongly disclosed sensitive information to 
an individual who subsequently publishes it. The secondary publisher may be 
liable as an accessory to the primary offence. In this regard, Crimes Act s.5(1) 
provides: 
5(l)Any person who aids, abets, counsels or procures, or by act or omission is in 
any way directly or indirectly knowingly concerned in, or party to, the 
commission of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth or a Territory, 
whether passed before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to 
have committed that offence and shall be punishable accordingly. 
13.44 In certain circumstances, this provision could enable the prosecution of 
a person who came to an arrangement with a Commonwealth officer for that 
officer to disclose information unlawfully. For example, it could apply to a 
journalist who published information about ASIS, knowing that it had been 
communicated to him or her by an ASIS officer without authority. But a 
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subsequent recipient who published the illegally-disclosed information would 
escape liability, having had no involvement in the original offence. Moreover, in 
the absence of evidence as to which officer was responsible for the primary 
disclosure, it would be difficult to mount a successful prosecution of the third 
party, even where the third party had obtained the information by coming to an 
arrangement with a Commonwealth officer. 
13.45 According to the Gibbs Committee, this represents a limitation on the 
operation of the law: 
A prosecution of a subsequent publisher of [protected] information for breaches 
of sections 70, 79 or 5 of the Crimes Act will ordinarily not succeed without proof 
of the identity of the officer who made the disclosure, the channel of 
communication to that publisher or at least the circumstances under which the 
publisher received the information in question. 393 
The Attorney-General's Department response commented: 
This is unsatisfactory, if only because the application of the criminal law will be 
highly arbitrary. If, for example, a third party has acquired official information 
to which he or she should not have had access, and deliberately discloses that 
information in circumstances which he or she knows will cause damage to the 
public interest, prosecution may be avoided provided that the circumstances in 
which the third party acquired the information are unclear. However, if the 
circumstances of the primary disclosure can be established, then the third party 
would be liable. Indeed, under the current law he or she would be liable 
irrespective of the potential harm caused by the subsequent disclosure. 394 
13.46 The Gibbs Committee recommended that Australian legislation should 
broadly follow s.S of the Official Secrets Act 1989 (UK) in creating an offence of 
secondary disclosure.395 The Committee recommended that the offence created 
should apply to a person who knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe, that 
the information in question: 
(a) had been disclosed (whether to him/her or another) by a 
Commonwealth officer without authority or had been unlawfully 
obtained from such an officer; or 
(b) had been entrusted to him/her in confidence by such officer on 
terms requiring it to be held in confidence; or 
393 Exhibit 14.4, paragraph 25.42. 
394 Exhibit 14.1, paragraph 5.6. 
395 Exhibit 14.4, paragraphs 3 1 .41-2. 
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(c) had been disclosed (whether to him/her or another) without 
lawful authority by a person to whom it had been entrusted in 
confidence. 
The Committee further recommended that, in addition to these matters, the 
prosecution would be required to prove that: 
(d) the defendant disclosed the information without authority; 
(e) the disclosure was damaging; and 
(f) the defendant knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, that it 
was damaging.396 
13.47 In supporting this recommendation, the Attorney-General's 
Department response commented: 
It must be emphasised that the secondary disclosure provision will only cover 
official information which it is important to protect. This means that criminal 
sanctions will only be imposed on third parties in circumstances where they have 
disclosed information which is genuinely secret. Further, they will only apply 
where the third party knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe, that the 
information is secret and that its disclosure would cause the relevant form of 
damage.397 
13.48 The proposed prov1s10n would cover the case of disclosure of 
information by an ASIS officer (but not a former officer) to a journalist where the 
journalist was well aware that this was an unauthorised disclosure. Criminal 
liability would depend on whether the disclosure was in fact damaging and 
whether the journalist knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, that it was 
damaging. 
13.49 The policy question is whether, if the voluntary D Notice system is 
revitalised as we recommend, a criminal offence of secondary disclosure is also 
necessary. The contents of some media reporting on ASIS throughout 1993 and 
1994 clearly fell within the current D Notice. Its publication represented a failure 
of the D Notice system. In part, this was a function of ignorance of the system398 
and in part, according to the Director-General,399 it was a function of journalistic 
attitude. It could certainly be argued that some of this reporting was damaging 
396 Ibid., paragraph 3 1 .44. The Committee's draft Bill did not include an express requirement that it be a 
damaging disclosure - see clause 85DF cf. clause 85DB(2). 
397 Exhibit 14. 1, paragraph 5.9. 
398 T*690*, *710*. 
399 T*982*. 
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to the work of ASIS and, further, that the journalists had reasonable cause to 
believe that it was damaging. Assuming that the sources of the information 
were, to the journalists' knowledge, ASIS officers, the offence would be made out 
if - but only if - ASIS could establish the fact of damage_ and that such damage 
could reasonably have been anticipated. 
13.50 Standing alone, this draft provision imposes what we regard as 
appropriate limits on the exposure of a journalist, or other secondary publisher, 
to criminal liability. But the provision cannot be considered in isolation. 
Because in its practical operation it will apply - or be perceived as applying -
most often to journalists, it must be considered in the context of our 
recommendations for the reactivation of the D Notice system and a review of the 
ASIS D Notice. 
13.51 Although the existing s.5(1) potentially applies to journalists, the 
proposed new secondary disclosure offence is both an extension and a 
refinement of the present law. In particular, it would apply to a journalist who 
had no involvement in the primary disclosure. If enacted it would be seen by the 
media - with some justification, in our view - as effectively replacing the 
voluntary D Notice system with a system based on criminal sanctions. Media 
witnesses made clear their opposition to such a course.400 If this offence were 
created it would, in all likelihood, destroy the voluntary system. Accordingly, 
we recommend that the Government not proceed with the proposed offence of 
secondary disclosure at least until it has been established beyond reasonable 
doubt that the D Notice system is incapable of being made effective. 
Identification of individuals: a mirror provision to ASIO Act s.92? 
13.52 Section 92 of the ASIO Act 1979 prohibits the publication of: 
any matter stating, or from which it could reasonably be inferred, that a person 
having a particular name or otherwise identified, or a person residing at a 
particular address, is an officer . . . employee or agent of the Organization or is in 
any way connected with such an officer, employee or agent or, subject to sub­
section (l)(B), is a former officer . . .  employee or agent of the Organization or is 
in any way connected with such a former officer, employee or agent. 401 
400 See for example the submissions from the Age, 18 November 1994 (Exhibit 12.5.6); and from the 
Australian, 29 November 1994; (Exhibit 12. 10.5). 
401 ASIO Act, s.92. 
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The prohibition does not apply in relation to action taken in respect of a former 
officer, employee or agent who has consented in writing to the taking of that 
action or who has caused or permitted the publication to occur.402 
13.53 ASIO has found s.92 to be an effective deterrent, although it does not 
offer a universal guarantee.403 ASIO's conclusion that it is a deterrent is based 
principally on the fact that there has been very little publication.404 On one 
occasion ASIO drew the attention of Four Comers to the provision, and its terms 
were complied with in the broadcast program.405 The author of a recent book on 
ASIO, however, advised ASIO that he was identifying a large number of officers 
and former officers, knowing that he was infringing s.92.406 
13.54 ASIS has submitted that a like prohibition should apply to the 
identification of ASIS officers and sources.407 This has been a prime concern of 
the Service from the beginning of the Inquiry, and a key factor in its decision to 
seek legislative coverage.408 
13.55 The proposal was taken up with media representatives during their 
evidence before the Commission. A number of media representatives were 
firmly opposed to the proposal. Mr Kohler and Mr Bartlett of the Age said they 
considered the D Notice system to be sufficient to prevent disclosure. They 
argued that there had been few, if any, instances of the names of ASIS officers 
being revealed and that any limitations in D Notices did not flow from the 
system itself but from the Government's failure to disseminate information about 
it.409 Mr Hill from the ABC told the Commission that the ABC would 'oppose 
any further restriction on the reporting of ASIS, whatever form that may take'.410 
Other media witnesses were more receptive to the suggestion. Mr Grant from 
Channel Seven thought it would be acceptable.411 Mr Harvey of Channel Nine 
generally favoured a voluntary rather than a proscriptive approach to the 
protection of ASIS security, but believed that a ban on the disclosure of the 
402 Ibid., s.92(1B) 
403 Exhibit 34. 1 .2, p.2. 
404 T*3 17*. 
405 T*3 18-9*. 
406 T*3 18*. 
407 Exhibit 20. 1 . 17, paragraph 124; T*958*. 
408 See paragraph 3 .4. 
409 T*840*. 
410 T*614*. 
41 1  T*756*. 
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identity of ASIS officers would make little difference to his organisation 'in 
practical terms' because it did so little reportage on ASIS.412 
13.56 An equivalent provision to s.92 of the ASIO Act would enhance the 
protection afforded to present and former officers and sources against disclosure 
of their identities. It would also strengthen the assurance which the Service can 
give to sources about such protection. We are satisfied that the importance of 
such protection to the effective functioning of the Service, and to the security of 
the individuals concerned, is sufficient to justify criminal liability without proof 
of damage should a disclosure occur. It is, moreover, difficult to see any basis 
for denying to ASIS officers and sources the protection afforded to their ASIO 
counterparts. We recommend accordingly. 
Secrecy provisions in ASIS legislation 
13.57 Elsewhere in this report we recommend the introduction of legislation 
for ASIS. We believe it should contain specific offences concerning the 
communication of information by ASIS officers or otherwise relating to ASIS. 
We envisage that, if and when the Crimes Act is amended along the lines 
recommended, that part of the ASIS legislation would be repealed. It is, in our 
view, desirable that there be a single code dealing with unauthorised disclosures 
and that, to the extent that special provisions are necessary in relation to the 
intelligence and security services, those provisions should be included in that 
code, rather than in separate legislation. 
412 T*673*. 
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Chapter 14 
Com.plaints and Grievances : External 
Review 
Inquiries into complaints and grievances 
14.1 When Mr Justice Hope proposed that a new office of Inspector-General 
be established, he apparently expected that such complaints as were received 
would originate primarily from the public. He propounded a model of inquiry 
into complaints based on informal fact-gathering and rejected the model of a 
quasi-judicial tribunal: 
Often ... an aggrieved person may believe, but will not know, that ASI 0 has acted 
in a particular way. The submission by the Australian Labor Party noted: 
. . . fishing expeditions into ASIO's activities should not be permitted: nor 
should a person be able, by virtue of some review Tribunal, to, in effect, 
deliver a requisition compelling ASIO to disclose whether he was or was 
not a 'target'. 
These considerations suggest that any inquiry should be more like those carried 
out in other areas by an Ombudsman .. . In this area a quasi-judicial inquiry of 
the kind that the Security Appeals Tribunal is well suited to carry out seems 
inappropriate. The emphasis will be on ascertaining the facts and circumstances 
by direct inquiry rather than on calling on ASI 0 to justify an acknowledged 
action or opinion on its part.413 
14.2 This reasoning applies more readily to complaints from the public than 
to employee grievances. An aggrieved staff member could be expected to seek 
exactly what Mr Justice Hope had considered unlikely - that the agency be 
required to justify an action it had taken. The original conception was that there 
would be other avenues for review of the grievances of staff and that IGIS should 
normally respond to staff grievances by suggesting that a staff member should 
pursue the grievance procedure within the organisation. The Inspector-General 
413 Exhibit 2.2.4, paragraph 17.72 (RCASIA, Report on ASJO, AGPS, 1984). 
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would not ordinarily inquire into particular cases but would be available to 
ensure that the procedures operated as intended, and fairly.414 
14.3 Our discussion in this chapter maintains the dis�nction between public 
complaints and employee grievances. We describe as a 'grievance' a matter 
raised by an employee or former employee of an agency which is related to his 
or her employment. We use the term 'complaint' for any other matter raised 
with IGIS concerning the activities of an agency. 
The power to inquire 
14.4 IGIS may inquire into complaints about: 
(a) compliance by ASIS with Australian law; 
(b) its compliance with directions or guidelines given by the Minister; 
(c) the propriety of particular activities of ASIS; and 
(d) an act or practice of ASIS referred to IGIS by the Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission.415 
IGIS also has the power to inquire into a grievance of an employee of ASIO or 
ASIS which 'directly relates' to the promotion, termination of appointment, 
discipline or remuneration of the employee or otherwise to the employment.416 
14.5 The power of inquiry is subject to important qualifications. First, the 
Minister's approval is required before IGIS can inquire into a matter which 
occurred outside Australia or before the commencement of the Act on 1 February 
1987.417 Secondly, a ministerial request is necessary before IGIS can inquire into 
matters which do not affect Australians or involve possible breaches of 
Australian law.418 
14.6 The power to inquire into grievances is subject to additional 
restrictions. Under the Act, IGIS is prevented from inquiring into the grievance 
of an employee of either agency if satisfied that: 
414 Ibid., paragraph 14.73. 
415 s.8(2)(a). 
416 s.8( 6). 
417 s.8(8). 
418 s.8(4). This restriction applies to inquiries into complaints but not grievances. 
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(a) the procedures of the agency relating to redress of grievances are 
adequate and effective; 
(b) the aggrieved employee has not pursued those procedures as far 
as practicable; or 
(c) the matter to which the grievance relates is not of sufficient 
seriousness or sensitivity to justify an inquiry.419 
14.7 IGIS also has a discretion not to inquire into a complaint, or to 
discontinue an inquiry, if satisfied that: 
(a) the complainant became aware of the action more than 12 months 
before the complaint was made; 
(b) the complaint is frivolous, or vexatious, or was not made in good 
faith; or 
(c) having regard to all the circumstances of the case, an inquiry, or 
continuation of an inquiry, is not warranted. 
The value of inquiries into complaints and grievances 
14.8 The value of IGIS's function of investigating complaints lies in the 
protection it offers to the rights of Australians and in the contribution it makes to 
the accountability of ASIS. The investigation of public complaints about ASIS by 
an independent statutory officer contributes to accountability by increasing the 
likelihood that any aspect of ASIS's activities which should be investigated will 
come to attention and be dealt with. In addition, the inquiries provide IGIS with 
an insight into the operations of ASIS and an 'information base'420 which enhance 
the quality of the monitoring undertaken as part of IGIS's broader role of 
independent oversight. 
14.9 Inquiries into staff grievances, on the other hand, will usually be 
directed to the way in which ASIS treats its employees,· rather than to its 
performance of its primary functions. This generally narrows the contribution 
which such inquiries can make to the accountability of the Service or to IGIS's 
understanding of its operations. The external review of grievances is of more 
benefit to the individuals involved and to the agencies themselves than to 
broader public accountability. 
419 s.l l (S). 
420 Exhibit 45.3.4, paragraph 74.4. 
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The experience of complaints and grievances 
ASIS Inquiry 1995 
14.10 Inquiries into complaints and grievances have made greater demands 
on IGIS than was anticipated by Mr Justice Hope. These inquiries have come to 
occupy 75 to 80 per cent of the time of IGIS.421 Staff grievances have accounted 
for much of this effort. As a result, IGIS has not been able to carry out as much 
systematic monitoring of the intelligence ·and security agencies as we believe was 
intended and is desirable. 
14. 1 1  In the first four years of IGIS's existence, between four and six 
complaints from the public were lodged per year. The only issue of substance 
arising from them concerned the arrangements for security assessments.422 Six 
formal grievances from ASIO officers were also lodged in this period and there 
were several informal approaches by ASIO staff. These led to an inquiry of 
IGIS's own motion into ASIO's procedures for dealing with staff grievances. 
14.12 Beginning in 1990-91, the annual rate of receipt of complaints from fue 
public approximately trebled. Ten were received in 1990-91, 19 in 1991-92, 21 in 
1992-93, and 12 in 1993-94. There was also an upsurge in grievances in 1990-91 
and 1991-92. Eight were received in the first of these years (6 ASIO; 2 ASIS) and 
nine in the second (6 ASIO; 3 ASIS) . The introduction in ASIO's grievance 
procedures in 1991 of a review panel with an external representative removed 
IGIS's jurisdiction over grievances of serving officers of the Organisation, 
although some · continued to be lodged by ex-employees. Two additional 
grievances were received in 1992-93 (both ASIO) and four in 1993-94 (2 ASIO, 2 
ASIS) . 
14. 13 Mr Holdich's inquiries into complaints dealt with several issues of 
apparent significance. Matters he investigated in response to complaints 
included security assessment procedures (for the second time), ASIO's 
compliance with the Archives Act, community interviewing by ASIO, 
communication of information on individuals by ASIO, and whether ASIO had 
maintained a file on a member of Parliament, had knowledge of the Hilton and 
Yagoona bombings which should have been communicated to the police, or had 
interfered with arrangements for the publication of a book. According to the 
annual reports, IGIS was dealing, on average, with about four inquiries of this 
level of significance during each year between 1990-91 and 1993-94. Many of the 
inquiries took more than a year to complete. 
421 T140. 
422 IGIS, Annual Report 1987·88, AGPS, Canberra, 1988, p. l .  
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14.14 Several grievances also appear to have involved substantial issues, and 
many were difficult to resolve. Of the six inquiries which Mr Holdich 
considered to have been the most difficult in the experience of his office, four 
were into grievances.423 On average, inquiries into grievances have taken about 
three times as long as those into complaints, a further indication of the relative 
difficulty of the two types of activity. 
14.15 The great majority of complaints concerned ASIO. All but nine of the 
83 received to the end of June 1994, including all the complaints before 1991-92, 
were about ASIO. None of IGIS's substantial inquiries about ASIS up to May 
1994 had been into complaints.424 Only two complaints about another agency ­
DSD - have been discussed in the annual reports, both referred by the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission and concerning alleged 
discriminatory employment practices. 
14.16 The sudden increase in complaints and grievances in 1990-91 created a 
significant backlog in inquiry work which has increased in each year since. Until 
1990, most inquiries had been completed in the year in which they began, but 
this changed dramatically in 1990-91 .  IGIS entered that year with three inquiries 
incomplete, received a further 20 complaints and grievances during the year, and 
reported on only seven. The backlog of inquiries at the beginning of July 1991 
thus increased to 16. It was 17 a year later, had increased to 23 by July 1993, and 
to 28 by July 1994.425 The development of the backlog is illustrated in Figure 
14.1 .  
14. 17 The burgeoning arrears of  work contributed to increasingly lengthy 
delays in the completion of inquiries. In the four years to 1989-90, 19 inquiries 
(63 per cent) were completed in 3 months or less and only five (17 per cent) took 
longer than six months to resolve. In the four years from 1990-91, 35 inquiries 
(44 per cent) were completed in three months or less, but 32 (40 per cent) took 
longer than six months. The average duration of completed inquiries into 
complaints in the first four-year period was 1 .8 months; in the second period it 
was 4.7 months. For inquiries into grievances, the comparable averages were 
12.3 months and 13.3 months respectively. 
423 Exhibit 23.6. 
424 Tl62-63; A complaint lodged by the wife of an ASIS officer was investigated jointly with the officer's 
gnevance. 
425 There was also one inquiry into a grievance which had been resolved in 1992-93, when the Attorney­
General had agreed to support the payment of compensation to a former ASIO officer, but had been 
reopened in 1993-94 when the Minister for Finance refused to approve the necessary act-of-grace 
payment. 
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14. 18 Considerably greater delays occurred in the inquiries that had not been 
completed by 30 June 1994. The average duration of the inquiries that made up 
the backlog at that date was 15.1 months for complaints and 20.6 months for 
grievances. As at 30 June 1994, there were 15 inquiries into complaints and 
grievances which were more than 12 months old. We consider delays of this 
order unacceptable. 
[Figure 14. 1] 
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14. 19 It is important that we record the efforts made by Mr Holdich and his 
staff since the middle of 1994 to reduce the backlog of cases and to manage 
inquiries more efficiently. Of the 15 long-standing inquiries referred to in the 
previous paragraph, unfinished as at 30 June 1994, 7 have now been concluded. 
It is evident that inquiries which have been undertaken since that date are being 
conducted with considerably greater dispatch than in the past. This is 
apparently attributable to a number of factors. Case management procedures 
have been adopted, which provide for the setting of timetables and clearer 
definition of the key issues. A case manager has been appointed, whose task it is 
to assist the Inspector-General in plaru1ing case management strategies and to 
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monitor the progress of inquiries continuously.426 Some additional staffing 
assistance has also been provided. We commend the Inspector-General for the 
initiative he has shown in addressing the problem of delay. 
14.20 Nevertheless, at the date of writing - nine months later - the size of the 
arrears is still such that a significant backlog of inquiry work will persist for 
some time unless special measures are taken to reduce it. The flow of work is 
not abating. During the first part of 1994-95, complaints from the public 
continued at about the same rate as in previous years, and several new inquiries 
into ASIS grievances were commenced. Mr Holdich told us that he would need 
another half dozen staff to eliminate the backlog quickly.427 This estimate is 
consistent with past completion rates. The staffing of the office at the end of June 
1994 was six. In the concluding section of this chapter we consider the resource 
implications of reducing the backlog. 
Public complaints 
14.21 The inquisitorial model of inquiry for which the IGIS Act provides is 
well-suited to the task of dealing with complaints from the public. Once an issue 
is raised, it is for the Inspector-General to investigate it by gathering such oral 
and documentary evidence as he judges necessary. We can see no advantage in 
making this a more formal process, less still in converting it into any kind of 
adversarial proceeding before a tribunal. We agree with the Inspector-General 
that such a proceeding would be inappropriate to the task and to the subject­
matter of inquiry, and could prove to be counterproductive, both for the 
complainant and for the agency.428 
14.22 Complainants and agencies have generally accepted the conclusions 
reached by IGIS after these inquiries, almost all of which have concerned 
complaints about ASI0.429 Since IGIS will ordinarily be unable to supply the 
complainant with any detail of the inquiries undertaken, continued success in the 
discharge of this function will depend upon the office maintaining credibility in 
the eyes of the public. Any perception that the office lacked independence from 
the agencies would jeopardise that credibility, as would any significant delay in 
the completion of an inquiry. 
426 T2858. 
427 T147. 
428 Exhibit 45.3.4, paragraph 74.4. 
429 Exhibit 23.3, paragraph 22. 
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14.23 As we have seen, IGIS's powers to investigate ASIS in response to 
complaints are restricted in several ways. The restrictions apply equally to the 
discharge of the oversight function. In Chapter 9 we have recommended some 
amendments to the IGIS Act to permit certain inquiries to be undertaken with 
ministerial approval, rather than being dependent on a ministerial request. 
14.24 Mr Holdich drew attention to the requirement for ministerial approval 
under s.8(8) for an inquiry into a matter which occurred before the 
commencement of the Act on 1 February 1987. Noting that complaints had often 
involved a sequence of linked events beginning before that date, he argued that 
his statutory discretion to decide whether or not to inquire into such a complaint 
might be sufficient, without any need for ministerial approval.43° For our part, 
we see it as highly improbable that ministerial approval would be declined in 
the circumstances described by the Inspector-General, where a complaint or 
grievance concerned a chain of events stretching back before 1 February 1987. 
We recommend no change. 
14.25 Both the Inspector-General and the Service made submissions 
concerning the procedures by which IGIS conducts inquiries. Since the 
procedures apply whether the inquiry is into a complaint or a grievance, we 
defer our consideration of those submissions until later in this chapter. 
Inquiries into grievances 
14.26 It appears that IGIS was given the function of inquiring into grievances 
of the staff of ASIO and ASIS because there was no other avenue of external 
review available to those employees. When ASIO attempted to have IGIS 
excluded from inquiring into grievances of its employees, the then Secretary, 
PM&C, responded: 
As a general principle . . . employees of all Government organisations should have 
access to an external review mechanism where they have serious grievances 
against management.431 
14.27 This principle was not, however, embodied in the IGIS legislation. 
Instead, the external review for which the IGIS Act provided was of a temporary 
and transitional kind. It was intended that the function of IGIS in relation to 
employee grievances would diminish or disappear once the internal procedures 
430 Exhibit 45.3.4, paragraph 85.7. 
431 Exhibit 15.2.3. 
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of the agencies for dealing with grievances were assessed as satisfactory.432 The 
original · Hope recommendation was that the emphasis should be on an 
appropriate and effective internal system of review of grievances and that review 
by the Inspector-General of an employee grievance should be at his discretion 'if 
he felt that those procedures were not operating properly or effectively'.433 The 
original drafting instructions for the IGIS Bill treated the adequacy of the internal 
grievance procedures as a matter to be considered by the Inspector-General in 
deciding whether or not to entertain an employee complaint.434 In the event, 
s.11 (5)(a) made clear that once the internal procedures were adjudged as 
satisfactory, IGIS would be excluded. 
14.28 In May 1993, IGIS received written advice from the Attorney-General's 
Department that an ASIS employee could still approach the Inspector-General 
with a grievance under s.8(6), notwithstanding that the Inspector-General had 
previously endorsed the ASIS grievance procedures as adequate and effective. 
According to the advice, the Inspector-General must be satisfied at the time the 
grievance is lodged that the procedures are adequate and effective. IGIS has 
interpreted this advice as meaning that he should consider on a case-by-case 
basis whether the procedures are adequate and effective, having regard to the 
way in which they are administered.435 
14.29 Between October 1993 and May 1994, there was a lengthy exchange of 
correspondence between the Inspector-General and the Director-General about 
the adequacy and effectiveness of the ASIS grievance procedures.436 Ultimately 
the Inspector-General advised that his concerns had been met by changes made 
to the grievance procedures and that he regarded them as adequate and effective, 
'subject of course to the necessity for that question to be re-assessed at the time of 
the lodging of any complaint under s.8(6)' .437 
14.30 The effect of s.11 (5)(a) is that, if the Inspector-General continued to be 
satisfied with the ASIS grievance procedures, there would be no avenue for 
external review of grievances. Apparently recognising this, the Inspector­
General is taking what we regard as a generous view of the 1993 advice he 
received. There have been three inquiries into grievances of current or former 
432 This was confirmed by Mr Mcinnes who was in PM&C when the legislation was negotiated - Exhibit 
32.1 ,  pp.3-4; T854; T877. 
433 Exhibit 2.2.2.7, paras 8.63-4. 
434 Exhibit 1 5.2.1 ,  p.19. 
435 Exhibit 20.1 .20, p.23; Exhibit 23.1 ,  paragraph 7. 
436 Exhibit 20. 1 .20. 
437 Ibid., [p.36]; T753. 
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ASIS officers which IGIS has commenced since giving clearance to the ASIS 
grievance procedures in May 1994. As we understand the approach, IGIS has 
considered as a threshold question whether the ASIS procedures were adequate 
and effective in the particular case. Where he has concluded that they were not, 
he has regarded himself as unconstrained by s. 11 (5)(a). This process has not, 
apparently, involved any systematic re-examination of the procedures as such or 
any identification of their deficiencies. 
14.31 In our view, there should continue to be an avenue for external review 
of grievances relating to ASIS. The fundamental principle is the one already 
identified, that aggrieved employees of Government organisations should have 
access to an independent review process. External review has the additional 
benefit that it provides an opportunity for the identification of flaws in the 
internal review processes. But even if the internal review processes are 
appropriate, and operate effectively, employees should have access to external 
review. It is in the interests of the individual and of the organisation that an 
employee should be able to challenge the outcome of the internal review. As the 
Director-General acknowledged: 
where, for the best reasons, [after] an application of what we think are good 
procedures, if people are unhappy, they do need some other external [avenue of 
review].438 
14.32 It follows that we see no place for a provision such as s .11(5)(a) . ASIS 
employees should have access, as of right, to a mechanism for external review of 
grievances, irrespective of the state of ASIS's internal grievance procedures. We 
regard it as most desirable that the Inspector-General should continue to monitor 
the adequacy and effectiveness of those procedures,439 and to advise ASIS of any 
deficiencies which are identified. This can only promote the interests of ASIS 
officers and of the Service itself, and lessen the need for external review. But, 
whatever the Inspector-General's opinion may be from time to time, there should 
be guaranteed access to external review. 
14.33 The key issue is whether the function of reviewing grievances should 
remain with IGIS. On the basis of our close examination of four of the Inspector­
General's inquiries into grievances of former ASIS employees, we have come 
firmly to the view that it should not. We set out our reasons in the next section. 
438 Tl 1 9. 
439 Which he can do of his own motion or at the Minister's request - s.8(2)(b). 
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The experience with ASIS grievances 
14.34 We have reviewed the Inspector-General's conduct of his inquiries into 
four separate grievances lodged by officers or former officers of ASIS. That 
examination has led us to conclude that the informal, inquisitorial model of 
inquiries which the Act establishes is quite unsuitable for the review of employee 
grievances. 
14.35 The chief deficiency of the inquisitorial approach is that it permits, 
indeed encourages, open-ended inquiries. The Act imposes no limits either on 
the scope of a grievance, other than that it must directly relate to the 
employment, or on the manner in which it is investigated. As a result, two of the 
four inquiries ranged very widely indeed. 
14.36 The extensive delays in the completion of the inquiries were partly a 
function of the range of issues raised by the complainants and partly of the 
Inspector-General's failure to impose any limits on his own investigations. A 
further contributing factor was the procedural requirements imposed on the 
Inspector-General by the legislation. The Act provides that: 
(a) IGIS shall not make a report containing opinions that are critical 
of an agency unless IGIS has given -
(i) the head of the agency reasonable opportunity to appear and 
make submissions (s.17(4)); 
(ii) the responsible Minister a reasonable opportunity to discuss 
the proposed report with him (s. 17(9)); 
(b) any person whom IGIS proposes to criticise must be given an 
opportunity to appear and make submissions (s. 17(5)); 
(c) on completing an inquiry, IGIS must prepare a draft report setting 
out his conclusions and recommendations and give a copy of the 
draft report to the head of the agency. If the head of the agency 
makes comments on the draft report, those comments must - so 
far as relevant - be included in the final report (s.21 (1) and (2)) .  
We understand the reasoning behind these provisions. There are, of  course, 
sound reasons of principle for providing an opportunity to respond to criticism. 
But the process of preparing draft reports, seeking comment and then modifying 
the report as necessary in the light of the comment can add considerably to the 
time it takes to complete an inquiry. 
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14.37 There is another difficulty. In several of the cases, these processes, 
involving proposed reports and draft reports, resulted in modification of the 
Inspector-General's view in the light of comments from the Service. This is 
likely, if known to a complainant, to give an impression that the Inspector­
General is insufficiently independent of the Service. In our view, the practice of 
soliciting comment on a draft report, and then deciding whether or not to 
incorporate it in the final report, is less effective than a procedure which allows 
all those involved to make submissions to a tribunal before it prepares a final 
report. This requires that all should understand what the issues are, and address 
them. 
The need for determinative power 
14.38 The Inspector-General has no power of determination. He is not 
empowered to give binding rulings, but is limited to forming conclusions and 
making recommendations. The indirect objective of each inquiry is to further the 
objects of the Act, in particular to assist Ministers in the oversight and review of 
legality, propriety and human rights issues (s.4) . The direct objective of the 
inquiry is to produce, for the Minister and the Director-General, a report setting 
out IGIS's conclusions and recommendations (s.22(1)). It is important to note 
that the report goes to the Minister and the agency. The complainant receives 'a 
written response' (s.23(1)) . The written response received by the complainant is 
often a very truncated version of the full report given to the Minister and the 
agency, which again can create a perception of imbalance. 
14.39 What emerges more clearly than anything else from our examination of 
the ASIS grievances is the need for an external review body which is 
demonstrably independent of government and, above all, which has the power 
to make a final determination binding on all parties. It is vital that the 
determination should be, and be seen to be, the end of the matter. To this end, it 
must be clearly understood from the beginning of the review process that the 
decision will be final and binding. 
14.40 Finality in this sense is necessary to exclude the possibility of any re­
examination of a grievance within government, as can occur when a Minister has 
to decide whether to accept a recommendation from IGIS. Finality of decision 
should also dispel any belief on the part of aggrieved individuals that there is 
some further avenue of appeal beyond the review body. Finality means certainty 
for both the individual and the agency, and it should minimise the risk of 
disaffection continuing and ultimately spreading to the public arena. 
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14.41 In our view, there is a persuasive case for moving to an adjudicative 
model for the review of grievances. The elements of this model would include: 
(a) a requirement for clear definition of the grievance; 
(b) a preliminary hearing directed at identifying the issues;440 
(c) the imposition of a timetable for the provision of relevant 
documentary material by the complainant and by ASIS; 
(d) the presentation of oral evidence by the complainant and by the 
Service; 
(e) power in the tribunal to call its own evidence;441 
(f) the making of submissions by the complainant and the Service, 
with the opportunity for each to comment on the submission of 
the other; and 
(g) final determination of the grievance by the tribunal, with power 
to award compensation. 
14.42 So structured, we think the model would be of great benefit to both the 
individual and the Service. It would promote early crystallisation of the key 
issues, underline the independence of the reviewer from both complainant and 
government and, above all, avoid the delay in resolution which can itself be so 
destructive. The essential feature of the model is that the parties would be 
brought together in the same forum, with each having the opportunity to 
respond directly to the other's case before the tribunal made its decision. 
14.43 Great care will need to be taken to ensure that the position of the 
complainant in such proceedings is adequately protected. Otherwise, the 
obvious inequalities in access to information and in financial resources are likely 
to produce significant unfairness. The imbalance in information is, of course, a 
characteristic of proceedings against government and can largely be rectified by 
strict insistence on the provision by the agency of all relevant documents. The 
tribunal's ability to enforce this obligation would be enhanced if the tribunal 
were able, in appropriate cases, to be assisted by its own counsel. 
440 cf ASIO Act s.58(4). 
441 cf ASIO Act, s.58(1 1). 
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14.44 The financial imbalance is more difficult to correct, particularly as it 
affects legal representation. Unless the right to legal representation were 
excluded altogether, or confined to the most exceptional circumstances, it must 
be assumed that the agency would almost always be represented. Most 
complainants, by contrast, would be unable to afford legal representation for a 
hearing of any duration. 
14.45 For a complainant to be unrepresented in circumstances where the 
agency was represented would, in most instances, be unacceptable. The 
solution, in our view, is for the right to legal representation to be excluded 
absolutely and for provision to be made for the tribunal to appoint counsel 
assisting, where the tribunal considers the nature and/ or complexity of the case 
warrants it. Counsel's function would be to gather and present the evidence, 
including by examining all witnesses, and this should ensure that evidence on 
both sides was properly tested. If no counsel were appointed, the tribunal itself 
would take the evidence from the complainant and from the agency. The 
absence of other legal representatives would help preserve procedural 
informality. As with the Security Appeals Tribunal, there should, in any case, be 
a requirement for the tribunal to conduct its proceedings with as much 
expedition and as little formality and technicality as possible.442 
14.46 We recognise that a blanket exclusion of legal representation is very 
unusual. It is not, however, unprecedented. The legislation establishing the 
Merit Protection and Review Agency makes no provision for representation of 
persons appearing before the Agency to give evidence or produce documents.443 
Under s. 17(6) of the IGIS Act the Inspector-General can approve representation 
'by another person' in the limited circumstances where the Act requires that an 
opportunity be given to the head of an agency or another person to appear and 
make submissions. In none of the cases we examined was such approval given. 
14.47 If, contrary to our view, legal representation were to be permitted, 
steps would need to be taken to reduce the inequality between complainant and 
agency. First, provision could be made for legal assistance to be granted by the 
Attorney-General in a case of hardship, equivalent to the procedure established 
for the Security Appeals Tribunal.444 Secondly, as we have said, the tribunal 
should be enjoined to minimise formality and technicality. Thirdly, the tribunal 
442 cf ASIO Act s.67(1)(b). 
443 Merit Protection (Australian Government Employees) Act 1984, Part II, Division 7. 
444 cf ASIO Act s.72. 
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should be required to take whatever steps it regarded as necessary to protect the 
interests of an unrepresented applicant. 
A new review body? 
14.48 If, as we recommend, an adjudicative model is accepted, we are firmly 
of the view that the Inspector-General should not be the adjudicator. The 
function of reviewing employee grievances should be removed altogether from 
the jurisdiction of IGIS. 
14.49 There are four principal reasons for this view. First, previous 
experience indicates that grievance inquiries are a very serious distraction from 
the Inspector-General's primary function of monitoring the activities of the 
agencies. Given the typically pressing nature of such inquiries, this distraction, 
and the diversion of resources which it entails, are difficult to resist. Secondly, 
the adjudicative function is fundamentally different from the investigative 
approach which IGIS will continue to adopt in his oversight role and in his 
investigation of public complaints. The former requires independence and 
detachment, while the latter necessarily involves close and regular contact with 
the agencies. The methodology is also quite different, the former requiring the 
evaluation of evidence presented by others, the latter involving the active 
gathering of evidence. We think that to require the Inspector-General to perform 
functions of both types virtually simultaneously would be likely to lead to 
institutional schizophrenia, with neither function being performed successfully 
as a result. 
14.50 Thirdly, the different roles require different qualifications. While the 
qualities of integrity, independence of mind and capacity for rigorous inquiry 
identified by Mr Justice Hope as selection criteria would be relevant to both, it 
would be necessary for anyone performing the adjudicative role to have 
knowledge of, or experience in, quasi-judicial review. Such qualifications would 
not be necessary for the discharge of the inquisitorial function. Fourthly, it is 
inevitable that IGIS will be in close contact with ASIS management in the 
performance of his monitoring function and will from time to time - we would 
hope more often than not - be providing management with a healthy report 
card. In the eyes of an employee or former employee raising a grievance for 
external adjudication, this may give rise to a perception of bias which could 
weigh against acceptance of the independence and finality of the adjudication. 
14.51 The adjudicative function should, in our view, be conferred on an 
appropriate tribunal. The obvious candidate is the proposed Security Appeals 
Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The function of 
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reviewing security assessments made by ASIO, formerly carried out by the 
Security Appeals Tribunal established under the ASIO Act, will be transferred to 
that Division under legislation currently before the Parliament.445 Like its 
predecessor, the Security Appeals Division will develop a specialist expertise in 
security matters and will be required to be familiar with public sector 
employment policies and practices, and with the operation of ASIO. It would be 
a natural extension of the Tribunal's review function in relation to security 
assessments for it to have the jurisdiction to review grievances of employees of 
ASIS and ASIO. 
14.52 The review of Government decisions on the merits is the defining 
characteristic of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The Tribunal's standing, 
its expertise in matters concerning Government, and the authority which its 
decisions carry are all factors conducive to finality. In addition, the AAT is a 
large enough tribunal to be able to cope with fluctuations in workload, without 
experiencing the problems which IGIS faced with the upsurge of grievances in 
the early 1990s. 
14.53 The Tribunal's review of a grievance should be on the same basis as a 
conventional proceeding in that Tribunal when a government decision is under 
review. That is, there should be a complete re-hearing of the matter, with the 
Tribunal exercising all the powers of the relevant decision maker in the agency. 
Its task should be to review the employee's grievance, as defined by the 
employee for the purpose of the internal grievance review which will have taken 
place first. In the case of ASIS, the internal grievance panel has recommendatory 
power only, the final decision resting with the Director-General. 
14.54 The basis of the Tribunal's review would therefore be the employee's 
application for a review of the Director-General's decision at the conclusion of 
the internal grievance process. Review of that decision would necessarily 
involve an examination of the matters raised in the grievance process. The issue 
having been thus broadly defined for the Tribunal, we would expect it to take 
control of the proceeding and, so far as necessary, be ready to seek its own 
evidence in addition to that placed before it by the parties. Given the sensitivity 
of the role, we recommend that the Tribunal be constituted for this purpose by a 
presidential member. 
14.55 Both the Service and the Inspector-General submitted that jurisdiction 
over employee grievances should be conferred on an independent review body. 
445 Law and Justice Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 3) 1994, clause 3. 
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The submissions were importantly different, however, from each other and from 
what we recommend. The Service proposed that IGIS retain the function of 
inquiring into grievances and that this be supplemented by ASIS or a 
complainant having access to a security tribunal, presided over by a judge, for a 
review of any recommendations, conclusions or findings of IGIS.446 The 
Inspector-General submitted that inquiry powers in relation to employee 
grievances should be divided, with the Inspector-General being given 
responsibility for investigation and conciliation or mediation of those grievances, 
with determinative powers being given to an independent tribunal.447 Both the 
Service and IGIS saw the proposed Security Appeals Division of the AAT as an 
appropriate body for those parts of their respective models involving a tribunal. 
14.56 As we have said, we consider that IGIS's role in relation to employee 
grievances should cease altogether, other than the monitoring functions related 
to internal procedures. Given the importance which is attached on all sides to 
expedition and finality in relation to review of individual grievances, we regard 
it as appropriate that there be two stages only, one internal and one external. If 
the internal processes fail, the external review should provide the kind of 
decisiveness which the Director-General clearly envisaged when he said: 
if they're dealing in a strictly judicial situation, where they come into a 
courtroom situation - a tribunal - present their case, the other side presents its 
[case], the person - a magistrate, a judge, whatever - makes the decision, bang, 
that's it. The !GIS process has been a lot more informal.448 
14.57 We think it important that former, as well as current, employees of 
ASIS should have an avenue for review of grievances. If the subject matter of the 
grievance is related to employment with ASIS, it should not matter that the 
person has ceased to be employed. Indeed, the fact of termination, or the 
circumstances in which it occurred, may well give rise to a grievance. It is 
obviously in the interests of the Service that there be an avenue for review. It is 
not appropriate for an internal grievance committee, even one with external 
representation as in the case of ASIO, to entertain complaints from former staff. 
Strictly speaking, the Inspector-General's jurisdiction over grievances under 
s.8(6) was confined to the grievances of current employees. The Inspector­
General has, nevertheless, conducted inquiries into the grievances of a number of 
former ASIS employees, apparently by treating them as public complaints under 
s.8(2)(a) . 
446 Exhibit 45.2.6, paragraph 4.2.8.4. 
447 Exhibit 45.3.4, paragraph 77. 1.  
448 Tl 19. 
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14.58 It should, we think, continue to be a pre-condition to external review in 
the case of an employee that the internal grievance procedures have been 
exhausted. Provision should be made, in terms equivalent to s. ll (S)(b) of the 
IGIS Act, for access to the AAT to be unavailable unless and until an employee 
has pursued the grievance through the internal processes. The Tribunal could be 
given power to relieve a complainant from this obligation if it could be 
demonstrated that, for special reasons, the pursuit of a grievance within the 
Service was impracticable. Likewise, there should be an equivalent provision to 
s. ll (S)(c), empowering the Tribunal to decline to entertain an application for 
review of a grievance if satisfied that the subject matter is not of sufficient 
seriousness or sensitivity to justify examination. This would be a matter upon 
which counsel assisting the Tribunal, if appointed, could advise. 
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The Public Face of ASIS 
15.1 The public face of ASIS is the face presented in the media. Perhaps 
more accurately it is the face drawn by the media, since a degree of artifice is 
often involved in order to supply by invention the facts which a firm policy of 
secrecy conceals. The portrait is seldom other than unflattering. There are 
several reasons for this. First of all, many media organisations are sceptical 
about the need for an agency such as ASIS and are therefore predisposed to 
denigrate it on principle. Secondly, unfavourable media attitudes reflect 
community responses in Australia, where there is a strong tradition of dislike of 
spying and of doing things in an apparently underhanded or unfair way. 
Thirdly, it is almost inevitable that there should be mutual suspicion and even 
hostility between the media, which trade in the free flow of information and 
opinion, and a service which is dedicated to secrecy. 
15.2 There is, at the same time, something of an irony here since both 
journalists and intelligence officers are deeply involved in the business of 
wresting secrets from those who have no wish to part with them; and cultivate 
and rely on sources of information whose anonymity they take great care to 
protect. Indeed, it might be suggested that there are other similarities. The 
derisive attitude of journalists towards ASIS is mirrored by the condescension 
which many people bestow upon journalists; and the soiled trench coat is often 
said to be the standard uniform of both journalists and spies, the former being 
distinguished only by their inky fingers and, according to Charles Dickens, their 
reptilian characteristics. 449 
15.3 There are therefore, or there ought to be, some affinities between a 
journalist and an Intelligence Officer which experience, however, does not 
reveal. Of the reasons for discord which we have suggested above, we are 
449 In The Pickwick Papers. 
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inclined to think that the journalistic judgment that our society has no need for 
an agency of this kind is the most influential. That assumption, added to 
ignorance of what ASIS actually does and how its members work and behave 
operationally, naturally produces a view of ASIS which owes much to the fiction 
of Le Carre and Fleming and to the persistent myth that ASIS is an uncontrolled 
and unaccountable body which pursues its own objectives without the restraints 
which executive and parliamentary structures impose upon other agencies of 
government. 
15.4 In this chapter, we examine how this image of ASIS is shaped by the 
approach which ASIS and the media adopt to each other. We then consider ways 
in which ASIS might develop its relationship with the media, so that what is 
presented to the Australian public more closely resembles the true position. 
The ASIS approach: the blanket of secrecy 
15.5 Historically, secret intelligence agencies adopted an approach of total 
secrecy. This meant that not only were their sources, methods and intelligence 
product kept secret, but their very existence was concealed from public 
knowledge. Although the establishment of the CIA in 1947 was a matter of 
public - and legislative - record, the British Secret Intelligence Service remained 
unavowed until 1992. Following the British example, the establishment of ASIS 
in 1952 was kept secret. 
15.6 The fiction of non-existence proved to be unsustainable in the long 
term. In 1977, Mr Justice Hope concluded that secrecy concerning ASIS's 
existence was neither necessary nor desirable.45° Citing ASIO and the CIA as 
demonstrating that intelligence services could carry out secret operations while 
being publicly declared, Mr Justice Hope recommended that the existence of 
ASIS be publicly acknowledged. The Government did so in October 1977, in a 
Prime Ministerial statement to Parliament.451 The Prime Minister added, 
however, that: 
ASIS' s capacity to serve Australia's national interest will continue to depend on 
its activities being fully protected by secrecy. The Government will therefore 
adhere strictly to the practice of refusing to provide details of ASIS's activities 
nor will it be prepared to enter into any discussion on the Service. 
15.7 Since 1977, ASIS has adhered to this policy of strict secrecy. According 
to the Minister, it has worked to secure its operations by seeking to avoid any 
450 Exhibit 2. 1, paragraphs 301-303. 
451 House of Representatives Hansard, 25 October 1977, pp.2338-39. 
174 
The Public Face of ASIS ASIS Inquiry 1995 
public reference to itself or its activities.452 The Service's guiding assumption has 
been that 'there is no such thing as good publicity for an intelligence service'.453 
The rationale advanced by the Service, and endorsed by the Minister,454 is that: 
People are willing to work with ASIS, to provide it with the information it is 
seeking, often at some risk to themselves, because they trust the Service to be 
discreet, to be reticent, to be able to keep secrets. Agencies of foreign 
governments are willing to work with ASIS and, through it, to share confidences 
with the Australian government because they trust in our discretion and security. 
An intelligence service that courts publicity, promotes an active public image and 
is regularly in the public eye is not one that is likely to win the trust of those 
with whom it needs to deal if it is to succeed at its appointed tasks.455 
15.8 Consistently with this policy, ASIS has had virtually no contact with 
the public or the media. Where contact with the media is considered by ASIS or 
the government to be absolutely necessary, it is handled by the Minister's office. 
The Minister is responsible for responding to media stories about ASIS and for 
making public statements about the Service. The Director-General does not take 
calls from the media.456 The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 
handles public (and some official) inquiries addressed to ASIS. ASIS has no 
programs of public information and as little as possible about the Service is 
released into the public domain. The only publicly acknowledged ASIS officer is 
the Director-General. 
15.9 The standard response to media stories has been for the Minister to 
state that the government neither confirms nor denies the statement being made 
about the Service. The practice has thus become known as 'neither confirm nor 
deny' (NCND). The reasoning is obvious enough: to confirm an accurate 
allegation would convert mere assertion into official fact, while to deny an 
untruthful allegation would imply confirmation of any subsequent allegation 
which was not denied. We examine the NCND policy more closely below. 
What is significant here is the uninformative and unresponsive attitude which 
NCND epitomises. 
15.10 Both the Service and the Minister acknowledge that non-engagement 
with the media has its costs: 
452 Exhibit 39.1 ,  paragraph 60. 
453 Exhibit 14.3, paragraph 1 .  
454 Exhibit 39.1,  paragraph 60. 
455 Ibid. 
456 TSO. 
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not the least being that the overwhelming majority of the material about ASIS in 
the public domain originates from those opposed to ASIS and has gone 
unchallenged and uncontested. The amount of material about ASIS in the public 
domain is currently substantial. Overwhelmingly it is negative artd critical about 
the Service and much of it is wildly inaccurate. It has been demonstrated to the 
media that ASIS is an easy and safe target - it does not fight back and anything, 
no matter how outrageous, may be said about it with impunity.457 
15. 1 1  Staff morale is adversely affected when persistent public criticism, and 
uninformed comment, go unanswered. According to the Director-General: 
people felt frustrated and angered by the various allegations that have been made 
about the Service. I think anyone from within the Service knows that they are 
without a foundation in almost all cases, or, where there is a germ of truth, that 
has been distorted. But there is a sense that people feel they're a hard-working, 
dedicated group of people serving the national interest and they are being 
consistently maligned in the media, without any response on the part of the 
government. And, as I said, this has caused frustration and I think it probably 
has damaged morale in some respects. 458 
15. 12 The Service recognises that a wholly passive stance with the media is 
no longer adequate. With the Minister's support, the Director-General has been 
working towards the development of a more positive media policy. Some 
elements of this will be examined further below. 
The media approach: 'a good story' 
15. 13 In a media-dominated world where information and entertainment 
become one and the same, and where the quest for ratings and circulation 
dominates, secret services are a good story.459 From the 'Boys' Own' tales of 
spies and adventure on the Northwest Frontier to the more modern and 
sophisticated development of the genre in the novels of Le Carre and Ian 
Fleming and the movies they inspired, security and intelligence agencies have 
been invested with an aura of romance, thrills and adventure. The exploits of 
James Bond present a shadowy world of violence and intrigue which many find 
fascinating. The CIA is given credit, at least in popular reports, for the exercise 
of power and influence on a formidable scale. Sometimes the more exaggerated 
criticisms of the maligned activities of such agencies even serve to enhance their 
image.460 
457 Exhibit 14.3, paragraph 3. 
458 TSS; see also the evidence of SWA, T969. 
459 'The operations of spies is great media'; Mr Hill, T*637*. 
460 T950, 1 133, 2041 .  
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15.14 Such an image may help ASIS recruit staff, but it also makes the 
Service a ready media target. The intrigue which secrecy generates can, 
however, attract the very attention which the Service and its sources, aim to 
avoid. It was readily acknowledged by the media witnesses who appeared 
before the Commission that ASIS makes a good story precisely because it is 
shrouded in secrecy. Mr Kohler believes journalists are 'fascinated by secret 
organisations'.461 According to Mr Hill, the scarcity of information about ASIS 
was 'what makes these exceptional stories like the Four Comers one so 
interesting'.462 Ms Grattan and Mr Kelly agreed that the newsworthiness of 
stories about ASIS was heightened by the secrecy surrounding the Service.463 
The case for publication by journalists would be weaker if more information 
were available in public statements.464 
15.15 That said, ASIS has not in fact been the subject of a great deal of media 
coverage since its formation. With one or two exceptions, there is little sustained 
interest in ASIS amongst Australian journalists. The two periods of significant 
media focus on ASIS (following the 1983 Sheraton Hotel incident and during the 
months preceding the present Inquiry) have resulted from internal problems of 
the Service spilling into the public arena, rather than from the efforts of the 
media to uncover information on ASIS. 
15.16 When stories are published, however, the combination of 
understandable ignorance, romantic speculation and deep-seated suspicion 
produces some surprising results. Perhaps the most surprising is that journalists 
and editors appear to suspend the operation of their ordinary critical faculties 
when faced with a story about ASIS. Some examples will serve to demonstrate 
the point. 
The ASIS assassin 
15.17 In March 1994, an article was published in the mass-circulation 
women's magazine New Idea entitled 'Confessions of a Spy'. It purported to 
describe the exploits of one Wendi Holland, who claimed to have been employed 
by ASIS between 1969 and 1989. The promise of the article's sub-heading - 'I 
killed more than ten people' - was immediately realised in the lurid language of 
the opening paragraph: 
461 T*837*. Mr Kohler is the Editor of the .Age. 
462 T*644*. Mr Hill was then Managing Director of the ABC. 
463 T*899*. Ms Grattan is the Editor of the Canberra Times; Mr Kelly, the Editor-in-Chief, the Australian. 
464 T*714*. 
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Australian trained assassin and spy Wendi Holland pulls a thin-bladed knife out 
from its wooden scabbard and slices the air in front of her jugular vein. 'This' 
she announces with a cold edge to her voice, 'is how I slitted his throat. He died 
very quickly.' 
Ms Holland described her training at a secret property near Canberra where she 
was taught 'to inflict wounds so the victims would die quickly'. She claimed to 
have carried out more than ten assassinations on orders from ASIS. A less 
dramatic version of Ms Holland's story had appeared in the Women$ Weekly of 
November 1993.465 The assassination claim had first surfaced in a Melbourne 
radio interview in December 1993, which was republished in the Canberra 
Times.466 It was subsequently repeated in separate media interviews with the 
ABC in June 1994467 and the Sunday Telegraph in July 1994.468 
15.18 It is remarkable that this story should have been given any currency at 
all, particularly by such serious-minded media as the ABC and the Canberra 
Times. As one newspaper admitted, it was 'the most fantastic story'.469 Even 
making allowances for the lack of information about what ASIS does and does 
not do, it must, on any rational view, have seemed highly probable that the 
exploits to which she laid claim were wholly unsound. 
15.19 Ms Holland maintained her story in evidence to the Inquiry. Despite 
repeated requests, however, she failed to produce any of the diaries and other 
documents which she claimed would corroborate her assertions of ASIS service. 
ASIS has no record of any contact with Ms Holland.470 We are satisfied that there 
is no truth in her claims to have been employed by ASIS, let alone in her stories 
of carrying out assassinations on ASIS's instructions. Nothing she said 
persuaded us that there was the slightest substance in her story. She received 
substantial payments for each of the magazine articles and it is difficult for us to 
say whether she believes what she is reported to have said - and, indeed, what 
she told us - or whether she has invented the whole episode. Whatever the 
answer to that question, Ms Holland's description of her adventures with ASIS is 
quite untrue. 
465 Exhibit 12.2, tab 1 1 . 
466 Ibid., tab 15A. 
467 Ibid, tab 25AA. 
468 Ibid., tab 28. 
469 Ibid., tab 28. 
470 T603. 
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The CIA assassin 
15.20 We have already referred to the claim made on the February 1994 Four 
Comers program by a former ASIS officer that a CIA officer had offered to 
murder an Australian diplomat471. In the transcript of the interview conducted 
in preparation for the Four Comers program, the reporter exhibited considerable 
reluctance to accept what the former officer said about this offer: 
A lot of people watching this may have difficulty accepting that the climate in 
Cairo got to such a stage that friendly intelligence services were offering to kill 
Australian Foreign Affairs officials to help you do your job ... 
A lot of people would find it absolutely incredible that things had got as 
bad as you describe . .. I don't think you've still described for me adequately just 
exactly why things were as bad as they were. Give me a bit of the emotion . . . 472 
15.21 We are not surprised at the journalist's evident scepticism about this 
highly improbable story. What is surprising is that he apparently ignored his 
professional instincts and gave the story a public airing. 
The ASIS fire 
15.22 In the early hours of 26 November 1994, a fire broke out in the 
administration and finance sections of ASIS headquarters. All fire warning and 
safety systems worked properly and the fire was promptly located by ASIS 
guards who were on duty at the time. Damage was limited to one wing, 
although there was smoke damage to adjacent areas. Several offices were 
destroyed, with extensive collateral damage throughout the whole wing. Total 
documentary losses were confined to part of the contents of one two-door 
compactus, located in the office of the archives and records disposal unit. The 
limited file material which was destroyed contained either old material of no 
current relevance or work in progress, the supporting material for which was 
held elsewhere. 
15.23 Press reports of the fire instantly assumed - without any factual basis 
for doing so - that the fire had destroyed a large number of documents directly 
relevant to the Inquiry. The Australian of 29 November claimed that 'hundreds 
of top secret documents' relevant to the Inquiry had been destroyed: 
The fire has erased highly sensitive ASIS files and archives that detailed the 
activities and operations of the troubled spy agency over the past decade. 
471 Paragraph 28. 12. 
472 Exhibit 12.4.2. 
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The blaze is a big blow to the Government's Inquiry into the accountability 
and management of ASIS because it destroyed many of the records needed to 
adequately assess the organisation's performance ... 
It was rumoured yesterday that the fire also destroyed thousands of files 
that the Service was alleged to have kept on Australian citizens. 
15.24 The Herald Sun of 29 November carried the same fanciful story, this 
time asserting that 'thousands of sensitive files' had been destroyed. The 
inference that this was a 'wonderfully convenient' fire proved irresistible, even 
to a journalist of the standing of P.P. McGuinness: 
[ASIS] has, it seems, resorted to the time-honoured 'the dog ate my homework' 
defence to stymie the Inquiry at present under way into its treatment of its own 
agents - in this case, it has simply burnt the inconvenient files (purely 
accidentally, you understand). 473 
15.25 It was not the function of this Inquiry to investigate the causes of the 
fire. It can, however, be said categorically that the fire did not affect in any way 
the production of documents to the Inquiry by ASIS. By the time of the fire, the 
process of collecting evidence was almost concluded, and all outstanding 
requests for ASIS documents have been met. Moreover, an inspection by 
Commissioner Samuels and Inquiry staff on 30 November 1994 established that 
the area where operational and personnel files are kept was not near the fire area 
and was totally unaffected. 
"Tens of thousands of files' 
15.26 The collection, retention and communication by ASIS of information 
concerning Australian citizens or permanent residents is a controversial issue. It 
is hardly surprising that this should be so. Where an organisation operates 
almost entirely in secret, there is ample room for speculation over what interest 
the organisation may be taking in the activities of Australians. Such speculation 
is traditionally - and understandably - more closely associated with ASIO. But 
ASIS is by no means immune. 
15.27 Wide currency has been given to an assertion that ASIS secretly holds 
tens of thousands of files on Australian citizens. This assertion owes its genesis 
to the following passage from the Four Comers program of 21 February 1994: 
REPORTER: Most Australian Government files like these are subject to strict 
privacy legislation but perhaps the most concerning aspect for all Australians 
473 Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 1994. 
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should be that ASIS secretly holds tens of thousands of files on Australian 
citizens, a data base completely outside privacy laws. 
OFFICER ONE: Those things are never scrutinised. A lot of information that 
goes onto those cards will just be hearsay. 
OFFICER 1WO: If ASIS provided information to ASIO which led to the 
refusal of a visa or a job my understanding is that the individual would not be 
told that on the facts and grounds. He would not realise that the information 
came from AS IS. That's my understanding. 
REPORTER: So information could be held, of a deleterious nature, on an 
Australian citizen, inside ASIS? 
OFFICER 1WO: Yes. 
REPORTER: And they wouldn't know anything about it? 
OFFICER 1WO: No ... No comeback at all.474 
15.28 As disclosed in his 1993-94 annual report, the Inspector-General visited 
ASIS on several occasions during that year to examine the Service's holdings on 
Australian citizens or permanent residents. He did this, he said, because: 
an ex-officer of the Service told me that ASIS holds thousands of files and cards 
on Australian citizens; that the files and cards recorded information and gossip 
of a personal nature and that this was freely available to ASIS officers and was 
made available on request to foreign intelligence services. 475 
15.29 After examining relevant cards and files, the Inspector-General 
concluded that the rights of Australians were not abused in any way. We note in 
passing that the publication of these conclusions in the Inspector-General's 
annual report received no publicity of which we are aware. Indeed, that report, 
which ought to have reassured the public that ASIS was, in this respect, 
operating within proper bounds, appears to have done nothing to inhibit 
speculation about these holdings at the time of the fire. As we have already seen, 
at least one of the reports of the fire suggested that it had destroyed 'thousands 
of files . . .  on Australian citizens' .  
15.30 Given the public attention which this assertion has attracted, we 
decided to conduct our own review of holdings by ASIS on Australian citizens. 
For that purpose, Commission staff examined a sample of close to 10 per cent of 
all holdings by ASIS on Australian citizens, the sample having been randomly 
selected by Commission staff. The holdings fall into four general categories: 
(a) persons 'listed' or briefed by ASIS; 
(b) persons of operational interest; 
474 Exhibit 12.1, tab 41;  see also Sunday Telegraph, 16 January 1994, Exhibit 12.2, tab 1 9. 
475 Annual Report p.23; Inspector-General's statement, paragraph 40. 
181 
17te Public Face of ASIS 
(c) staff; and 
(d) persons of security interest. 
We deal with each of these categories in turn. 
Listings 
ASIS Inquiry 1995 
15.31 Numerically, the most substantial holdings are those relating to the 
'listing' of persons for whom entitlement is sought for access to briefing on ASIS 
and to its secret intelligence reporting. These are people who are employed by 
other Government agencies - particularly assessment agencies, policy advising 
agencies, and law enforcement agencies - whose jobs require knowledge of ASIS 
and its product. The holdings are not in the form of files but rather card 
references. There are files to do with listing, but they are generally, and sensibly, 
created for each department or agency so that records are held together of those 
officers of the department or agency who are entitled to receive ASIS material. 
15.32 There is no doubt that it is appropriate for ASIS to engage in a process 
of clearing people for the purposes of listing, and appropriate for them to hold 
material which records those who are listed. Other than advice about listing to 
the individual and to the department or agency concerned, no material held for 
this purpose is passed outside ASIS. There is thus nothing improper in the 
holdings ASIS has for this purpose. 
Persons of operational interest 
15.33 There are also holdings in ASIS on Australian persons whom ASIS 
thinks are, or could become, of operational interest. That is to say, these are 
people who ASIS feels may be able to assist them in the performance of ASIS 
functions. Particularly in the early days of ASIS, these would often be people 
who were known to be travelling to parts of the world of interest to ASIS and 
whom ASIS might contact on return to see whether anything of interest had been 
observed. They may be people whose professions ·or language skills are such 
that there is potential for them to gain access to persons in positions of influence 
in other countries, or potential for them in other ways to gain worthwhile 
intelligence material. 
15.34 Clearly, the interest ASIS has in such people is a positive interest, and 
one which is directed at the discharge of the Service's intelligence collection 
function. Based on our sample, the bulk of persons in this category have only a 
very limited reference on card. In general, and certainly in more recent periods, 
a file would only be created on such a person where ASIS determined to 
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approach them to seek a working relationship with them. Such files, and there 
are few, are then held in the Operations Division registry and very closely held 
indeed. Thus there is no publication, except within ASIS, of the information that 
a person is a potential contact and where that potential is activated, knowledge 
within ASIS is restricted to those who need to know. 
15.35 Our sample showed no evidence of any material adverse to a person 
being recorded in this process. We conclude that it is legitimate and appropriate 
for ASIS to collect and hold information of this character on Australian persons 
in pursuit of its assigned functions and that the interests, including the privacy 
interests, of Australian citizens are not infringed by the careful processes which 
are followed. 
Staff 
15.36 The next largest category established by our sample comprised 
holdings relating to ASIS staff, former staff or potential staff. In most of these 
cases, holdings would appear on files created for the purpose. The material held 
on those files is, based on our sample, material of a kind it would be legitimate 
and normal practice for any employer to hold in relation to staff or potential 
staff, allowing for the fact that ASIS (because of its particular functions) requires 
more extensive security checking and revalidation than would most other 
employers. 
15.37 Material on those files is for ASIS purposes and our sample found no 
evidence of publication of any of this material outside ASIS. We conclude that 
there is nothing improper in the holdings ASIS has of information on Australians 
for this staffing purpose. 
PeJSons of security interest 
15.38 The final and smallest category, and the category potentially most 
relevant to the assertions which have been made, is holdings on those Australian 
persons considered by ASIS to be of security interest. This is not a category 
defined by ASIS. Rather, it is our general description of the holdings relating to 
security concerns of various kinds, either for Australia or for ASIS itself. 
Examples of the former concern involvement of Australians in organised crime, 
including drug trafficking, in terrorist activities or in activities which appear to 
threaten the safety of other Australians. In these instances, information is 
generally passed to those Australian authorities (in particular the Australian 
Federal Police and ASIO) who have responsibilities that are relevant. Examples 
of security concerns for ASIS itself included threats to identify ASIS officers, 
183 
The Public Face of ASIS ASIS Inquiry 1995 
threats to the security of ASIS premises, cases where people pose as ASIS officers, 
and publication of material relating to intelligence and security in the media. 
15.39 In some cases (such as threats to the security of ASIS premises), 
material was passed to other agencies with relevant responsibilities. On 
occasions, where threatened publication of sensitive material was involved, legal 
advice would be sought from the Attorney-General's Department. Otherwise, 
the holdings in this category are not published and are securely retained within 
ASIS. 
15.40 Holdings in this category are essentially of a factual kind. No 
examples were seen in our sample of recording of personal information or the 
personal characteristics of an individual as perceived by ASIS staff. The 
holdings on media publications were, for the most part, simply copies of the 
articles or transcripts of electronic reporting. As already indicated, in some of 
those cases legal advice was sought. But beyond that, the material was not 
published outside ASIS nor could material on the files sampled in any way be 
described as containing personal details or material impacting adversely on the 
individuals or affecting their privacy. 
15.41 Most of these holdings take the form of references on general files 
rather than specific files relating to individuals. Based on the Commission's 
sample, it is estimated that there have been some 2,300 such file references or 
files created since ASIS came into existence in 1952. Of this total there have been 
some 850 such references or files created since 1 January 1980. 
15.42 No evidence was found of any systematic exercise of collection of 
information by ASIS on any individual or group. Rather, the character of this 
material is reactive, involving the drawing together and recording of information 
externally generated which has a bearing, as ASIS perceives it, on its security or 
on Australia's security interests. We conclude, therefore, that material in this 
final category, like the material in the other categories referred to earlier, is being 
held by ASIS for reasons directly associated with its functions, and that the 
material is being held in appropriately secure fashion and could not fairly be 
said to infringe the privacy rights of Australian citizens. 
15.43 It follows that we consider the assertion made on the Four Comers 
program, and the flavour given in the subsequently repeated assertions, to be 
without any credible foundation. 
15.44 We add that the regular monitoring by IGIS of ASIS's holdings and 
their dissemination of information on Australian citizens provides a valuable 
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check and discipline and should be continued. It represents a safeguard which 
will help ensure that ASIS does not collect, hold or disseminate information that 
is not related legitimately to its functions or to security. 
The need for verification 
15.45 The publication of wholly or substantially false stories points to the 
need for improved avenues for checking the veracity of information. We 
recognise that there are limits on the capacity of editors to satisfy themselves that 
their journalists' sources are reliable. At the same time, we were unimpressed by 
the degree of rigour apparently applied to the assessment of the reliability of 
sources for such obviously sensitive stories as these. Although editors may 
reserve the right to insist on their journalists disclosing their sources, calling on 
them to do so is the exception rather than the rule. Largely, editors rely on the 
experience of the journalist and on general assurances.476 
15.46 While we accept that independent checking by a senior editor of the 
sources for a journalist's work is not realistic as a general proposition,477 we 
would have thought that stories about security and intelligence merited special 
attention. This is so both because of the risks of harm being caused by such 
stories and because of the acknowledged lack of information in the hands of 
media organisations to enable them to make judgments, about ASIS in general 
and about the consequences of publishing particular allegations. Greater rigour 
in internal processes will be enhanced by making available to media 
organisations more authoritative advice and information on intelligence matters. 
We have addressed this in Chapter 11 in the context of the D Notice system. The 
idea of an ASIS media liaison officer is considered further below. 
Alternative approaches to media relations 
15.47 The problems of sensationalised and inaccurate reporting are not 
unique to ASIS. Other security and intelligence agencies have had to confront 
similar problems, and have in recent years begun to respond by adopting a more 
activist approach. The comparisons are instructive. 
15.48 ASIO has re-fashioned its approach to the media and public relations. 
Recognising that there is 'a great deal of legend and myth about ASIO', the 
Director-General has determined that ASIO should be 'a little more transparent 
476 Mr Kelly, T*701-02*, T*717*, T*729*; Ms Grattan, T*892*, T*904*, T*9 17*; Mr Kohler, T*837*, T*845*, 
T*BSO*, T*852*. 
477 T*852*. 
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than it has been in the past'.478 ASIO is developing a public communications 
strategy, the elements of which include: 
(a) the Director-General making himself available, on a selective 
basis, to the media;479 
(b) annual appearances before Senate Estimates Committees and their 
successors, Legislation Committees, since 1993; 
(c) describing publicly what ASIO does, including in the public 
annual report, while not commenting on sensitive operational 
matters; 
(d) adopting a policy of selective denial of allegations against ASIO; 
(e) the appointment of a media liaison officer, whose function is to 
field approaches from journalists and discuss with them stories 
which they intend to publish. 
15.49 ASIO's new media strategy has been well received by media 
organisations. According to Mr Harvey, the Nine Network has built a 
relationship of respect with the ASIO media officer, because information from 
the officer has been shown to be accurate.480 Mr Grant also welcomed the 
appointment of an ASIO media officer, and commented favourably on the 
Director-General's appearance at the National Press Club.481 Mr Waterford had 
found the ASIO media officer particularly useful for checking factual material.482 
15.50 The ASIO media strategy appears to have broken down some of the 
aura of mystery which had made ASIO an attractive media target. Mr Harvey 
considered that there were fewer media stories about ASIO because the media 
could no longer 'willy nilly publish material' without the opportunity of 
checking it with ASI0.483 According to Mr Grant, the new approach had helped 
'demystify' ASIO and reduce the number of stories which 'take the mickey out of 
ASIO', so that it had become 'less of a bete noire in the public mind'.484 
478 Exhibit 34. 1, Attachment A. 
479 Exhibit 34. 1, p.8. The Director-General appeared at the National Press Club in 1992. 
480 T*678*. Mr Harvey is the Director ofNews, Canberra Bureau, Nine Network. 
481 T*750-1 *. Mr Grant is Bureau Chief, Channel Seven. 
482 T*884*. Mr Waterford is Deputy Editor, the Canberra Times. 
483 T*669*. 
484 T*750-1 *. 
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UK Secret Intelligence Service 
15.51 The public avowal of the existence of the Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS) in 1992 was part of the British government's efforts to be, in Prime Minister 
Major's words, 'as open as possible about security and intelligence matters 
without prejudicing national security, the effectiveness of the intelligence and 
security services or the safety of their staff'.485 In 1993 the government published 
booklets on the internal Security Service and on the Central Intelligence 
Machinery. The latter describes the mechanisms for tasking and co-ordination of 
the various intelligence agencies, and summarises the functions of the different 
organisations. The main function of SIS is described as being: 
the production of secret intelligence in support of Her Majesty's Government's 
security, defence, foreign and economic policies . . . through a variety of sources, 
human and technical, and by liaison with a wide range of foreign intelligence 
and security services. Specific operations are subject to longstanding procedures 
for official and Ministerial clearance. 486 
15.52 In 1994 Parliament passed the Intelligence Services Act to provide a 
statutory basis for SIS. One of the provisions of the Act was the establishment of 
an Intelligence and Security Committee, made up of nine members of both 
Houses of Parliament. The Committee is to 'examine the expenditure, 
administration and policy' of the intelligence agencies, and to produce an annual 
report which the Prime Minister will table in Parliament.487 The legislation was 
described by the Government as a further step in implementing a policy of 
greater openness in security and intelligence matters, wherever possible. 
US Central Intelligence Agency 
15.53 In recent years, the CIA has made moves to greater openness in its 
dealings with the media, in response to a political climate which demands more 
information and comment from intelligence agencies. The CIA maintains a 
Public Affairs Staff to produce public information and to deal with inquiries 
from the media. The Director of Public Affairs told the Commission that each 
year his staff receives around 2000 calls from the media and produces about 350 
background briefings on issues related to the Agency itself and on developments 
in international affairs. The CIA has also produced a number of booklets 
providing information on both the US intelligence community as a whole and on 
the CIA itself. One of these publications, entitled A ConsumerB Guide to 
485 Exhibit 5 .7. 1 . 1 ,  p.3. 
486 Ibid, p.20. 
487 Exhibit 5.5. 1, s. lO. 
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Intelligence, describes the entire intelligence process as one of the functions of 
government, setting out the respective roles and functions of the various 
collection and assessment agencies such as the National Intelligence Council, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defense Intelligence Agency and National 
Security Agency. 
15.54 The CIA's publications state clearly that the Agency collects secret 
intelligence. The Consumer$ Guide describes the CIA Directorate of Operations 
as having 'primary responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign 
intelligence'.488 Another publication says that the Directorate of Operations: 
is a secret service with its own specialized way of recruiting, training, and 
maintaining networks of human agents - some might call them spies - to collect 
information about events and issues that threaten or might be potentially 
harmful to our country. 489 
The CIA does not, however, provide any specific information about operations. 
The CIA maintains a policy of not commenting on allegations about the Agency, 
but in some cases, involving more outlandish claims, provides more information 
to journalists on a 'background' or off-the-record basis. 
A new approach for ASIS 
15.55 While greater publicity can impose its own pressures on an intelligence 
agency, there is no indication that this has impeded the operational effectiveness 
of ASIO or the overseas agencies. Comparisons apart, it is, we think, clear that 
ASIS can no longer afford to maintain a wholly passive stance in public and 
media relations. While the spate of disclosures may properly be regarded as 
exceptional, and reflective of particular grievances rather than an endemic 
problem, it nevertheless demonstrates, as the Minister and the Director-General 
have acknowledged, a clear need to rethink ASIS's approach to the media and to 
public communications in general.490 Not only is this necessary in the interests of 
ASIS, but there is a wider public interest in ensuring that information which is 
published about ASIS is as accurate as possible. 
15.56 Both the Minister and the Director-General argued that any new 
approach to media relations must continue to be governed by 'a high degree of 
488 Exhibit 5.7.3.4, p.7. 
489 Exhibit 5.7.3.3, [p.9]. 
490 Exhibit 39. 1, paragraph 60; Exhibit 14.3. 
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reticence'.491 This, it was said, was dictated by the operational requirements of 
the Service. In our view, it is essential to distinguish between the attitude which 
the Service adopts towards the media, on the one hand, and the nature of the 
information which ASIS provides to the media, on the other. We see no reason 
why an active approach to the media cannot be combined with circumspection 
where necessary in the provision of information. Of course, such an approach in 
practice is much more complicated. The old approach has the attraction of great 
simp�icity, in that no decisions have to be made about what can and cannot be 
said, since nothing at all is said. But the Service has now recognised that there 
are, for good reason, limits to secrecy. We are not suggesting that the Service 
should seek publicity, but rather that it should engage with the media and adopt 
a positive approach to the management of its public profile. 
15.57 The challenge is to achieve a fundamental improvement in public 
awareness of ASIS. There is a good deal which can be stated publicly about ASIS 
without disclosing information which would prejudice operations or put 
individuals at risk. We see advantage, and no disadvantage, in public 
statements being made about: 
(a) ASIS's functions - what it does and does not do; 
(b) the public and governmental purposes which it serves; 
(c) how it is controlled and to whom it is accountable; 
(d) why the nature of the work requires a high degree of secrecy; and 
(e) the similarities (as well as the differences) between ASIS's 
management and staffing arrangements and those of other 
government departments. 
Information about the ASIS budget is already published in a one-line 
appropriation. Some elaboration of that, together with broad staffing 
information, should be considered. 
15.58 The introduction and enactment of legislation for ASIS would itself 
enhance public knowledge in all these respects. As our draft bill indicates, the 
legislation should clearly define what ASIS can and cannot do, and the purposes 
for which it acts. It should define the key control and accountability 
relationships between ASIS, the Minister and the Parliament. The second 
491 Ibid. 
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reading speech could be used as an opportunity to explain the importance of 
ASIS to Australia's interests. We have referred elsewhere to the examples used 
in the British Parliament, drawn from actual operations, to demonstrate how SIS 
serves the national interest in the fields of counter-terrorism, counter­
proliferation and the detection of drug trafficking.492 A number of these matters 
can be dealt with more systematically, more permanently and more accessibly in 
the form of a public booklet, which we consider below. 
15.59 We see the Director-General's role as being of particular significance. 
If there is to be a new approach, it will be for the Director-General to define it -
in conjunction with the Minister - and to educate the staff of the Service about it. 
Its implementation will impose its own additional responsibilities on the 
Director-General. He will need to provide leadership in the development of 
relationships at a high level between the Service and media organisations. Such 
relationships would largely be conducted at an informal level but could 
occasionally be formal. Most media witnesses endorsed the concept of an 
occasional briefing of editors by the Director-General, dealing with general 
issues about what ASIS does and seeking to define the boundaries of what is and 
is not publishable, and why.493 
15.60 The Director-General's role should be supported and complemented 
by an ASIS media liaison officer. In addition to being responsible for 
coordinating the Service's public information and media relations activities, this 
officer would be a point of contact for journalists and editors seeking to verify 
information about ASIS, including allegations against the Service, received from 
other sources. The officer could give advice about the possible national security 
and intelligence implications of a proposed story, including possible threats to 
ASIS operations and the safety of ASIS officers and their sources. In addition the 
officer could be a source of general background information about ASIS. 
15.61 Media representatives generally accepted that the government, and 
ASIS in particular, was best placed to make judgements about risk to national 
security. Mr Kelly agreed that an ASIS media officer could assist his 
organisation to make better informed decisions about publication.494 Mr Grant 
said that he would also like to be given 'off-the-record' background information, 
regretting that such information was not supplied by ASI0.495 According to Mr 
492 Paragraph 4.43. 
493 T*682*; T*698-9*; T*838*. 
494 T*736*. 
495 T*754*. 
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Kohler, advice from ASIS on the risk to its operations from publication of certain 
information would be very useful. More information from official sources, 
including 'off-the-record' comment, would improve the veracity of reporting on 
ASIS.496 
15.62 The success of an ASIS media liaison officer would hinge upon the 
officer's credibility with journalists and editors. This would in tum depend on 
what functions the officer was able to perform and how the position was used by 
the service. The media would need to be confident that advice given by the 
liaison officer was reliable and objective. Initially at least, there would naturally 
be some scepticism: 
The problem for the media in such a process is that ASIS would have a number 
of reasons for ... discouraging the media from publishing, such reasons not 
necessarily relating just to the identity of ASIS operatives or national security. 
So, how confident could the media be in the advice being given from ASIS? One 
would be inclined to think that this would be fairly self-interested advice.497 
15.63 It would be necessary for the officer to demonstrate that ASIS was not 
interested in secrecy for its own sake or in order to conceal suspect activity. The 
relationship could be very quickly jeopardised if ASIS were seen to be using the 
officer in a manipulative or entirely 'self-interested' way. As Mr Harvey said, 
'the system would fall down . . .  if we were ever misled intentionally'.498 
Provided that credibility was established, it seems likely that there would be 
acceptance of a 'no comment' response where this was necessary: 
If the journalist, media organisation, feels that that person is scrupulously 
honest, that he or she will never mislead, although on certain occasions they 
might say, 'Well, I can't tell you anything', but that they will not deliberately 
mislead, well they carry much more weight than if they are just seen as 
stonewallers or people who, in a tight corner, would tell you a lie. 499 
15.64· The other source of natural media reluctance to make use of an ASIS 
media liaison officer would be a concern that approaching the officer about a 
story on ASIS might prompt the Service to take out an injunction to prevent 
publication. Mr Kohler told the Commission that if ASIS were to use its media 
officer in this way the system would never work again.500 Clearly, there is a 
difficulty here. An approach to the media officer would signal an intention to 
496 1*829*, *836*, *854*. 
497 1*736*. 
498 1*670*. 
499 1*884*. 
500 1*829* 
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publish, subject to any advice received. The officer might advise that the subject 
matter referred to by the journalist was sensitive and ought not to be published. 
If the journalist gave any indication that the advice was not likely to be followed, 
the media officer would have no alternative but to advise the Government 
which, in turn, would be bound to consider its legal options. If an injunction 
application were then made, the process could easily be characterised as a 
deceitful stratagem on the Government's part to solicit, under the guise of an 
advisory service, advance notice of sensitive publications. While this difficulty 
should not be underestimated, we do not see it as removing the need for a source 
of advice within ASIS for media who are concerned to honour their commitment 
to the D Notice system. We have recommended in Chapter 11 that a revised D 
Notice should provide much fuller advice and explanation about the potential 
sensitivities of certain categories of information. It should be couched in such a 
way as to encourage editors to recognise that advice will, from time to time, be 
necessary. 
The policy of 'neither confirm nor deny' 
15.65 NCND allows any claim about ASIS to go unchallenged, even where it 
is entirely fanciful or seriously damaging to ASIS or to Australia's foreign 
relations. The Minister has faced the dilemma of determining whether to break 
the NCND principle and make a public denial of 'bizarre allegations' which have 
been made against the Service.501 We have referred to ASIS's frustration at its 
inability to rebut claims made against the Service.502 Silence in the face of 
repeated assertions about ASIS can be taken by a foreign government or a 
sceptical public as confirmation. 
15.66 There will often be circumstances, concerning operationally sensitive 
information or allegations, where the appropriate response from any 
Government will be NCND. But if this media policy is applied in a blanket 
fashion, it is severely limiting for the reasons we have mentioned earlier. 
15.67 ASIO has adopted the practice of issuing selective denials in instances 
when the allegations are inflammatory and likely to cause conflict in the wider 
Australian community. The Director-General of Security cited the Organisation's 
denial of allegations about purported ASIO operations within the Macedonian 
and Aboriginal communities.503 
501 T2465. 
502 T49. 
503 T2604-7. 
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15.68 .The disadvantage of selective denials, as advanced to us, is that they 
tend to undermine NCND in the long term. Senator Evans was opposed to 
issuing individual denials under 'the pressure of the moment', because it 
weakens the principle as a whole.504 If one allegation is denied and another is 
not, a close observer could infer that the unrebutted allegation is true. In the case 
of the wilder accusations about ASIO which occur in the midst of passing 
domestic political controversy, this is probably not a concern. Denials by the 
Australian Government about foreign intelligence could, however, provide 
information to a watchful overseas intelligence agency. It is even possible that 
claims could be made in the media in the hope of obtaining a denial and thus 
allowing information about ASIS operations to be gleaned by a process of 
elil:pination. 
15.69 A carefully chosen forms of words and presentation can convey the 
message that the allegation is too outrageous to be taken seriously. Such an 
approach may enable the NCND principle to be maintained while allowing the 
more incredible accusations to be dismissed. The possibility of such an approach 
was acknowledged by the Minister.sos 
15.70 A modified approach to NCND should be possible if, as we 
recommend, the amount of information on the public record about ASIS and its 
activities is increased. The legislation we propose will be the key point of 
reference. Its enactment should enable the Minister, for example, to dismiss out 
of hand allegations of outrageous behaviour by ASIS such as those made by Ms 
Holland. The Minister would be able to point to the sections of the Act defining 
and limiting the functions of ASIS and to the arrangements for oversight, in 
declaring that ASIS is not authorised to behave in such a fashion and could not 
possibly do so without detection. This points to the need for a coherent public 
information strategy, to which we now turn. 
A public information strategy 
15.71 The Service recognises that one of the key factors allowing uninformed 
speculation about ASIS activities to go unchecked is the absence of any 
information on the public record about the control and accountability structure. 
Early in the Inquiry, the Director-General identified this as a problem to be 
remedied and proposed the development of a public booklet explaining what 
ASIS does and describing the arrangements for control and accountability.506 A 
504 T2466. 
505 Ibid. 
506 T46; T524. 
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draft public booklet was subsequently prepared and submitted in conjunction 
with ASIS's proposal for legislation.507 
15.72 ASIS believes that a booklet of this kind will help to 'reassure the 
public that ASIS is an adequately controlled and accountable organisation' and 
enable it counter allegations against it.508 As well as describing the elements of 
the control and accountability framework, it is envisaged that such a booklet 
would describe the origins and development of ASIS, its role and function in 
government, what it does and does not do and the kinds of people who work for 
ASIS. 
15.73 Such a booklet would, we believe, make an important contribution 
towards filling the information gap. The booklet should lay particular emphasis 
on the value of ASIS's work to Australia. There are, quite properly, concerns in 
the community about the role of intelligence and security agencies in the post­
Cold War environment. ASIS can point to the strong endorsements of its 
ongoing role by the Richardson and Hollway reviews, and the continuous 
assessment of the value of its product by the assessment agencies, ONA and 
DIO. The booklet could give examples of ASIS operations, suitably sanitised, to 
illustrate the benefit of ASIS's work to Australia's national security and economy, 
and its contribution to the international effort in support of peace-keeping and 
against threats such as weapons proliferation, terrorism, illegal drugs traffic and 
organised crime. All of this can, we think, be achieved without disclosing any 
operational information. 
15.74 The revised draft booklet submitted by ASIS with its final submission 
is a good starting-point. 509 It will need refinement, in particular in the light of 
the decisions which the Government makes on our recommendations for 
legislation, parliamentary oversight, the role of !GIS and other related areas. 
15.75 Consideration should also be given to the issuing of a publication on 
the intelligence co�munity as a whole. It should describe the functions of the 
various agencies and the arrangements by which they are controlled. It would 
provide the opportunity, for example, to emphasise the often misunderstood 
distinction between the internal role of ASIO and the external role of ASIS. Such 
a publication, published by ONA or by the Prime Minister's Department, would 
reinforce the message that ASIS and the other intelligence agencies are part of the 
507 Exhibit 6.2. 1, Attachment G. 
508 Exhibit 6.2. 1, paragraph 29. 
509 Exhibit 45.2. 12. 
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ordinary machinery of government and exist within clearly established lines of 
control and accountability. The recently-published British booklet entitled The 
Central Intelligence Machinery provides a useful reference point. 
15.76 A public information program might extend to the publication of an 
official history of ASIS. A history of the Service was commissioned as part of the 
work of the first Hope Royal Commission. An edited version was appended to 
the fi�th report of that body but never released publicly. It could be used as the 
basis for a substantial monograph, supplemented by a study of the period since 
1976. The Commission received submissions supporting such a history.510 
Conclusion 
15.77 The picture of ASIS which is presented to the Australian public should, 
as nearly as possible, resemble the true position. It seems to us to be self-evident 
that the persistence of an image of ASIS based on untruths and half-truths is 
contrary to the public interest. Within the constraints of secrecy which we have 
discussed in detail elsewhere, the Australian public should know what their 
foreign intelligence service is and is not doing in their name and on their behalf. 
We also think it very much in the interests of the Service that this should occur. 
15.78 The essence of the strategy which we recommend is that as much 
information as possible about ASIS should be on the public record. As we have 
said, the foundation of this is the legislation we recommend. It will confer 
legislative authority on the Service and establish a mechanism for parliamentary 
oversight. The public information booklet should be a simply-expressed 
document, reinforcing the legislation, which can be used to communicate what 
ASIS does and why. H should place particular emphasis on the uses to which 
ASIS product is put, in the service of the national interest. 
15.79 ASIS should ensure that public attention is drawn to relevant reports of 
the proposed parliamentary committee, of the Inspector-General, and of the 
Auditor-General in the event that full external audit coverage is achieved as we 
recommend. Such references will no doubt draw attention to positive comment 
510 Dr Gregory Pemberton of Macquarie University believed that 'a limited history of ASIS' sponsored by 
the government would be preferable to the 'more sensationalist and speculative accounts' which emerge 
in an environment of official secrecy, an argument almost identical to that used by ASIS to support the 
publication of a booklet. (Exhibit 46.2, p.3). Mr David McKnight of the University of Technology, 
Sydney, also supported the idea, along with a liberalised archives policy, as an aspect of the accountability 
of the Service. (Exhibit 46. 1, p.2). 
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about the Service but will also serve to remind the public of the many levels of 
oversight of ASIS. 
15.80 The Director-General and the proposed media liaison officer need to 
work to build relationships with the media. These relationships will be 
enhanced by the ability to refer to the legislation and the booklet and the reports 
of those other agencies. If the blanket of secrecy is lifted in all these different 
ways, it should become much more possible - and credible - for the Service and 
the Minister to deny obviously false assertions of the kind we have described in 
this chapter. 
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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRAUA 
ELIZABETH THE SECOND, by the Grace of God Queen of Australia and 
Her other Realms and Territories,  Head of the Commonwealth: 
TO: 
THE HONOURAB LE GORDON JACOB SAMUELS AC QC 
GREETING: 
WHEREAS it is desired to have an inquiry into matters relating to the 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service: 
NOW THEREFORE We do by these Our Letters Patent issued in Our name 
by Our Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia on the advice of 
the Federal Executive Council and in pursuance of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, the Royal Commissions Act 1902 and other 
enabling powers, appoint you to be a Commissioner to inquire into: 
(a) the effectiveness and suitabil ity of existing arrangements for: 
(i) the control and accountabil ity of the Service; 
(ii) the organisation and management of the Service; 
(iii) the protection of the Service's intel l igence sources and methods; 
(iv) the resolution of grievances and complaints relating to the 
Service; and 
(b) whether any changes in existing arrangements are required or are 
desirable: 
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AND We direct you to produce with Michael Henry Codd AC a single report of 
the results of your inquiries and his inquiries under the relevant Commission: 
AND We further direct you to consult with Michael Henry Codd with regard to 
the methods and procedures to be followed in relation to his and your inquiries 
and concerning the content and preparation of that report: 
AND We authorise you in the conduct of your inquiry to have regard to any 
information, evidence, document or thing communicated or furnished to you by 
Michael Henry Codd under the relevant Commission: 
AND We declare that in these Our Letters Patent, the expression •relevant 
Commission• means the Commission of inquiry issued this day by Our 
Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia by Letters Patent to 
Michael Henry Codd: 
AND We require you as expeditiously as practicable to make your inquiry and, 
not later than 31 December 1 994, to furnish to Our Governor-General of the 
Commonwealth of Australia the report of the results of the inquiries and such 
recommendations as you consider appropriate. 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
for the Prime Minister 
WITNESS the Honourable William George 
Hayden, Companion of the Order of 
Australia, Governor-General of the 
Commonwealth of Australia on 1 1'  � "ff-
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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRAUA 
ELIZABETH THE SECOND. by the Grace of God Queen of Australia and 
Her other Realms and Territories. Head of the Commonwealth: 
TO: 
MICHAEL H ENRY CODD AC 
GREETING: 
WHEREAS it is desired to have an inquiry into matters relating to the 
AustraJian Secret Intelligence Service: 
NOW THEREFORE We do by these Our Letters Patent issued in Our name 
by Our Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia on the advice of 
the Federal Executive Council and in pursuance of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Australia. the Royal Commissions Act 1902 and other 
enabling powers, appoint you to be a Commissioner to inquire into: 
(a) the effectiveness and suitability of existing arrangements for: 
(i) the control and accountability of the Service; 
(ii) the organisation and management of the Service; 
(iii) the protection of the Service's intell igence sources and methods; 
(iv) the resolution of grievances and complaints relating to the 
Service; and 
(b) whether any changes in existing arrangements are required or are 
desirable: 
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AND We direct you to produce with the Honourable Gordon Jacob Samuels 
AC OC a single report of the results of your inquiries and his inquiries under 
the relevant Commission: 
AND We further direct you to consult with the Honourable Gordon Jacob 
Samuels with regard to the methods and procedures to be followed in relation 
to his and your inquiries and concerning the content and preparation of that 
report: 
AND We further direct you, in conducting your inquiry and preparing the 
report, to take account of any views of the Honourable Gordon Jacob Samuels 
concerning how those inquiries are to be conducted and that report prepared: 
AND We authorise you in the conduct of your inquiry to have regard to any 
information, evidence, document or thing communicated or furnished to you by 
the Honourable Gordon Jacob Samuels under the relevant Commission: 
AND We declare that in these Our Letters Patent, the expression •relevant 
Commission.. means the Commission of inquiry issued this day by Our 
Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia by Letters Patent to the 
Honourable Gordon Jacob Samuels: 
AND We require you as expeditiously as practicable to make your inquiry and, 
not later than 31 December 1 994, to furnish to Our Governor-General of the 
Commonwealth of Australia the report of the results of the inquiries and such 
recommendations as you consider appropriate. 
Minister for Foreign Affairs 
for the Prime Minister 
WITNESS the Honourable William George 
Hayden, Companion of the Order of 
Australia, Governor-General of the 
Commonwealth of Australia on 1<- '$ ,....-� 
Governor--General 
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COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
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TO: 
THE HONOURABLE GORDON JACOB SAMUELS AC QC 
� GREETING: 
0 
WHEREAS by Letters Patent issued in Our name by Our Governor-General of th 
Commonwealth of Australia on 15 March 1994 We appointed you to be a Commissioner t 
inquire into and report upon the Australian Secret Intelligence Service: 
AND WHEREAS it is desirable that those Letters Patent be varied in certain respects: 
NOW THEREFORE We do, by these Our Letters Patent issued in Our name by Ou 
Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia on the advice of the Federal Executiv1 
Council and pursuant to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, the RoytJ 
Commissions Act 1902 and every other enabling power, declare that the Letters Patent issued 01 
15 March 1994 shall have effect on and from 20 December 1994 as if the words "not later than 3 
March 1995" were substituted for the words "not later than 31 December 1994". 
inister for Foreign Affairs 
for the Prime Minister 
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WITNESS the Honourable William George Haydell 
Companion of the Order of Australia 
Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australi< 
on 
Governor-General 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
ELIZABETH THE SECOND, by the Grace of God, Queen of Australia and Her other Realms 
and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth: 
TO: 
MR MICHAEL HENRY CODD AC 
GREETING: 
WHEREAS by Letters Patent issued in Our name by Our Governor-General of the 
Commonwealth of Australia on 15 March 1994 We appointed you to be a Commissioner to 
inquire into and report upon the Australian Secret Intelligence Service: 
AND WHEREAS it is desirable that those Letters Patent be varied in certain respects: 
NOW THEREFORE We do, by these Our Letters Patent issued in Our name by Our 
Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia on the advice of the Federal Executive 
Council and pursuant to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Royal 
Commissions Act 1902 and every other enabling power, declare that the Letters Patent issued on 
15 March 1994 shall have effect on and from 20 December 1994 as if the words "not later than 31 
March 1995" were substituted for the words "not later than 31 December 1994". 
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WITNESS the Honourable William George Hayden, 
Companion of the Order of Australia, 
Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia 
on 
Governor-General 
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